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PRE FACE 
The pr esent re searc h wa s inspir e d by a variety of 
sources. Many of cour se were of an academic nature. 
However, my personal fe e lings for Namibia an d Nam ibians 
proved an important factor in de s ign in g and sustaining 
this thesis. 
The time period I am dealing with presents its parti -
cular probl e ms to any researcher. Out st a nd ing among 
these was the gothic han dwr iti ng of German missionaries 
- a long for g otten script that I l e arnt to read and 
write in my first two years of schoo ling . Although 
my memor ies were fragm en t ed , the old t raining proved 
useful, and some corre spondence with my parents in 
this handwriting soon enabled me to decipher the records. 
In the body of the the s is, all quotes from German or 
Dutch records were trans lat ed i nto Eng li sl1 by the 
author. 
A note on my source ~aterials i s important here . 
As fa r as Namibia is concer n ed , the r e mi g h t be 
littl e in the way o f historiogra phy but there is a 
l a r ge coll e ction of source mat e ri a ls whos e value, 
for this the s is , vari e s ac cordi ng t o the pe riod in 
,• .· 
which they were writt e n. Apart from substantial 
literature of settler/soldier remini sce nces mainly 
print e d in the 11 Heimatka lender 11 over the last 60 years 
(whi ch is of greate r va lue for th e colonial period 
rather than pre-colonial time s ) there is a weal th 
of ethnological data collected in the post World 
War I period or later, often d ea ling with Nama and 
Herero. Works like Vedder's 11 Th e Nama" or 11 Die 
Bergd ama ", Lebze lter' s research of the early 1930s, 
Schapera, Hoernl€ and Schulze-Ewerth, a ll published 
in the 1930 s , are among tna more prominent in this 
respect. 
Due to their structur a l-functionalist approach, these 
works are not historical. Yet they cannot be easi ly 
discarded by the his torian be cause they contain a 
wealth of ethnological data; Thus, although some 
use has been made of them, I h ave made a conscious 
effort not to extrapolate the evidence in studies in 
my reconstruction of historical processes taking place 
a hundred years earli e r. My concentrat ion has been 
fully on those ethnolog ical data I could find in the 
early record s themselves . 
Th ere is a third set of dat a that also had to be 
di scarded, and that i s the accoun ts, art i c les and 
reports cont a ining d eta il s about customs and rel ationshi ps 
which they were writt en . Apart from substantial 
literature of settler/soldier reminiscences mainly 
print e d in th e 11 He imatkalend er 11 over the l ast 60 years 
(which is of greate r value for the co l onia l pe riod 
rather than pre-colonial time s ) there is a wealth 
of ethnological data collected in the post World 
War I period or later, often dealing with Nama and 
Herera. Works like Vedder' s "Th e Nam a 11 or "Die 
Bergdama'', Lebzelter's re search of the early 1930s , 
Schapera, Hoernl€ and Schulze -Ewerth, all publishe d 
in the 1930 s , are among the more promin e nt in thi s 
respect. 
Due to their structural-functionalist approach, these 
works are not historical. Yet they cannot be easi ly 
discarded by the historian be cause they contain a 
wealth of ethnological data. Thus, although some 
use has been made of them, I h a ve made a conscious 
,• 
, ...... effort not to extrapolate the evidence in studies in 
my reconstruction of historical processes taking place 
a hundred years earlier. My concentr aiion has been 
fully on those ethnological data I could find in the 
early record s themselves . 
There is a third set of data that also had to be 
di scarded , and that is the accounts, articles and 
reports containing d e tDils about cu stoms an d r e lationship s 
of the different tribes. Th e se were written in the 
German colonial period by members of the Schutztruppe, 
missionaries, and were compiled by the colonial 
adminis t ration. Here, whateve~ is said about customs, 
rituals of "the natives" and about the relationship 
between the different groups, c annot be taken as true 
for the period 50 years earlier. The political, 
social and economic transformations of the 19th 
century prior to colonial occupation were very deep 
and far-reaching as far as Namas, Orlams and Damaras 
were concerned and possibly for Herera-speakers as ~ell. 
This whole dimension of change, which is at the heart 
of this thesis, gets lost in the timeless narrative of 
most of this material. 
Data referring to the pre-colonial period is found 
mainly in the missionary ~ecords of the Rhenish 
Mission Society. This is of some significance .for 
research into pre-colonial Namibian history. Firstly, 
it sets certain limits to the kind of questions that 
may be answered. Secondly, to work almost exclusively 
ll"ieAn.S 4-kl.~ 
from missionary records,Aour view of the impcirtance 
of missionaries in these areas might be distorted. 
However, we must not forget that the missionary sources 
are not only a condition of research today, but are 
also indicative of the type of historical reality 
we have to deal with. To have only missionary records 
and none of politicians, merchants, .settlers, etc., 
pos s ibly mean s tha t miss ion a ri es were agents of social 
for ces which otherwise are expressed by 
politician s or settlers. This seems to be true in 
th e pr esent case; as I hop e to show, th e import ance 
given to missionaries i s not a distortion which 
slip ped i n due to one -sided records. These missionary 
r ecords are very extensive . Yet, the quality of this 
ma t e r ial is flawed because missionar i es often had no 
reliabl e sources of information for themselves and 
thu s reli ed on rumours. 
Sec ond ly , it is available in Sou th Af rica and Namibia 
in extracts only, microfilms bei ng large ly unava ilable. 
In addition to this, the manuscript e xt racts compiled 
by H. Vedde r and E. Me ier in 1928, comprising some 
40 volumes, cannot be treated as authentic primary 
material . Rather th e y appear to be notes and summari es 
of source materials which were u se d by Dr . Vedder for his 
histor y book . This becomes clear from comparisons of 
Ved d e r' s extracts with unabridged extracts published 
by Dr. E. Moritz in 1915 as well as parts of diaries 
reproduced 'in full' in the mission journal. This 
was, forinstance, ofte n the case with missionary 
Kleinschmidt's jou r nal . 
This rather depressing situat j_o n is wAl l-balance d , howe ver , 
by very exte nsive ext ract s d one in 1915 by E. Moritz 
as well as in the printed mission journal and the 
11 Jahres bericht" (Annual Report ) . Furth ermore , the 
Rhenish Mission Society Ar chives in Windhoek contain 
rich source mat e rials on the period even if these only 
concern the official side of missionary involvements 
like station reports and conference minutes. 
Good use could also be made of the microfilm collection of 
the London Missiona ry Society records in the Cape Archives, 
because both Brothers Albrecht and J. Schmelen were sent 
out by that society. The records are by no means complete. 
Many Schme len records were lost during the civil war situ-
ation which developed in the 1820s around Bethany, and the 
letters of the Brothers Albrecht are not always with the 
London Missionary Society material as many were also 
sent to their Rotterdam mission society. 
Two particularly important private collections were 
also consulted, th~ Carl Hugo Hahn Papers and the 
Andersson Papers. The Hahn collection contains his 
diaries until 1860, although accounts of his time in 
Windhoek with Jonker Afrikaner are missing. This is 
the only case where unabridged diaries were available 
to me. I was able to make good use of the records 
of this rather po litically-minded missionary. The 
Andersson Papers were among the most interesting and 
rewarding source materials I looked at. Charles John 
Andersson was involved in Nama- and Damaraland as an 
explorer, hun ter , trader a nd politician for almost 
20 year s. Th e coll ec tion contains diarie s , not es : 
lett ers a nd corr e sponde nc e , ethnological ob s ervations, 
spec ial accounts of certain events which he prepared 
to send away , and innum erable sketches. (These I 
could not u se be c a us e the y were microfilmed). J.A. 
Davi es of the Pretori a Archives compiled an excellent 
typ e script li s t of the Andersson Papers which provid e d 
an in va luabl e index to the full 5 microfilms. 
Indispe n s ible for any pre-colonia l hi story are the 
Wesl ey a n Mis s ionar y Society rec ords a s this s ocie t y 
was involved in Nama land until 1852 . Som e of thes e 
ar e availabl e in the Cory Library , Grahamstown, and 
were kind ly made availabl e to me by photocopying. 
In addition , the published wor ks of the Wesleyan 
mis sionari es proved extreme ly useful. 
I 
Fin a lly, men tion must be made of various scattered it e ms 
in th e Cap e Archives. Some o f these were very us e ful 
but t he ac tual involveme nt of the Cap e Government with 
th e terri to r ie s north o f the Orange Rive r only began 
in th e 1870 s with the visit of t h e Spe cial Commissioner 
Palgrave . Al though hig hly int e resting , these material s 
are r a ther pe ri pheral to thi s wo r k and ar e , therefore, 
us ed to support my c o nc luding r ema rks only. The 
li s ts o f th e Londo n Mis s ionary So c i e ty and We sleyan 
Missionary Society manuscripts and published materials 
pertaining to South Africa by Gower and Hinchliffe 
are an excellent help. Similarly, the bibliography 
by Strohmeyer and Moritz proved very useful as an 
overall research guide. 
GLOSSARY 
Cattle .Damaras Herer'o-speakers. The term 
fell into disuse from mid-
19th century onwards. 
Great Namaqualand Namaland. Originally used to 
· distinguish northern territories 
beyond the Orange River. 
Judge Council member in the kommando 
group. See also 'raadsman'. 
Commonly applied in the Germ~n 
sources. 
Kaptein Kommando leader 
Konferenz Annual meeting of all Rhenish 
missionaries working in Nama-
and Damaraland. 
Raad Council. Major governing 
body of the komrnando group. 
Raadsmen Counc:i.l members 
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THE DEVELOPMEN T OF A THEORETICAL 
AND EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
To begin with, I shall look more c l osely at previous studies 
of the pre-colonial period in Ot·der to clarify the context 
of my work. I shall al so present some of the major issues 
which ha v e informed my research and which I hope to 
elucidate in the follo wing chapters . 
1.1 CRI TIQUE OF HISTORIOGRAPHICAL WOR KS 
1.1.1 Rainer Claus 
Events and processes covering the period 1800 - 1870 in 
Namaland and Damaraland can be looked at from such 
.,~ 
diverse perspecti v es that sometimes ther e is littl e 
overlap in the emp irical data dealt with. R. Clau s , for 
example, in a recent study of Namibian p e ople~' r eact i ons 
to colonialism,- re lies on very rigid anthropolo g ical 
t f th I H . . b I 1 co ncep s o e e rero tr1 e . However, he finds that 
he cannot d e al wi th ' th e Nama ' in the s a me way bec a use they 
wer e very s cattere d . He goes on to say that attempts a t 
unity und ar Jonker, and later under Hendrik ·Witbooi , were 
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Concluding his discussion, he rema1"ks that "the rate of 
warlike a c ti vi ty amo ng the Nama wa s very high 11 • 2 Thi s 
misses th e importance of soc i al and econom i c factors as 
determinan ts of raiding and "warli ke activities". 
1.1.2 Heinrich Vedd e r 
In terms of empirical depth, and the range of data 
collected, H. Vedder's work is of a differ e nt order. His 
650-page history of th e pre-colonial period has remain ed 
the standard textbook and has not been surpassed as 
narrative history. 3 H. Vedder's work might have been a 
br eakthrough in the 1920s and 1930s but his perspect ive is 
now dated, mainly due to the concepts and attitudes 
governing it. His ethnographical and histori6al studies 
have centred on the role and r esponsibility of the white 
race as the carrier of Christian Wes tern civilisation, in 
which the German sett lers of Namibia had a specia l place. 
Central to his interpretation of the pre-colonial period 
are the manifold conflicts characteri s ing the history of 
19th century Namibia. As with many writers be for e 
4 and after him he regarded differences in 'race' or 
2 • j_ b j _ d • 1 2,0 I 21 • 
3. Heinr ich Vedde r: South West ~. frj_ ca in Ea 1:_~y Ti_'.ll e.s , London 
1938. 
4. Sec for examp l e , Ho b den i Ludwi g von : Gcschich t e der 
Rh e inisc hen i·'C..ss ior, s gcs e J i::jc ha.ft 1 Barrr:ei1 1068; a -
li st of su c:h works ~"i.s in Heinrich Loth : Die Chr :i. st li ch~ 
Mi SS ion in .S~idwes t-A fr j ka . Zr ur des trukt i v e r1-RoJ~-i-f..-de1~­
-H.he in fac:hen Miss ion beim Pro zess der Sta a L ;, bi ldur1g-·rn·-
s.R)--TiH1r2 --l _f1_2J.f .. lo, ftn . 9. ·· 
'culture' as the basi s of th ese conflicts. Thus, we 
have a historic periodisation of 'Namal a nd aga inst 
Hereroland' (1840s) and then 'He r e roland aga inst Na maland' 
(1860s). 'Th e He rera wa r of fre e dom' and 'the Or l a m war' 
were further subdivided. 5 This 'tribal' sub~division led 
to a view of history in which th e German colonial masters 
app e ar as last-minute saviours , the initiators of the 
colonial pax. 
Els e where I have argued in gr e ater detail the ext e nt to 
which his treatment ·or the pre- colonial p e riod support e d 
colonial settler myths , especially as far as the ' Berg dam a ra ·• 
were concerned. 6 Significantly, in his history h e wa s 
using the sa me combinati6n of strictly racist as s umptions 
and implicit g lorification of German colonialism7 that 
~ was prevalent in pre-World War 11 German colitics. 
L. Engel; · in a recent study, ha s provid e d the mo~t lucid 
conclu s ion s a bout the development of a military-nationalist 
feeling amon g the German s of the territory in the first 
half of the 20th century; stressing th e integ r a tive role 
8 of Vedder's work in these processes. This is the context 
5. H. Vedd e r: Early Time s , list of contents. 
6. Br igitte Lau: 'Thank God th e Ge rmans came': Ve dd e r ··an d 
Namibian Hi sto rio g r ap hy', Afr ica Se min a r: Collec t e d Pap e rs , 
vol. 2, 19 81 , Centre for Afr i can Stu d i es , Uni versity o f 
Cape Town . 
7. Ibid. 
8. Lo th a r Enge 1 : ..KQl_Q.r1 i Pd ismu 'i__u n d }Ja t j ona J i sm \J ,',L.ilrL.9_~1JJ.~ ctL~D-
pro t_s:s.!~~-n_t.i_~_gm;;;_}JJ ___ i c-1fflJ~.2 .i.~1_ . ._ J.9.Q..'l=.1..9.E..5-+ Fr an kf' u r t I Ma in 
19 7 6, 292- 311, 47 9 - 482 . 
in which Ve dd e r' s historica l work has to be considered. 
It can be easily establishe d that conflicts in the 
pre-c olonia l period did not_ happen along 'ethnic' or 
rcultur a l' lines but alwa ys cut across such differences. 
I will look mo re closely at these issues in chapter 9 and 
will me rely no t e her e that the ·original Narna gi"ouo under 
Willem Swartboo i allied itself with Kamaherero, a powerful 
Herero chief, in the conflicts of the 1860s. Also, in 
the 'Orlam war' th e Orl a m Kapteins and their followers 
foJght aga ins t an alliance of the Afrikaners, Oasib and 
his people, Na nib of the Veldskoendraers, people under 
Jan Booi a nd o t hers. Cl early, conflict has to be under-
stood in t e rms other than those of Dr. Vedder. 
1.1.3 Winifr e d Nacht we i 
A furth e r group . of writer s has attempted to interpret the 
pre-colonial period from a historical ma t -er:i_alist 
perspective but have at timB applied an overtly structuralist 
appro ad h a nd ha ve reduced the data ·· to ~ very schematic 
catego ri e s. Ap a rt f rom We rnet's re s earch essay on the 
Herera mode of pr oduction 9 only Heinrich Loth 10 has 
9. Wo l fga ng We r ne r: 'An ex plorator y inves t i gation into the 
mod e o f produ ction of the Here ra in p r e-colonial Na mibia 
t o c a 187 0 1 , B . .SOc .Sc . Honours th esis, University of 
Cap e Tow n , 1980. 
10. Mi .s::'-)Cm : 1 963 . 
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focuss ed on the pre-colonial period. Others have dealt 
with it briefly. Nachtwei, 11 for example, starts with 
the modes of production of the various pre-colonial 
'ttibal societies'. He indicates that the 'tribes' were in 
a state of transition from a primitive classl e ss society 
to the b eg innings of class society. 12 This highly formal 
and mechanistic conceptualisation does not make it pos s ibl e 
to offer any explanation for conflict, impoverishment and 
disintegration among the various groups .ID Namaland othe r 
that "scarcity of pastures and water places" due to 
"13 "European population pres.sure. However, since by the 
1860s there were less than 200 Europeans resident in those 
vast expanses, this is ·hardly credible. Therefore, his 
contention that colonial expansion started indirectly with 
the Orlam migrations and directly with penetration by 
hunters, traders and missionaries, remains unsubstantiated. 
Nachtw e i presents the missionaries as a major dynamic force. 
He maintains that although lacking any conception of 
general social and economic forces at work, the individual 
missionaries came to be the initiators of most of the 
economic and political action. Among other things, he 
blames them for weakening the political power of the 
'tribes' by dividing them, thus facilit~ti ~g colonial 
conquest. But how and why did so f ew isolat ed for ~ign 
11. Winifred Nachtwei: Namibia. Vo n der antikoloni a ] e n 
Pe :_<?.:1 t~_zu_m na tiona1E-J1 Be fi'-ej '-'.ngskampf . Mannh eim --197 6 . 
:r2. Ibid., 26 
13. Ibid. 
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individuals come to pl a y suc h vita l roles an d ocquire 
su c h a degr e e of political power? By pres e nting the 
missionaries in this light, he ob s cures the material 
foundations of historical processes. The complexity of 
the role and class position of mi s sionaries will be 
demonstr a ted in cha pter 6 
1.1.4 He inrich Lcith 
I 
Heinrich Lath's pioneering v6lurne on the role of the 
Rheinish Mission Society14 in many ways ::.ts s it'."l.i.l ar t o Nacht v1 e i ' s 
study but deserv e s special mention because of the e xce ll e nt 
empirical research that we nt into it and the wealth of 
material presented.; in many ways it se rv e d as a stepping . 
stone for this thesis. 
6 
Lath's most interest in g innovation is his assumption that no 
basic structural differenc es existed betwe e n Orlam , Na ma 
and Herera groups. Certainly as far as Na mas and Orl ams 
are concerned, there are no major empi~ical observa tions 
to be made from 1842 onwards whi ch wou1d suggest othe r" . .vise . 
He demonstrates tha t t he bas is of conflict a nd d est ru c tion 
in 19th c e ntury Namib;o. cannot be found in ' ethnic' let 
alone 'racial' differenc es . Furth e rmore Lath's approach 
introduces a certa i n dial ec tic into q0estions deal i ng 
14. H. Loth: Mi ssion. 
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with the pre-colonial period . This dialectic has been 
. 15 ma1nta±ned by other writers such as R. Moorsom and W. Wern er 
and is a l so a feature of this th es is, namel y a changing 
focus on r e l ationships wi th i n gro ups as well as between 
groups. Hi s consistent consi derat ion of broad processes of 
'~~ cial differentiation' among Orlarn, Nama and Herera-speaking 
groups is a ne w approach to Namibian historiograhpy which 
allow s for deeper insights than had been previously 
achiev e d. His content io n that Herero/Nama ~nd Orlam groups 
had reabhed a 'stage' of 'nomadic ear ly feudalism' in their 
developmeht by the 1840s , ie unconvincin g because of lack 
of evidence.
16 
Nevertheless, his constant awareness ·df 
processes of class for mat ion and class-based action among 
Kapteins and chi e fs is particularly useful for th e p e riod 
when German~ made the first 'protection treaties' wit h 
Kapteins. He shows convincingly how class structures were 
exploited by missionaries who intensifi e d the various 
, 
divisions within communibes such as among the Witboois and 
the people of Hoachanas. 17 
·------- -----------------
15. W. Werner: 'Investigation 1 ; Richard Mo orsom: 
'Colonisation and Proletarianisation : An Ex p loratory 
Investiga tion of the Fo r mation of th e Working Class 
in . Na mibi a .und er German and So uth African Rule to 
1945;, MA Sussex 1973. 
16. Brigitte Lau: ' A critique 6f the historical sources 
and historiograph y relat ing to th e ' Damaras ' in pre-
colonial Namibia ', BA Ho n ou rs thesi s, Universit y of 
Cape Town , 1979. 
17. H. Loth: Missi o n, 96-11 8 . 
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However, his interpretation has certain apparent weaknesses. 
Loth realises that it ems like guns , wagons and hors es 
played an inc reas ingl y important role in the pre-colonial 
history. He presents the missionaries as the principal 
age nts of this 'Europ ean influen c e ' (as h e calls it). 
He shows how th e missionat±es , by controlling access to 
trade routes and e ven trade items , acquired a r ema r kab le 
position of political power which in his opinion was no 
less than the "complete indirect domination of the tribe" 
(as in the cas e of Bethany, Berseba, Rehobothl 18 This he 
supports with a battery of empirical data. Yet not all 
Orlam and Her era groups had a missionary. If missionaries 
became so powerful, surely their absence must also be 
significant? This question wi ll be considered later . 
From this point in his arg ument, Loth allows the story 
to unfold: the missionaries, endowed with these powers, 
destroy~d attemps at centralisation and progress within -
the early feudal mode of production of the Hereros, Namas 
and Orl a ms, because they took sides against the Afrikaners 
under Jonker. In later years, after the Afrikaner power 
was broken, missionari es were still effectively involved in 
weakening the powers of resistance of the various groups 
to colonial conquest, and of th e n e w attempts at 
centralisation l ed by Hendrik Witbooi. Loth ther efore sees 
the missionaries not as b e arers of 'civilisation' but as 
d e stroyers of social /political progress for the sake of 
-----·--· 
18. Ibtd., r29 -31 
colonial domination . 
However, ther e are certain serious contradictions and gaps 
in this interpr eta tion. The high level of formal 
abstract ion running through his argument detracts ffom its 
validity. As with Na ch twei , there is no true expla.na ti on 
as to how isol a ted individuals should have acqu ired such 
power. Why did 'the European element' become so important? 
Who f i rst brou g ht it into the country? Not the missionaries 
but the Orlam groups . Thus, there is a crucial difference 
b etwee n Orlam and Nama groups in historical terms that 
both Loth and Nachtwei overlook. Orlam groups emerge d out 
of a different social, economic and political context. 
Loth confirms that these groups had already 'overcome' 
th e social stage of kin___ship orga nisation19 but does not see 
the special and ?ngoing dynamic behind this. And .of course 
if th ey had 'overcome ' this stage, what was the situation 
of the other Namas and Herera-speakers? Had they also 
'overcome ' it? · 
Th e ne g lect of these issues has certain consequences. For 
example toth does not account for the hegemony· of the 
Afrikaners under Jonker. Yet it was precisely this 
position of political domination by one group that the 
mi ss iona ries attempted to und ermine . What was at the 
base of this position of political domination, and how 
19 . Ibid. , 19 
9 
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wa s it reproduced? How could it be destroy e d? What 
was the Afrikaners' r e lations hip to the ' subject e d' 
He r e ra-sp eaker s? He r e we hav e an area of interaction and 
conflict, obviou s ly at the c e ntre of political and 
social-economic chang e, that wa s not produced by missionarie s 
but had a dynamic of its own. Why ·could other Orl am 
groups not use similar positions of dominance? Also, 
Jonker's allianc e with Her e ra-chiefs is inadequa tely 
20 explained a s "pure avarice" on their part. Furthermore, 
we must not r egard it as an allianc e of the Herero-Nama 
'peoples' but rather of the chiefs, at time possibly 
against the wish e s of their followers. 
The weakest point of Lath's interpretation becomes 
apparent only with the events af t er 1870. 21 In 1870 there 
wa s a 'p eace' conference which finally consolidated · the 
Afrikaners' loss of, and actual exclusion from, . a position 
of political power. Thus under leadership of Hugo Hahn 
who had tried to wo rk against the Afrikan e rs ever since 
1844, the missianar; es triumphed, and here Lath's 
interpretation is most applicable. 
For the following 30 y e ars, ho wever, the patt e rn of 
conflict characterising much of the 19th century continu e d 
without th e politica l involv e me nt of th e missiona ries . 
- ---- ------- --·----------·- ·- - -·- ----·--
2 0 . Ibid.; 44 / 45, ftn. 15. 
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Loth tried to argue around this by stating that until 
1883 .·.Nama /Or lam and Herero conflict had been s ustained by 
compe tition between the 'Briti sh element ' (traders and 
Cape colonial officials) on the Orlam/Nama side and the 
G . . . ' . th H . d 22 erman mission soc1ecy on - e erero s1 e . Such a 
dichotomy i~ not supported by the evidence . Thus, Andersson 
and Green who wereimoortant among B~itish traders in the 
area, were the main material supporters of Kamaherero and his 
group in the conflicts of the 1860s. Similarly, the Cape 
Government's Special Commissioner Palgrave worked closely 
together with Her erogroups 2nd not with Nama/Orlams. 
After th e 1870s , with the decline of missionary importance, 
the commercial and politic~l roles performed by missionari es 
were increasingly taken over by traders, Cape government 
agents and lat er, by German colonial administrators. Yet 
despite the changes in the composition of the European 
presence, the nature of existing conflicts between Na ma , 
Orlam and Herero remaivned unalter ed . 
The eradication of the differences betwee n Nama and Orlarn: 
are crucial issues for the historiogra phy of the first half 
of the 19th century. Awar e hess of the difference betwee n 
Namas and Orlams on the one hand ~nd Herera- s peakers on 
the other hand "is crucial for any understanding of the 
period leading into the 20th century. 
22. Ibid., 10 2 . 
Thus, among the unan3wered questions arising out of 
Lath's work are: the nature of Orlam groups; the overall 
di ffer....__;ences in social I politic.a 1 organisation that 
continued to persist among various groups and their 
ll.e_ 
relations with each other; andnnature and basis of the 
Afrikaner's hegemony and their relation to different 
groups of Herera-speakers. Considering these issues, we 
should be able to situate the role of the missionaries 
within the context of existing political and economic 
forces. This may lead towards a re-interpretation of 
the years after 1870. 
1.1.5 Richard Moorsom 
While Lath's sound and detailed ernpjrical work gave rise 
to specific questions with which to approach the source 
material, R. Moorsom's chapter on the pre-colonial period 
was stimulating on a conceptual level. Although I do not 
wish to underestimate the emp±tical value of his research 
it seems to me that in the first chapter of his study~ 3 
he was more concerned with hypotheses and a theoretical 
fr~mework that would not only help to understand the pre-
colonial period,but also be consistent with his actual 
topic;namely class formation processes until 1945. His 
hypotheses and arguments are very challenging because 
they are creative1 coherent, and supported by material 
evidence. 
--------- -·-.. ----·--- --------
23. R. Moorsom: 'Proletarianisation') chs. 1 and 2. 
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In this chapter Moorsom is operating with two basic concepts 
that are, i~ a way, mutually exlusive and contradictory. 
The one is 'social formation', the other 'und e rdevelopment'. 
Situated in between these two are the Orlam groups, no 
longer a 'social formation' of any kind, nor~nderdeveloped', 
yet, as Moorsom argues, they are the agents of underdevelop-
ment. His remarks about the Orlam groups present a 
pioneering breakthrough in their attempt to understand the 
pre-colonial period. He sees them as agents of mercantile 
capital, thus constituting the forefront of capitalist 
penetration of the country. His emphasis is on Orlam-
groups as victims of social distinte~gration through the 
expansion of the Dutch settlement at the Cape. He shows 
that they did not have the social relations to organise· a 
productive base that could sustain them from within. 
Their productive base was rather to be found outside 
of their own ranks, namely in the acquisition of cattle 
. 
belong;ng to others. This goes very far towards 
identifying a major element in the confJ.ict between Nama/ 
Orlam and Herera groups. However, he fails to integrate 
this understanding with his other findings. There is first 
of all the highly schematic and rigid concept of 'social 
formation' which, as I noted before, does not seem 
adequat e for a1,y of the pre-colonial data in these areas. 
Certainly the Orl a m groups themselv e s, crucial · as 
their migration obviously was, do not appear to be part 
of any of the 'social formations 1 which Moorsom analyses. 
While it is true that the postulation of one Namibi a n social 
formation in the 1840s or '50s does not seem possible, 
it is equally impossible to detect three of four different 
'social formations' for the same period. 
Apart from the inherent difficulties of the concept of 
'social formation 124 most of the 19th century material 
provides no evidence for detecting whole groups of people 
who were sufficiently di.stant from others in any sphere to 
constitute a distinct 'social formation'. A possible 
exception is the Ovambo-speakers whos e basic framework of 
social/economic interaction remained largely separate from 
the people further south for most of the pre-Colonial and 
even colonial period. No disting uishing feature of a 'Nama 
social formation' can be found. It was not lan g uage 
(shared by Or lams and Ha u-khoi) : not 'cul tu re' (shared by 
Hau-khoi and also Orlams) and least of all territory. 
Similarly, what Moorsom calls the 'Her era social formation' 
is equally difficult to establish. Although this thesis 
does not focus on Herera-speak e rs, their interaction with 
Orlam and Nama groups becomes of cruci a l importance from 
the time of the Orlam migration into, and invasion of, the 
Orange River at the beginning of the 19th century. 
----·----· 
24. For a di s cussion of the t e rm as u s ed by historians, 
see Mark s and Atmore ( e d s ): 'In trod uction 1 , Econ omy_ 
and_Society Jn Pre -.In clust r-i a l ~out l1 Africa, Londor:, 
1980, :)] , ftn. 9. 
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~orsom's us e of the term 'social formation' is too reminiscent 
of th e old 'tribe' to be useful: it is certainly too 
schema t ic and rigi d to account for the changes which took 
place. Thi s is borne out by his own treatment of these 
questions . Thus, the 'social formations' which he d~scribes 
(as if th ey we re somewhat outside of history) disappear 
from th e 1860s onwards. He noted that there was a 
11 subs t an t i al break-dow1;, of tribal relations in the Sou th 
in the 1860s and 1880s 11 • 25 However, we do not know what he 
me ans by rttr ibal relati.onsH. He then proceeds to use 
terms like "southern remnants" and "northern tribes" with-
out definJ.ng them. Nor do es he ex2lain the differentiation 
be twe en 'north' and 'south'. The static use of the concept 
of 'soci a l formation' as Moorsom employs ii here, thus 
does not appear to have any explanatory value. 
Moorsom's use of the notion of 'underdevelopment', on the 
other hand, is ve ry useful as it gives analytical depth to 
fiis account of the processes whereby Nama peoples living 
north of the Orange River were incorporated into the 
expanding world economy. The conditions of this incorpora-
tion, and the changes in politica l and social relations 
engendered by it, are the content of 'underdevelopment'. 
Moorsom aPgues that it was underdevelopment , introduced 
by th e Orlam groups, that eventually led to the "breakdown 
of tribal relations 1• and to the emergence of ''wa r-b ·ar.ds '', 
25 . R. Moo!~sorn: Proletarianisation' , 37. 
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with leaders establishing their autho r ity outside of 
'tribal structures 1 • He argues that in pre-colonial 
Namibia mercantilie interests emanating from the Cape 
intervened ' i~ · th~ processes of production so that 'tribal 
relations' and material self-sufficiency were undermined. 
Thus he sees the major cause of underdevelopment as 
unequal exchange. As far as 'the south' is concerned, I 
have not found any evidence to contradict these contentjons~ 
Nonetheless this conception i s not without serious 
difficulties, both on an empirical and on a theoretical 
level. 
A major flaw in his interpretation is that he does not 
consider why merchant capital and unequal exchange should 
not have effected 'the north' and 'the south' in the same 
way. Why did Herera groups not becor;ie 'underdeveloped'? 
Here the influence of colonial historiography is evident, 
as he tends to imply that the Herera were inherently able 
to cope better because their level of "necessary 
consumption" of trade items did not rise above the rate of 
reproduction of their cattle. (His assertion that the 
areas controlled by Herera-speakers -we re better suited to 
cattle-raising do es not really undo this impr es sion.) 
p\cu.-s:..'bl~ . 
Misuse of the term 'underdevelopment.' denies him ci i\ qxplanat1on 
why groups of Her e ra-speakers prospered through their 
contact with the Cap e nexu s . 
1.2 
Thus, in the 1870s and 1880s, wh en Nama/Orl am groups be -
d . . h d 
26 . IT came mor e an more impover1s e , variou s :erero chiefs 
and th ei r follow ers appear to have accumulated mor e ca t tle 
wealth than ever before. 27 Until the cru sh ing of the 
Herera by German colonialism it was a major complaint by 
settler farmers th a t the colonial economy d id not 'work' 
becaus e Herera monopolised the bes t pastures and controlled 
the market almost entirely. 28 
Certainly the s e ar e issues that demand thorough qualifica-
tion of Moorsom's conceptua l fra mewo rk. Ho0ever , th e r e are 
other difficulties. It seems that the not ion of under-
development · in this context shoul d be ex am ine d furth e r. 
THE RELATION BETWEEN MERCHANT CAPITAL AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
When merchant capital and underdev e lopment 
theorist s like I. Wallerstein, A.G. Frank and W. Rodney 
29 analysed theaccumulation of capital on a world scale, 
17 
26. It seems to me that this is what 'impoverishment' mea.ns; 
not a particularly low leve l of consu!iiption but being 
increasing l.y unabl e to pay fo r what yo u need. 
27. See bel ow , conclusion 
l 
28. See Carl Sc hlettwein: Der Fa r me r in De utsch-SUd westafr ika, 
Wisma r 1907, 39 - 41; also He l mu t Bley: - South We s t Afrj_cal!nder 
Germ_an Rul e , London 1971 ,124. 
29. I. Wall erstein : ~__MQ_Q._~rn_ Wo~~S¥-S..tem , New York 1 9 71~; 
A.G. Fran k : CaQitali s m and UJ.Lcj_2 rdev_e lo__.12_P}ent _ __i.0_ La tiE_ 
Arneric~, New York 19 69 ; S. Amin : _l:\c __ C.JJ_ITI_llJ_a t_;,i...o_n___ _Q_[La.. 
}'JorJ,_Q:_Sca l e_, 2 vol s ., New Yo ~~k 197 6 , VJ . Rodn e y : . D..?..~ 
] u r o_p_s_!:!,l},9_£n1.~-~~-~~-~ ~ ... _.!_ .. fr ~:._?_§'.:-2. Lon d on 197 2 i P : Ba r a n : 
Th e Politica l Econ omy of Gr owt h, Ne w Yo rk 19~1 . 
It-!rius t --be-·-·3:z;,:e s s ed here t.ha t th es e i ,1or ks i n d :L c a t e 
specific s t. a ge :::1 l.n a deba t e U1 a t vis i-1 t c1r1 fo 1~ al.wost. 
t we nty yea r s ; they a r s not r e presentat iv e of U i e debat e 
as a who l e . 
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their focus was on relations of exchange, and of under-
development throug h un eq ual exhangc. E. Laclau's work was 
an early reminder that the dete.rmining relations of any 
social formation were t~ose of production, and not exchange 30 . 
. 
This notion recei ved considerable clarification with Kay's 
analysis of the nature of merchant capita1 . 31 Both writers 
attempted to chang e the empha s is from how exchange with 
capitalist countri e s affected other countries to an 
analysis of the relations of production existing in a 
Third World Count~. This enabled an understanding of 
relations with capitalism to be centred ' firmly within 
the Third World formations. 
Br~nner added theoretical depth to these attempts by 
arguing that notions of development/underdevelopment must 
not only be applied to the context of relations of 
prod~ction but to the extraction of relative or absolute 
surplus value . Thus a strong case was put forward to c eh tre 
our analysis on the class struggles in the social formation 
corn~ned, even if exchange relations with capitalist 
countries remained an essential element . 32 
30. E . Laclau: 'Capitalism and Feudalism in Latin America', 
Ne~J=eft Reviei.:, 67, 1971. 
31 . G. Kay: Dev elopme nt and Underd e velopment, London, 1975, 
chapters -i:r-an-d 5. 
32. R. Brenner : 'The Origin s of Ca pitalist De velopm e nt: 





In this context a new body of work emerged with the 
conceptualisation of the ' articulation of modesfproduction ' 
which parallelled work being done by Fr e nch economic 
anthropologis~ 33 Here, even the terminology development/ 
underdevelopment was supplanted by terms focussing on 
relations of production and reproduction, class struggles 
and alliance~ and how these were 'articulated' at various 
levels at a point in · history with the capitalist mode,34 
19 
Al 1 these at tempts allow us to period is e merchant capital F~-t-\c/-roJ. 
and to conceptualise ' underdevelopment' or commoditisation 
processes in circumstances other than formal political 
domination. Let us consider Taylor 1 s summary of these 
questions. 35 
33. Claude Meillassoux : 1 "The economy" in agricultural self-
sustaining ~ocieJ,ies: A preliminary analysis'.) in: 
D. Seddon(ed): Relations of production. Marxist 
Approac hes to Economic Anthropology, London 1978; 
Meillassoux: 'From production to reproduction: A 
Marxist Approach to economic anthropology', Economy 
and Society, 1, , 1972; E. Terray: J::1arxism_§.nd ____ _ 
' Primitive' Soci e ties, New York 1972; P . P. Rey: 'The 
Lineage tvb de -~Production ' , Cri tiqus of Anthropolo g y , 3 
1 9 7 5 ; P . P . Rey : Co 1 on i a l i s rn e J _ _ri e o _- G o 1 o o i a 1 i.S.ro..e__p_t 
~osi tion au ~-~pi talism~, Paris 1971. 
34. J. Taylor: _f:r<~.m Moderoisa ti on _.l.Q _ _l'1_2Q_es of Production_, 
London, 1979, chs . 10 and 11. 
35. Ibid., 192-193 . 
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Firstly, there was capita list ~enetration of Third World formations 
under the dominance of m~rchant capital . before the Industrial 
Revolution. Here merchant capital operated independently 
of productive relations. Merchant capital per se did not 
control production and therefore remained dependent for its 
profits on those people who did. Thus, the conservative 
nature of ~erchant capital bec ame apparent; no matter 
what changes were called for, merchant capital in itself 
was not able to effect a full transition from one mode to 
the other. In the same vein, surplus labour time was drawn 
away from directly productive activities and became 
increasingly allocated to activities centred on the sphere 
of exchange, as in road~railway, and harbour building 
.. J.L\e, 
and~purchasing of wagons. Where merchant capital penetra ted 
with the support of political control by the nation-state, 
as with 16th and 17th century Dutch colonialism in the 
West Indies, it began to rule over production. However, 
this tended to intensify pre-existing, non-capitalist 
relatiomof surplus extraction, and thus obstructed 
processes of separation of direct producers from the mearls 
of production. 
Yet, when merchant capital began to be subsumed by indus-
trial capital, thus becoming an instance in the capitalist 
circuit, control was es tablish ed over the reproductive 
21 
processe s of social format-ions. The capitalist mode, 
according to Marx, has the tendency "to transform all 
possible production into commodity production; the main 
means by which it does this is precisely by drawing this 
production into its circulation proc e ss The j_nt e r-
actj_on of industrial capital everywhere promot es this 
transformation ... Whatever the origin of the co mmod ities 
that go into the circulation process of industrial capital 
... they confront industrial capital straight away in its 
form of commod ity capital, they themselves having the 
form of commodity-dealing or merchant's capital; and 
this by its ver y nature embraces commod ities from all 
modes of production. 11 36 
Thus, merchant capital began to subjugate production in 
non-capitalist formations to the needs of expanded 
reproduct i6n of the capitalist mode, even without direct 
colonial domination. As was indicated in th e preceding 
paragraphs, this was only possible in the age o f commodity 
exchange, i.e. when merchant capital had become an instant 
in the full -fledged capitalist circuit. 
It seems to me that these considerations are extremely 
useful in creat ing a new approach to the dynamic of 
'und erdcvelopment·1 of Orlam/Namas as Moorsom saw it. The 
36. Ka r l M~, r :x : I I, Penguin Books , 19 78 , 190. 
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expansion of merchant capital int o areas north of the 
Orange River in th e epoch of its subsumption under 
industrial capital, caused commoditisation to become 
'lo6ked' into the social repr6duction of Orlam groups. 
Thj_s ever increasing dependence upon the world ca pi talis t 
economy, in its local form as the Cape trading nexus, 
engendered the 'd eve lopmen t of unde rd e velopment' by dissolving 
and transforming previous s ocia l r e lations of production~ 
This conc._,etualisa ti on of underd e1.re lopment enables us . to 
determine how the Nama 'tribes' became underdevelop e d 
through a mixture of conqu es t and alliance with Orl am 
groups. This means that we must look as closely as 
possible at the changing social relations that structured 
the forms of production of Orlam groups. It also mea ns 
that we should begin to analyse the whole area of relations 
between the various groups; focus on their interaction 
as they became incorporated into the excha~ge nexus of 
the Cape; and abandon the analysis of cl ear ly defined and 
bounded units like 'tribe' and 1 socia l for ma tion'. Th e 
power base of the Afrikaners and how it was reoroduced 
and finally undermined emerges again~ as in the critique of 
Loth, as a - major i ss ue. Thi s approach will also enab l e 
us to look more closely at what i s mea nt by a ''breakdown of 
·tribal relations" , what h appened to th e c a ttle-br e eding 
skills of Narna-speaking pastorali sts , and the advantage of 
separating 'noPth ern tribes' and ' s outh ern r emn~nts' for 
the post-1870s. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE PEOPLE AND THEIR ENVIRON MENT 
2.1 DIFFICULTIES OF CLASSIFICATION 
An attempt to talk about the people of Namibia involves 
not only the presentation of actual data but far-reaching 
decisions about concepts, categories, and premises as 
analytical tools. Past historians have often not been 
aware of thi s (and nor have modern administrators) but 
have simp ly stated that they were dealing with different 
11 tribes" or "nations"~ In terms of the various groupings 
which emerged in Namaland in the 19th rentury, this is 
entirely inad e quate. 
My subject matter in this study of the transfor~ation of 
hoc.) 
society in Namaland is an attempt to show{\any clear-cut 
1' tribes1. geared towards the reproduction of kinship , , 
structures ceased to exist and were breaking up when 
Namaland was incorporated into the exchange nexus emanating 
from the Cape of Good Hope. However, people persisted in 
interacting in terms of various groups rather than 
indivi duals. Althou gh a larger fram e work of intera ction was 
creat ed , vi z. , Namaland, people continu e d to 'belong " to 
ind i vi dual I<a p t e i n s . The de pt h o f the s e q u es ti on , ( i . e . 
how a group i de ntity consciousn e ss j_s r e ached and maintain e d 
1. This exte nd s to the present day. Bachert in a r e c e nt 
s tudy a rr i v ~ s a t th ~ un dA 0standin g , in a rath sr 'bri e f 
a.ncl un eq u i v oca l wa y: that all evid e nce to th e contra ry 
notw i th s l:,a n d j_ng
1 
:' t he iHt lJ o ois can bes t be r eg::i. r de d as 
a trib e - th a t is an ind epe ndent un i t in te r a cting with 
23 
oth e r tr:Lo e~;n . C . oochert: 'Th e Wi tboois and the Ge r mans 
in SWA. A studv of their interaction between 1863 and 
1905 1 , M.A., D~r-ban, 1980. 
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by men and wome n) can not be plumb ed here. Yet I hope 
to make it quit e clear that the decision to speak and think 
about tribe s in Nama land, is based on myth and prejudice. 
By the time the colonial conquest b e gan the penetration of rnt~~a~ 
(l(pi~cd was fc~r advanced and had led to new social and political 
forms; 'traditional' ways of living had been transformed 
and the dynamics of the various groups living in Namaland 
were . being de t ermin ed by the production of commodities for 
r~·1'af .U..o.f' 
exchangeAfor consumption. Thus a process of transition to 
capita lism was well on its way. It seems necessary to 
elaborate on the t erminology that is required here, even 
though it ·~ight not be immediately obvious what is to be 
gained by sup plan ting 'tribe' with terms like 'groups' or 
·•communities' or 'Amraal 's people 1.. 
Recent year s have seen many attempts to come to grips with 
a heritage of anthropological classification and concepts 
informed by the colonial experience which no longer seem 
to be a de qua te . 
harshly impo s ed and 
Classifications appear to have been 
often do violence to the data. 2 
My material suggests that this is even more so for certain 
regions and times tha n had be e n previously recognised. 
2. See for example C. Schrire: 'The Ev o lutionary Implications 
qf Mod e rn Hunter-Gathere rs. With Special Reference to 
Three Cent uries of Bushm e n Farming'-> Rutgers University 
1978,. unp ubl. pa per presented at University of Cape 
Town Arch aeo log ic a l Conference, June 1979; R. Elphick: 
Kraal and Cas tl e, Yale, 1977; Ox ford History of South 
j\ fr ic·a-;---rvr:--w·i lson and L. Thompson ( e ds), Oxford 1969; 
S. Marks an d A. At more: 'In troducti on ', S. Marks and A. 
Atmore ( e ds ); Ec ono my and Socie ty in Pr e -Indust rial 
.2.9_12..t: h ... l}.Fr:isJ:L~ t 6!1-Zi() n:·-r~nro . 
In 19th century Nami bia , especially th e s outhern part, 
kins hi p ideo l ogie s wer e rapid ly l osing their pow e r a nd 
homesteads d i sintegra t ing . Und e r th e inf lux of the most 
di verse peopl e a nd pressures fr om the south a nd south - east 
of th e Or ange Ri ve r, gro up s formed an d re-formed~ The 
11 Gri quas n, o r th e 11 Koraq nas 11 arc cases in point. A recent 
study, whil e not r ea lly concerned wi th thes e qu es tions, 
·/·~ r' 
still sugges t s th a t the Koraunas . were 11 to some extent at 
l eas t, an amalgamat ion o f previo us ly diverse elements 113 
and M. Legass i ck ' s work on the emergenc e of the Griqua 
4 pe opl en shows ve ry succinctly that concepts of 11 tribe 11 
or "society 11 are qu it e inade quat e to deal with the formation 
and dissolution of these 11 poli t .ies 11 • 5 Studi e s analysing 
---------------- ----
3. T. Strauss : War Along the Orange , Cen t re f or African 
St ud i cs , Un i v er s i t y o f Ca p e · Town , 1 9 7 9 . 
4. See M: Lega s sick : ' The North e rn Frontier t o 1820: 
The emergence o f the Griqua peop le', R. Elphick and 
H. Giliomee (eds ): The Shap ing of Sbuth African Society , 
1.§_~2 - 1.~g_Q_, London 1979. 
5. As appears from work which has been don e r e cently i n 
this regard , t hese terms seem e nti~ely inadequat e e ven 
wh e r e mor e clear-cut soc i al units are c dn cerned ; see 
for example Maf'ej e , A,: 'Th e I deo logy of Tr ibali sm ', 
Journal of Modern Africa n Studi es, 92, 197J; M. 
Gode l :le-r: ' The concept of 'tribe' : a crisis involving 
me r e ly a conc e pt o Y th e tmpiricalfoundat i on s of 
anthropol ogy i tsel f ' ?, M. Godelier : Perspectives in 
Ai?thro_polo gy , Ca rnbr· :i.dge 1977. 
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the past of very numerous 'werfts' and collections of 
people termed 'Bushmen' by European contemporaries,ha ve 
yet to be att e mpt ed . 6 
All this is not to deny that at some stage in their history 
the people of Namaland lived in fairly well-defined groups 
each with a specific name, were organi se d in lineages and 
clans with certai n rights of seniority, and were involved 
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in pre-capitalist forms of production. As I will demonstrate, 
this way of life broke up during and after the Or lam 
migrations. Therefore we cannot deal with certain Nama 
'tribes ' j_n the 1800s and apply the same name to what is 
essentially a completely different type of community 60 
years later, This is even more true for the groups : df · 
people who migrated into the territory from the 1800s 
onwards. Although they did have a Nama 'tribal' name of 
their own the use of such a name in tracing the history 
of Namaland is qu es tionable. The one name not only 
conceals all changes but also suggests a continuity, 
stability and structural similarity with ~ other Southern 
African 'tribes ' or social formations (like Amaxhosa, 
6. Ap a rt from isolat ed pieces of work by John Wright and 
C. Schrire this is a whole field which so far has not 
been touched u pon to the best of my knowledge. See 
C. Schrire, op.cit., John Wright: 1 San History and 
Non-Sa n Historians', University of London, Institute of 
Commonwe alth Studies, Collected Seminar Papers No 22. 
Amazulu et~) that is essentially misleading. Some wr iters 
have aba ndoned the notion of 'tribe' an d merely replaced 
it with random categories which are equally inadequate. 7 
Nonetheless, people in Nama land did identify themselves 
as members of specif ic groups. This continued to be a 
feature of Namaland long after the 1870s; in fact, some 
of these early groups still exist today. Therefore, 
as designations and terms must be used, this means that a 
certain. arbitrariness must prevail. Hopefully my 
terminology will succeed in creating some new sensitivity 
toward s established and worn-out classifications without 
unduly confusing the i ssues . 
2.2 THE THREE MAJOR HISTORICAL AREAS 
Namibi a today consists of three major regions historically 
known as Great Namaqualand (Namaland), Damaraland and 
Ovambol and . On e might add sandy tracts of desert in the 
east and west and some areas separat ing Damaland from 




My notes on geography are mainly informe d by Wellington: 
South West Afri ca and Its Human Issues , Oxford 1967; 
F. Jaeger: Geographis che Landschaften Sildwes tafrikas, 
Windhoek 1 9o5 . See also map 1. · 
See for example Lynn Wadley who argued recently that 
'Bergdarna' groups were "hybri dised" and would do 
whatever suitedkhem best at va r ious times : grow 
toba cco, make pipes, herd other people ' s cattle, etc. 
L. W2dley: ' Big Elephant Shelter and j ts Role j_n the 
Ho lo cene Pre -hj_s tory o f Centr a l South Africa', C:i.inb;a-
b.asi<;_ 3 (1) 1979, 53.· 
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The colonial boundaries, established in 1884, created 
her e as elsewhere an artificial overall unity; yet by 
the time of their establishment, people of diverse 
origins and cultural backgrounds h ad begun to interact 
in a co ~mon social/political fram e of reference in the 
area comprising mode rn Namibia. Distinct pre-capitalist 
social formations had either ceas ed to exist altogether 
or h a d be en fun damenta lly transformed. 
2.2.l Namaland 
-
When the colonial frontier of the Cape was breached by 
trekbo ers in the 18th century, fugitive slaves and other 
emigrants from the Cape Colony settled ih · the ' area beyond 
the northern ' colonial bord er . This area came to be 
known as 'little Namaqualand'. By the time this term 
was established, al l the people dwelling in those parts 
had become part of a trad e nexus emanat ing from the 
Cape . Without goods obt a ined from the Cape , their very 
existence was threatened. 9 Throug h these exchange 
relation s hips, the 'dolonial frontier' was extended 
continually, no t only northwards, but also eastwards 
and north-eastwards. Th e change to British rule in 
the Cape as well as revolutionary change s in the British 
9. See Legassick' s treatme nt of this question in: 
!The Emergence ', Elph ic k a nd Giliomee (e ds.): 
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The Shaping , also J.S. Marais: The Cape Coloured People , 
Johar;;1e sb l1rg , 1973, Cha pters 1 a nd 2. 
economy itself sparked off new impulses and cr eated 
new pressures for a further ext ens ion of the nexus of 
10 social relationships based at the Cape. The action 
tak e n by a mere handful of pioneers no w came to be 
considered necessary by whole groups of people: namely, 
to cross the Orange River from the north of the Cape 
Colony and settle on the other side. 
It has not been possible for me to establish wh en the 
nam e Great Namaqualand came into use. Contacts across 
the Orange River seem to be much older than sugges ted 
by our earliest written records of Europeans living on 
that side. 11 The Brothers Albrecht, missionaries of 
the London Missionary Society spoke, as early as 1805, 
12 of the people residing on that side as 'Great Namaquas' - . 
By that time it was also known that north of the Great 
10. Anon.; 'Class Formation and Class Consciousness 
in Namibia: Some History of the Nama -People and th e 
Rehoboth Basters'~ Namso News, 3, 1 977; see also 
my theoretical considerations in Chapter 1. 
11. Thus, the head of the Gai-//khaun was fully aware 
of the power of the Cape Governor in 1820 already, 
see CALMS Journals, Kitchingman, 1820, 16. 
12. CALMS Journals, Albrechts, 30 Augu st 1905. 
Le Vaillant. spoke of the 'Great er Nimiquas' 
already in 1796 as quoted by K.H.F. Budack: 
'Die Traditi on e lle Politische Stru k tur Der 
Khoe-Khoen In S0dwestafrika', Ph.D., Universi ty 
of Pretoria, 1972, 22. 
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Namaquas lived the 'Tamaras' . 1 3 The migration of 
groups of people known as 'Orlam' f~om little Namaqualand 
and the Cape Colony into Namaland had two major effects. 
Firstly, with the establishment of Jonker Afrikaner in 
Windhoek, a rough borderline was drawn in the north 
along the Swakop River and 'Great Namaqualand' became 
a fairly well-defined territory, bounded by the Atlantic 
Ocean in the west and the Kalahari Desert in the east. 
Secondly, these Orlam groups 'colonised' the Nama 'tribes' 
living in this area, and soon they, too, became intimately 
lj.nked to the trade nexus with the Cape and were absorbed 
into the incipient imperialist system. · 
2.2.2 Damaraland 
Damaraland was also called Hereroland and roughly com-
. : • 
' 
prised the area north of Windhoek up to Otavi (around 
the 1870s it also included Windhoek). It .appears that 
from the mid-18th century onwards, this whole area 
was mainly populated by quite diverse and largely un~ 
connected groups of pastoral nomads speaking the Herero 
language. The processes by which Herera-speakers 
became incorporated into a larger system of economic 
13. CA LMS Journals Albrechts, March 1809 
gf ven). 
(no day 
and social relationships dominated by fuerchant capital 
will not be analysed here as it is not the focus of this 
work. Yet , it will be given att~ntion as this is pre-
cisely th e time when 'tribal' boundaries in Namaland 
were breaking down. 
2.2.3 Ovamboland 
Ovamboland in the far north will be quite outside the 
framework of this thesis, although, even here, a specific 
kind of involvement in the political situation further 
south led to changes that made them part of 'South West 
Africa' even before the formal colonial era.
14 
2. 2. 4 Geog.!::._~Ph __ ica l Di stinc tions, Past and Present 
Geographic a l distinctions be tween these three historical 
land scapes exist as well. However, it seems to me that 
modern clima tic and environmental conditions do not 
necess a r i ly corres pond to the situation existing 150 
years ago. Tod ay there are very large arid and semi-
arid stretche~ of country extending from Oranjemund right 
up to the Sk e le ton Coast and Kaokoveld; particularly in 
-----------·-·--------- --- --- ·---- --- -------·---· 
14. Se e , for instance 1 R . Moorsom and G. Clar e nce-Smith: 
1 Urid,=. rdeve l opm en t and Class For· mat ion in Ovam boJ.anJ :.J 
Palmer and Pa rsons (eds.): Th e Foots of Rural 
Pove rty, Lo ndon~ 1977; also ___ ffaHD"""'s- reports of hi.s 




the south these are sometimes more than 100 km wide. 
The country from the Or ange Riv e r up to Rehoboth is 
too dry for cattle ranching today and has become a major 
sheep farming area. Rainfall is very un satisfactory 
as periods of intense rains often alternate with ext ended 
drought s. 15 It has been estimated that due to the 
unrel iability·· of rainfall, farmers have to farm exten-
sively and consequently the aver age farm in this area 
is today from 10 000 - 20 000 ha in extent. 16 The 
quality of the pasture is suited mainly to small stock, 
the carrying capacity being 7 ha for small stock ·and 20 
ha per head of cattle. 17 
From Rehoboth to Otavi on e finds bushy savannah with 
good grasses and sufficient water (even if not surface 
water) to make cattle ranching possible, and compared 
to the south, the carrying capacity of pastures is 
substantially · higher . 
In Ovam boland and the adjacent Kaokoveld, cattle and 
karakul farmin g is conducted toge ther with a very 
limited agriculture along the Okavango River in the 
north-·west. 
15. See J.H. We lUngton: Iss_u es , 32-38. 
16. F. Jaeger : Ge ographi s che , 119. 
17. <J. We ll i.ng ton : Tc:: ~U 0 "" 5,-,(. _-'--_~- -~~ ' 
32 
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Taking a cursory glance at evidence from earlier sources, 
it appe a rs tha t the extreme south did not provid e suitable 
situations for agr icultur e , with th e exception of rather 
numerous tobacco gardens . Howe ver , the land supported 
large communitie s of nomadic pa s toralists who lived 
together with their very substantial he rds near Warmbad 
and all along th e Fi s h River. 18 Even Hoachanas in the 
185ilicould sustain 2 000 cattle for some months. 19 
Otjimbingwe produc e d hundr eds of bushe ls of wheat in the 
1860s20 while every mission station ha d its founta i n 
and there were many others beside s . Sometime s these ran 
freely a nd oozed awa y into th e sand, at other times, 
little pools we re formed c ar rying water all year through. 
Agriculture at Warmb~d wa s abandoned, not so much because 
of lack of rainfal l but becau s e of the salt content of 
t i. • 1 21 11e SOl • Droughts did occur even then but so did 
22 heavy rainfalls in the winter months of June/July. 
18. See, for j_n stance, Barn a bas Shaw: 'A short account of 
th e .Great Namaquas', WMN 3, 1 821, 119; also CA L MS ~ ·, 
Jou r nals,Albrec hts 4 Fe b. 1809; Quell e n 5 , 4Jun e 
1854. Vollmer report e d in 1 862 th a t-i ~ the Uppe r 
Fish River the r e existed "some big ponds full 
of fish which are navigable all year through", 
Qu e llen 5, 18 Jan. 1 862 . 
19. BRMG 1866, 59 . 
20. BR MG 1866, 38. 
21. CAL MS Letters ,Albrec hts . 8 Nov. 1807. 
22. In June I J uly of 1836, "fine rains n we re reported, 
s ee E . Co ok : The Modern Mi~si onary, Liverpool, 1849, 
50. In 1837 he-noted -thatra in s -had not fallen in 
J u ly " a~· usu a ln , Ibid ., 69. He also reporte d 11 h ea vy 
l .. ,.,i· ns 11 ;r ~ 1 · rr t' "",_ 1 ° ·38. Ibi' d onl C.l •. ~i.. 1 fl ...l.cJ A '-1 l ' j . L () , . • • ' e 
Ovarnbo land was described by Hahn a nd other travellers as 
a lusci ous tropical paradis e with permanent settlements 
and we ll-organ i sed agricultural prdduction. 23 The 
major sand dunes north of Walvis Bay (amongs t the highest 
in the world today) appa rently did not then exist. 
Instead the r e wa s savanna, bush and an abundance of game 
just inland from the immed iate coastline. 24 It is 
evident that it is only developmen~ of the past century 
that have tod ay rend ered this land productively unviable. 
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On the basi s of mid-19th century observations, it seems that 
th e marked difference in terms of soil aridity and suita-
bility for cattle farming observed today between Nama-
qu a land and Hereroland is not so much a natural 
condition ··as man-made and of much more recent origin 
than has thus far been accepted. Consequently, it is 
not po ss ibl e to use these conte mporary differences as 
ba ses for historical explanation which has been done in 
25 the past . 
23. See, for instance, the de sc ription in F. Galton: 
The Narrative o f an Explorer in Tropi ca l Africa. 
London, 1 853 , ch .7. 
24. Thus, Andersson reported one mile of sand de se rt 
inl and (from Walvi s Bay), WA AP 1, Au g . 1850. 
F. Galton mention e d sand dunes only south of Walvis 
Bay and called the area to the north-~l ain', 
F . Ga lton : Narrative, 29. Similarly, Captain 
Mor ell, some-20 years earli er , had not found sa nd 
dune s about the Kui seb River, let alone furth er 
north of it, see Morrel l' s Voyage to the Afri can 
Gu ano I ~lan ds . A Narrative of-a-Voy ag.e-r0t11e South 
\~-sf--c-oasT.oT-Tfr:Ccci;·--c0nct o-n,--Tif44. 
R. Moor so::1 : 'Pr o l e tar iani sa ti on' J c:hapter 3. 
As I will now attempt to show, it appears that unscru-
pulou s exploitation of the soil, the l argeTs cale 
decimation of game, and the more historically spe cific 
proce sses set in motion by the Orlam migration can be 
held partly responsible for s uch dessication. 26 
Colonial domination and nee-colonial exploitation have 
not reversed these processes, but, on the contr ary , 
have augme nted them. 
2.3 THE PEOPLE IN NAMA- AND DAMA RALAND 
2.3.1 Her e ra-Speakers 
In Damaraland there were groups of He re ra-speake rs 
clu s tered around chiefs, some cf them with great we~lth 
in cattle, many followers and considerable fame. 
'The Hereros 1 did not exist as a political entity. The 
major unifying factor of these pastoral nomad s was their 
lang uage. Herera is part of the ge9eral Bantu-language 
group. The first migration of Her e ra -speak e rs into 
South West Africa probably happened around the mid-16th 
ce n tury when the y migrated from the east to sett le in 
th e Kaoko ve ld. It seems that only in the second half 
of the 18th century did groups of them begin to push 
M-- ----·--· -----------
26. S. Nicholson: 'The Me thodology of Historica l Cli mate 
Reconstruction and its Application to Afr i ca', 
Jou~n a l of Af rican Hi story (20), 1979, 31 . 
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southwards, 27 a movement that was eventually checked 
by the Afrikaner Orlams under Jonker Afrikaner. They 
were skilled catt l e breeders. Some chiefs possessed such 
enormous herds as to arouse the great admiratian and envy 
of more than one European contemporary, especially in 
28 the latter part of the 19th century. Women 
collect ed veldkos, grew calabashes, and some men hunt e d . 
Their settlements seemed to have been of a semi-permanent 
nature as Herero women built mud huts. The most highly 
esteemed articles were iron beads and copper ornaments 
which were traded from neighbouring Ovambos. Pou_ tic ally, 
they were organised into disconnected lineages and clans, 
although the formation •of l arger chieftaincies can be 
traced in the 19th century. 29 
27. In the absence of any well-
established archaeological res earch in this field 
our evidence comes mostly from oral traditions 
collected by Vedder and available in Qu e llen 2, 
and T. Sundermeier: Die Mbanderu, St. Augustin 
1977, 11-17. 
28. For instance, missionary BUttner's ironical remarks 
do not quite conceal the envy and admiration behind 
them: "The Herero are a people which . . . do not 
seem to know anything higher than to h a ve as many 
cattle around them as possible. . .. As a real 
German is enthusiastic about his forest, so they 
are enthusiastic about their cattle, and for a 
prince in Hereroland there is no greater pleasure 
than observing how hi s cattl e are count e d. For a 
Herera party there is no topic more int e r e sting 
than to go through the experienc~ of th ~ ir oxe n and 
the ancestries of the ir cows aga in an d a g ain ... " 
G. Buttner: Da..s !Hnter land von Wal f }_s chba i und An gra 
Peq uena , He i delbe rg T884 , 2 28; --sce -als_o_ fa rm er----
·s c 111 "' t- ,__ • 1"" , n ' "' h ; O' h 1 ,,. ;::i p n r e c i· - '1- -: v "' ~ e rr ~ r I< "' _, b CJ 1 , t H "' , .. t·· r c ,. t:; ..., L,. i· - .l. .. - :. .. .- c-, ... j ....... t- - a .J _!_ './ _. ! L .:. C.!. . •..J C •• . •. -c-;-; " • ) 
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he rds and th e ir catt le breeding in De r Farmer in De u t sch-
Sud we '.3t-A f r i ka, Wisma r· 1907, 37. -
29. W. Werner: 'Investigation', 51-61. 
37 
My data up to the 1870s suggests that it is adequate 
to speak of 'Tj imuaha and his follow e rs' or 'the people 
arou nd Kahi tj e n e ' or 'Ma ha rero and his elders' etc., 
and not pos tul a t e 'tribes ' again. This ter min ology 
does not convey any insight into the changes experienced 
by vari ous people sharing Herera language and cultural 
practic e s, but this is not my focus here. On the other 
hand, it certainly prevent s us from applying rubber-
stamp cat egor ie s (which i mplies so much more prejudic e 
than we ar e willing to acknowledge 
most of the timaj1 like 'the Herera' or 'the Herera tribes'. 
Hopefully my us age does what is required at this stage: 
it beg s the qu est ion. 
2.3.2 The 'Da marasi 
The n ext difficulty is of a more grave nature, n a mely 
how to describe ahd name a still obscure cat egory of 
per sons wh o ar e known tod ay as Damaras, or Bergdamaras, 
or even 'Kli pkaffir s ', a ver y strong t e rm of derision 
which is s till in us e . 
~o 
Els ewhere J I have tried in 
d e tail to de a l wi th the class ification of th e se people; 
who th ey we r e , how they changed and wha t roles they 
pl ayed. Th e r esult was tentative a nd l eft many questions 
30. B. Lau : ' Critiqu e ' . 
unanswered. I concluded that people had existed who 
were part of the Na ma language /culture group but for 
unknown reasons had historically evolved certain dis-
tinct characteristics like stable settlements, massive 
hunting apparatuses and copper mining and working, but 
owned hardly any cattle. These were not shared by 
other Nama-speakers. They also had a separate identity 
and their own name. It is especially this latter fact 
which is undeniable and must convince us, contrary to 
other evidence, that people existed who were Namas but 
not of the original Nama 'tribes', nor were they Orlams. 
They could also not be classed among the entirely 
vague group of people termed 'Bushmen' .3 1 Jonker 
Afrikaner, a major political leader and pioneer, and 
al.so a historian, once told Galton and Andersson that 
those "Bergdamaras always existed in this country 11 • 
He explained that it was only in Damaraland that they 
lived in mountainous areas, having taken refuge the r e 
from encroaching Herera-speakers. By way of proving 
this point, he added: "About the Kuiseb and south of 
31. There is even a very early reference clearly 
indic a ting that Hau-khoj were part of the Nama 
l a nguage /culture group. Thus, when the 
Albrechts mentioned the 'fieldshoewearers', 
they added: "To the north -we st of them there 
ar e t wo other tribes belonging to the Namaquas. 
They are called the Kykoup (Gai-1/kh a un, ~ .LJ and 
the Ta.mma ras 11 • CA LMS <Journals, Al brechts 
March . 1809. 
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it, a gre a t numbe r of Bergdama ras are living. The 
Ovahereros have not been much in that direction. 
Be fore the arrival of the Dama r as 
/ 
the Namaquas J a:nd 
Bergdamara s are said to have lived together in the 
~2 plains and poss essed plenty of cattle."_,_ In the 
absence of a publishe d 19th century archaeology there 
is very little to qualify or add to this information. 
Althoug h in the pe riod under consideration we never 
me e t th em as political actors in their own right but 
mninly in relations of subjugation and exploitation to 
others, members of this group at times liv~d · in relati vely 
independ ent settlements and called themselves by their 
very own name: Hau-Khoi .. For the purposes of this 
discussion, there does not seem to be a better term. 
2.3.3 Other Nama Speakers 
The big body of Nama speakers, numbering betwee n 17 000 
and 33 ooo, 33 was historically separated into two major 
32. WA AP 2, 18 Aug . 1851. 
33. CA G, 50-3.77 , 11 Report of H.C. Palgrave, Esq., 
on his vi sit to Darnara land in 1876". He estimated 
33 000 Nama-speakers in the t err itory including 
' Bergdamaras '. T. Hahn's populati on fi gure was 
16 850, Ibid., 94. Other estimates wer e around 
25 00 0 inhabitants of Nama land, see CA HP 9, last 
page of diary 3, 1845 -1 853. 
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groups: the original 'Nam aquas' and so-call e d Orlams 
who migra ted into Namaland from ar e as furth e r south. 
They s e ttl e d th e re, associ a ting with one of the five 
most influe ntial leading 'Orlam' fa milies.3 4 
Without access to an acceptable body of archae ological 
data, the origin a nd time of migration of the origina l 
Na maquas must remain obscure. There are, of course, 
numerous theori e s. Among th e m, R. Elphick's theorie s 
appear to be the most recent ones. Elphick suggests 
that Khoi-Khoi t~ibes migrat e d to the middle r e aches 
of the Orange Riv e r from a certain 'nucleus ar e a' some-
where ne a r present-day Bot swana. There the y split, 
cne part moved north-west to the Atl a ntic Ocean and 
34. The origins of the term Orlam ar e not quite 
clear. Cand y Malher be has found the earlie s t 
references to 'Oor lams ' or 'Oorl amsche Hot t entot t en ' 
as coming f r o m the east (Be thelsdorp, Gr a aff-
Rein 2 t) rat her than the north, me anin~ 'civili s ed 
h eathen', or denoting 'Bushmen wh o had had 
some contac t with the colony, gene rally a s 
herdsme n for farmers', oral communicatio n 
with C. Malherbe. 'Oorlam' was also 
cl a ime d to be derived from th e Mala y word 
for whit e l am b or 'barre n ewe ', F. Galt on: 
Narr a tive , llO. 
Another e x planat ion suggest s th a t it is derive d 
f r om 'o ve rl a n d ' , s e e A. Ki enetz : 'The Ke y Rol e 
of t h e Orl am mi g ratj.c n s in the ear ly Europeani-
sation o f SHA ( Narn l bia) 1., In ternati o na l J our na l 





settled in present~day Namibia; the other moved 
south. 35 Hopefully future archaeological research 
will tell us more a bout the dates and scales of these 
migrations, and whether the country was unpopulated 
then or not. 
At the tur n of the 18th century, these Namaquas were 
separated into a number of different groups and sub-
groups. These seem to have been established by at 
lea s t the mid-18th century. 36 According to oral 
tr a ditions collected by Hoernle at the beginning of 
this century, these seven or eight groups were all 
de s cendants of one line of ancestors. She recalls 
a myth of origin related to her by a headman of the 
most southe rly group, the Bondelswarts. This myth 
states that there were once five brothers, each of 
whom became the founder of a Nama 'tribe'. The eldest 
was the ancestor of the Gai-//khaun or 'Red Nation'; 
the other brothers founded the !Gami-ttiJn or Bondelswart~the 
//Hamben or Ve ldsko'2nd r aers, . the ! Khara-khoen or Frans-
mann Hottentots br Simon Kopper Hottentots), and the 
//Khau-/g6a n or Swartboois, who are said to have 
descended from the youngest brother. The tAonin or 
Topnaars a nd the !Gomen or Groot Doode are not part of 
35. R. Elphick: Kraal and Ca s tle, 18-22. 
36. W. Hoe rnle: 'The Socia l Org an:Lsati.on of the 
Nama Hottentots of Souti1We st Africa', Am. An_!::_hroe_. 
1925, 6. 
this legen d but th emselves claimed t o be offs hoots of 
the Gai-//khaun . In the 1850s a new Nama group, also 
related to lin eages of the Gai-//khaun established 
themse lves at Keetmanshoop and became known as Karo- !oan 
or Tseibschen Hottentots. 
Interestingly, many of the Du tch names -appear to have 
been literal tran s lations of the Nama name: thus the 
!Gomen were the Grea t Dead , or Groot Doode ; the 
!Gami-inJn were the people of the black bundle or 
Swart Bonde1. 37 The / /Haboben were called after a 
kind of sandal worn by th e people which means veldschoen 
in Dutch and Habeb or Howeb in Nama . The iAonin were 
the people of the point (the sea coast being the extreme 
point of Nama occupation).38 Their Dutch name Topnaar 
37 . Hoernle related that "their own legend concerning 
their name is that they once formed one group with 
the Rooi - Natie; that on the death of an old chief 
his sons qu a rreled among themselves, the older 
going off with his supporters, while the younger 
brother stayed behind with his little group huddled 
together so that th ey looked like a little black 
bundle", Ibid., 5. This, howe ve r, was denied by 
Budack who offered th e translation ' Bondelsitter' 
as a corr e ct equivalent of the Nama name , K. Budack: 
'Die traditi one lle politische Struktur der Khoe -
Kho en in S0dwestafrika ' , Ph.D., University of 
Pretoria, 197 2 . In this conte xt A. Albrecht ' s 
notes are very int erestj_ng : 11 The whol e nation 
is divided into differen t tribes, each of them 
di s tingui shed by a particul ar name and governed 
by a Chief ... Tha t divi sion or tribe of th e Great 
Namaqua nation in which we have begun our missionary 
work is call ed Kaminuqua (Kaminocqu e ) ... Our inter-
prete r tr ansla t ed it into th e Dutch name of Bondel-
zwart but. I c a n no t t el l what this means 11 • He 
42 
men tion e d the fol r,\skoen ~rae rs but d i d not know the latter's 
Nawn n ame . CA U -t;S Le tt. e r..!', I\. t1lbre cht , 1 0bservatior1s ' 
n.d. ; ca 1809 . -
38. W. Hoe rnl § : Op.cit. , 5-16 . 
also refers tci one of their staple foods, namely the 
!Nara plant. Names like "V.eldskoendraers" and "Bondelswart 's" 
were known from ve ry early times. Thus the Albrechts 
had already mentioned them in the first years of the 
century. 39 
It is necessary to establish whether any of these names 
ar e of help in understanding the pre-colonial history 
of Namaland. This question arises because we must 
bear in mind that in contrast to more modern ideologies 
about the different 'tribes' in the area, the Nama-
speakers around the turn of the last century shared 
structures of political/social and economic organisation, 
language, myths and rites. They also had a conscious-
ness of being related to one another which was ex-
40 pressed in genealogical terms. They did not occupy 
their own territory. Hoernl§'s claim that they all 
had fountains and places seems true enough, but these 
waterhol~s were not limited to a specific territory. 
41 Rather, they were widely dispersed. 
The Gai-/ /khaun, Bondelswarts, Veldsl<oendrae:i::-s and I /Khau-:-g6an 
populated the terri t ory from north of the Orange River 
------------~--·--···-·- --. ·------.... ·-----------
39 . CALMS Letters> A. Albrecht, 
1
0bservations1, ca 1809. 
40. With regard to expressions of fictional or real 
gen ealogical rel a tions among the various groups, 
se e a l s o W. Ho e rnl~: 'Organisation', Am . Anthrop. 
1925. 
L1.1. See map 2. 
43 
44 
up along the Fish River at least as far as the Hutup 
and had no apparent boundaries between them. (The 
story of the 'Red Nat ion' with their 'tribal headquarters' 
at Hoachanas is one of the more blatantly mythical 
foundations of Namibian history.) The early pattern 
of settlement and how this changed will be looked at in 
detail in Chapter 5 . 
42 
Yet, the different names and identities undeniably 
existed even in the very early period. Later, as will 
be shown, they were furth e r entrenched by merchant 
capital penetration. Patterns of alliances and con-
flicts evolved which were precisely defined in terms 
of these groupings. Also, territories and boundaries 
became more sharply defined. It appears that even 
if we do not know exactly to what extent a ·group 
was simply a family with leadership rights claiming 
that they represented "the Veldsko e ndaers11 or :1 the 
Bondelswarts'', the re is some historical reality expressed 
by these names and, therefore, we cannot abandon them 
entirely. 
However, there is a second observation ~f importance 
42. The only group which appea red to have occupied 
a relatively we ll-def i n ed area - namely the mouth of 
the Kuiseb R:Lver - from the beg:Lnning of the 19th 
centu ry ornvards were the /:Aon i n or Topnaars , 
cf'. J. Alexand e r: Ex~dj ~ion~ Di_sc~ver~- i~~o 
the I n terior of Africa, London , 1830, II, 99-102. 
· " 
to be made here which clearly shows that these are not 
semantic games but that the terms and names do repre-
sent real processes past and present and must be taken 
seriously. 
It is noticeable that among the original Nama groups 
and the Europeans with whom they interacted, the practice 
of calling a group by the name of their leaders became 
more and more prevalent. 43 For instance, 
the !Khara-khoen at some stage were called the Frans-
44 manschen Hottentots. This name fell into total 
disuse (except on maps) and the people were later called 
'the Sjmon Kopper people' or 'Piet Kopper's people' 
or 'the Kopperschen'. In the same way the //Khau-goan 
(or children of the Gai-//khaun) came to be called 'the 
Swartboois' after the Dutch name of Chief !Huisib, 
William Swartbooi. Sometimes they were also called 
'the Rehobothers' after their headquarters. The Namas 
who settled around Keetmanshoop in the 1850s had no 
Nama appellation, but instead came to be called the 
T . b I h H tt t t ft th . h. f T . b 45 se1 sc en o en o s a er e1r c. ie sei . 
43. There is, of course, one major difficulty here which 
can only be solved by oral research among old people 
in Namibia. This is that our written documents 
were produc ed by Europeans and we actual ly cannot 
be certain about the names and term s that were used 
in the va rious time period s by Kapteins and other 
Nama- speakers themselves. We can only assume that 
here (as in other ca se s) the European missionaries 
did not use their personal nom e ncl ature but that 
their use of names by and l arge r ef lect ed the u sage 
of the people they lived with. However, it does 




With the Bondelswarts a similar proc ess occurr ed even 
if it was 'the other way round· - t,he Nama name of the 
l 
Chi ef was replaced by th~ surname 'Band e l' or 1 Bondel-
swart' . 46 This practice became completely entrenched 
with the beginning of the German administration. The t erm 
Veldskoendra e rs also fell into disuse. Instead, 
frequent mention was made of '1 Nanib11 or "Hendrj_k Nanib 
and his people". 
(Footnote 43 continued): 
not even matter significantly whether it was Nama-
speakers themselves or Europeans responding to 
some changes who used these new names. What we 
are interested in is only the reality of change. 
44. The origin and meaning of this n am e is rather 
obscu re . Vedder claimed that the Nama name 
meant 'the quite tall pe ople' but this has no 
apparent connection to the term 'Fron ~ m~n­
Hottentots'. Budack, in a rec ent study, also 
came to the conclusion that from an etymolog ical 
point of view the name could not be clarified. 
K. Budack: 1Struktur •: , ru, 
45. CA G. 50 . -1877, Report, 91~. 
46. For example, CA C 0 43q1i R. Ridgill to Civil 
Commissioner, 24 Sept., 1855. 
46 
I think the changes in usage are significant and must 
be accounted for by changes in political/social 
st ruc tur e which I shall analyse in greater detail in 
Chap te r 5. What bec a me defunct, as I shall demonstrate, 
was not just the old 'tribal' name but also the pre-
capitalist structure of social and political organisation. 
Political l eadership, patterns of settlement and general 
processes of community formation among Namas took on 
forms similar to thos e in Orlam groups, as did practices 
of calling a whole group by their leader's surname or 
th e name of th e ir 'headquarters'. It is only by paying 
attention to names and designations that such fundamental 
changes can be fully comprehended. 
Our usage of terms must be adapted to indicate that 
these transformat ions were taking place. Therefore, 
I will continue using Dutch coll e ctive nam e s, esp e cially 
A "'i 
•]; ' 
for the early period, like 'Veldskoendraers' and 'Bonde lsw~rts' 
but will attempt to make adjustmen~ for lat e r periods, 
for example, 'Nani b and his followers' or ! Abraham 
Bandel and his people'. 
Special me ntion has to be mad e of the so-called 'Red 
Nat ion' or 'Rooi Nasie'. This term is altogether 
unac c eptabl e . First of all, it is a collective term 
tha t wa s appli e d to a J.l Nama speakers (exc ep t to Hau-Khoin) 
ll 7 
~nd not on ly to the Gai-//khaun. Secondly, it is 
t f d 
. . 48 a erm o erision. Therefore, I propose to use 
the term Gai-//kh a unfor the earlier pe riod and possibly 
'oasib and his follower~ for a lat er time. 
2.4 THE ORL AM MIGR ATIONS 
As me ntioned earlier, in the beginning of the 19th 
century the so-called Orlams were migrating into area s 
north of the Oran ge River. 
The social and political relationships which were 
established betw e en the incoming Orlams and the resid e nt 
Narna groups, the nature of the alliances that were 
struck and rel ated questions will only be considered 
later. 
Such kommando groups moved northwards and crossed the 
Orange River. After a tumultous period of violent 
conflict with the original Nama-speakers, they began 
to settle. 
47. It appears to be a t e rm commonly applied to th e Khoi--
kh oi by Bantu-speakers . Other people also used 
th e express ion 'Red Pe ople' to mean Nama in general . 
Thus , Jonker once explained t o Anders s on and Galt o n 
tha t whe n He r e ros had migr a t ed southwards, ma ny of 
'the r ed people ' or the 'Namaquas ' were kil l ed, 
w~ AP 2 , 18 Aug . 1851. 
48. See Qu ell e n 5 , 26 Oct. ~852. Vollmer not ed tha t 
' R r~ d ··--pc op 1 c ' w a s a t e r· ti! o f r :i. d i cul e . 
48 
Thi s area of South African history has been sorely 
negl ected . Apart from Marais' history of the Cape 
Coloured People, a research essay by Theresa Strauss 
on the Koranna wars and Heese's important work on 
education in Namaqualand, 49 we can only point to work 
49 
that deals with the dissolution of Khoi society at the time 
in a more indirect way, such a s that of Candy Malherbe 
and Susan Newton-King. 50 None of these works focus 
on the processes that led to the Orlam migration, namely 
the gradual northward expansion of trade in guns , 
ammunition, horses, wagons, European clothing and other 
goods, and the social relationships accompanying it. 
Processes of expanding merchant capital at the Cape , 
on the one hand, and social disintegrat ion of Khoi 
communities, dispossessioni labour coercion and violence 
on th e other led to the emergence of a new 'frontier' 
institution in the western and north-western Cape. 
This was the kommando. Legassick's desctiption of the 
49. J.S. Marais: The Cape Colour ed People, 1652-1947, 
Johann esburg, 1937; There sa Straus s : War Along 
the Orange , Centre for African Studies, Cape Town , 
1979; J. A. Heese. 'Onderwys in die Geskiedenis 
van Nam akwa land', Ph.D., Univers ity of Stellenbosch, 
1946. 
50. Susan Newton·-Kh1g: 'Th e l a bour market of the 
Cape Colony, 1807-28, Marks and Atmore (eds.): 
Economy and Soci e ty in ]='.re-Industrial Sout h Africa, 
·c3·n ct o ri -, 1 9 8 o . - ---- ·-------
first stages of formation of such a ko mmand o i s very 
i]uminating in this context . As colonial citi zens 
ttmoved out to tap new trad e rout es or n ew hunting 
grounds , the y would have found Khoi Khoi eager to accept 
arm s and powder in return for serving as gui d e s . . . 
By the end of the 1 8th c en tury, this class of Kho i Khoi 
de pendants, some of them having r egained auton omy , had 
be come sufficien tly numerous to become kn o wn as 
Oorl ams , that is, Hot tentots who . r . are born an d bred 
with the farmers, most of whom und erstand and speak the 
low Dutch language 11 • 51 
As this description indicates, t hose Orlams who often 
formed an autonomous komma ndo group and trie d to maintai n 
it, were people who were resourceful enough to r e ject 
roles of subordinati on that became available as the 
settlement a t the Ca pe expanded . Chara cteristical l y, 
50 
the men vest ed with l eadership positi on s in such a kommand o 
owned some property , we re of 'mixed' descent and were 
ba ptised. They had clearly broken away from the soci a l 
r el a tionships which charac terised Khoi g roups. The 
' pe ople they collected around themselves had d ive rse 
origi ns : th e y were runaway s l a ves, disposse s s e d Khoi 
51. M. Legassick : ' Emergence ' , 255. .Se e also J. du 
Bruyn : ' The Oorlam Afrikane rs : f ro m dep ende nce 
to dom i na nce , c . 1760- 1823', u npubl . pap e r , UNI SA, 
1981; Edna Bradlow: ' Th e s i g ni f i ca nce of arms an d 
~mmunitio n on the Cap e ' s north e r n fro~tier a t th e 
turr1 of the 18th century ', Hi. s t _~n-· ~a , 26(2_), 19 8J . 
. , 
retainers and the like . 52 Most importantly, 11 the 
emergenc e of the commando-like band, which was the 
vehicle for the hunting, trading and raiding of the 
fronti e r zone, depe nded on access to firearms, horse s , 
and gunpowder 11 • 53 
The emerge nce of the kommando was thus typified by a 
circuit of raiding and trading which is precisely cap-
tured in a contemporary's remark. Thompson noted that 
the Orlam <Jonker Afrikaner 11 coliected a band of people 
of his own race, runaway slaves and other de speradoes , 
and having by some means procured fire-arms, commenced 
a regular system of depredation upon the defenceless 
Namaquas and Korann a s, plund er ing them of great numbers 
of their cattle which he exchanged again with some unprin-
cipled colonists for further supplie s of arms and 
ammunition.n 54 
No 'tribal' names were attached to thes e groups, and 
even if Nama names were given to them, most of them fell 
~------------
52. M. Legassick: 'Emergence ', 255. 
53. W.M. Fr e und: 'The Ca pe und er the tran s itional 
gov~rnme nts, 1795-1814', in: Elphick and 
Giliomee ( eds ): The Shap ing of South Afri can 
Society, Lon do n, I979·:-------
George Thornp ~:o n : 
Sou th e rn Afrj.ca , 
Tr ave ls and Ad ventur es in --·-,--o-------·----·- ---Lo n a on , 1 027 . p.291. 
51 
into disuse quite soon. 55 Orlam groups came to be 
called either ·by an individual family name or by the 
name of their major place of settlement. Thus, all 
tho se associating with the family which held central 
le ade rship rights came to be called by the name of that 
family. This was the case with the 'Afrikaners', first 
under Jager, then under Jonker and lastly under his son 
Jan; and also with the people around the Witbooi 
family. 56 
The other Orlam groups came ~o be known as the people 
of Bethany57 under David Christian and his father 
Jacobus Booi; the people of Berseba under the Goliath 
and Isaac famili es , and the Gobabis people under Amraal and 
later his son Andries Lambert. This last group is the 
only one which was called by a Nama name, even under the 
58 Germans, nam e ly the "Khauas Hottentots". 
55. This does not only refer to the names given by 
European contemporaries. Elsewhere I have stressed 
an 'invisible 1 source of historical information, 
namely the g uides, servants and wagon drivers who 
would invariably accompany Europeans on their trips, 
B . Lau : ' Cr it j_ q u e ' , 3 3 . 
56 . Although the Witboois had a Nama name, Kobesin, this 
apparently was a great ly disl iked nickname meaning 
'lazy', W. Hoernl e : 'Organisat ion', 4. 
57. Accordj_ng to Vedder, they also had a Nama nam e , ! Amas, 
'those who wear tanned leather trousers', Vedder: 
Ear 1 y Times , 1 7 0 . 
58. This becomes obvious in colonial hh1tor• iography, 
see for exa:npl e , H. Bley: Sou th West Africa under 
German Rul e , London, 1971. 
52 
Numbers varied widely and it is impossible to achieve 
any accurate as sessments of population figures for the 
group or changes in its size for any length of time. 
It seems reasonable to suggest that population figures 
vacillated roughly between 300 and 3 000, or even more . 59 
2.4.1 The Afrikaners 
The first group to have crossed the Orange River were 
the Afrikaner family and their associates, under Klaas, 
Jager or Adam Afrikaner. As early as the mid-1]10s 
Klaas had been commissioned by the farmer Pienaar to run 
a farm on one of the islands in the Orange River, from 
60 where he launched raiding expeditions into Namaland. 
Thus beginning to build up their own support base and 
supply routes, the Afrikaners soon felt themselves to be 
in a position to shed their servile roles. In a quarrel 
with Pienaar, the farmer was killed, his farm raided 
and the Afrikaners, with their women and children, came 
to settle at Jerusalem and Blydevewacht to the north of 
------·--··-----
59. Hahn estimated that the Afrikaners, 'Bushmen and 
Bergdamar a ' include d, numbe r e d 5 200 pe ople, CA 
HP 9, last page of diary 3, 1845-1853, n.d., 
n.p. 
60 . See · M. Lecy.i .s.sj_ck: 'Emerge nce', 261, al s o J. du Bruyn: 
'The Oorl a m Afrika ne r s : fr om depend e nce to 
dom:i.nane e , c. 1760-1 '823' ~ u npubl. p2 pc: r, UNIS!l , 
198J.. 
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~ h 0 g R. 61 ~ e ran e iver . __ J age r had be e n baptised and seemed 
to ha ve made do without large - sca le raids, but not 
witho0t material s upport from the mi ss i onaries, fo r a 
62 num ber of years. He died in J.823. 
As a very persistent l ege nd ha s it, on e of his you nge r 
sons, Jonker, who was not pre pared to c ede th e kapt~inship 
to hi s older bro t her, took the first chance to l eave h im 
with some pe opl e when he was called up t o th e Fish River 
by th e Kaptein of the Ga. i-//khaun t o help them against the 
encroaching Hereros. He 11 defeated the Damaras j_n three 
bloody fights in 1835, took their cattl e from them , 
conciliated the Hill Damaras and became the g r ea t ch i ef 
of this part of the country". 63 
This is evid en tly Jonker 's per sona l ver si on of his tory , 
related by him to Capt. Ale xande r. Another vers ion, 
more credibl~ partly (but only partlyJbecause it is 
supported by more people than one, put s it this way : 
61. E. Bradlow: 'Pet r us Pienaar : ruffian or courageous 
pioneer ', Quarterly Bulletin of the South Af ri can 
Libr a r y , 3lf-----C-TI-,-f9BO.-- See also Du Br uyn : ' The 
Oor lam Afrikane r s ', 19 81. 
62. J. Ebner : Reise nach SQd ~frika und Dars t e llung 
meiner wahrend a-Z~Fit-.Tabren als Mi ss ionar unt er 
den Hot teri.toTte·n gemacht e_n Erfah;:::_ungen . Be rlTn, 
"'"?l":"-r,--T,.---l O..:. ::;i j L9o . 
63. J. Al exander: Discovery , II, 151. The dc.te mu st be 
1825 because Schn:elen alr eady visited Jon ker al Tse -
bris near Windho ~k in 1825 , see J BRMG 3 , 1 832 , 69 . 
54 
...... 
"After Christian Afrikaner's death the Chieftainship 
fell on his son Jonker, under whose leade rship the raids 
on neighbouring tribes were started anew (wiederaufgenommen 
wurd en ) . Fights took place, won by the Afrikaners who 
took many cattle, except for once when they were defeated 
by the Bondelswarts under Jan Ortmann. After this 
event Jonker Afrikaner preferred not to stay near the 
victors and led the people far away, north-eastwards 
64 near to the country of the Damaras". At any rate, 
Jonker and his 'band' were firmly establi shed in the border 
area between Namaland and Damaraland by the mid-1820 s . 
Their settling was not support ed by, but nor was it 
against, the will of the head of the Gai-//khaun. 65 
2.4.2 The Bethany People 
The next group to be mentioned in a chronological context 
are the Booi or Frederick family of Bethany . When 
London missionary Johann Heinrich Schme len first arrived 
in Klipfontein~ as Bethany was called in 1814, h e 
64. Moritz Backhouse, 1840, 233; see also H. Tindall: 
Two Lectures on Gr e at Namaaualand and its 
In~ a·b j_ tan t s , Cape-To ,._;n,-TB 5 b , 3-b_.- -------
65. For more details, see chapter 3. 
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interviewed Kaptein Kobus (Jakobus), asking how long 
he had been resident there . Kobus claimed that it was 
ten years. Schmelen the n proceeded to ask another 
le~ding family head (this was Fleremuis who had come 
with him and about 120 other men across the Orange River. 
Amraal Lam ber t, who lat er became the head of the 'Gobabis 
people', was also with them
66 ) whether he was prepar ed 
to settle down at Kl ipfontei n together with Kobus Boois, 
5~ 
to which he agreed. r 
The story of this family is quite complicated and cannot 
be followed through here in great detail. Kobus had 
five or six sons, one of whom was David Chri stian , who 
succeeded Kobus as kaptein. After considerable strife 
in the 1820s, which made Schmelen' s continued stay 
impossible, the eldest son, Jan, split and moved away from 
the area. For the next 40 to 50 years these people 
(and undoubt ed ly others who had no original connections) 
lived in the area between Bethany and the Kuiseb and 
Swakop region and never established themselves at a 
fixed place with a missionary . 
2.4.3 Amraal and His Group 
Let us now look at Amraal Lambert and the peopl e associated 
56 
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66. BRMG, 1855, 338. 
67. _TLMS , IV, 162. 
with him. After crossing the Orang e River with 
Sc hmelen as not e d above, he lived at or near Bethany 
68 for at least 14 ye a rs. Cook visited him seve r al times 
and also helped him, Fleremuis and their 'band' of followe rs 
to get a missionary in the early 1840s. He left us the 
following account: "His great grandfather was the Chief 
of a tribe who inh a bited the country in the vicinity 
of Table Bay, and poss e ssed the lands most valu a ble in 
the western division of the colony. His grandfather 
lived with his people principally at the Hex River, 
situated in the district of Clanwilliam. His father 
became wa g on driver to a Dutch farme r , but aft e r the 
father's death, the family possessing among them 
some cattle ... ultimately crossed the Great Orange River 
and ... finally ··settled on the banks of the Fish River, 
where Amraal, the eldest brother, became a chi e f of 
considerable importance. About four years later, a 
long drought induc e d them to remove to Nou .:zan:i.bj_s. n 69 
68. Schmel e n often mentioned him as part of the 
mission a ry esta blishment at Bethany, se e CA LMS 
Journals, 1815-1816, 2 8 ;also letter to Kitching -
man, B. le Co r deur and c·. Saund e r s (eds): 
The Kit c hing man Pa pe r s , 95. Schmelen's r e lations 
with Amr a al were ~lo se ; the latt e r g ui d ed and 
accompa nie d him on his trip to He r e rola nd and 
Walvis Ba y in 1825, s e e RLMS 182 6 , 85; also 
BRMG 1855, 33. 
69. E. Co ok: Th e Modern Mi ss ion ary , Li verpool, 181{9, 
102-103. ·7 ve-r yslrn i l a r ver sion j_s gj_ve n i!1 BR MG 
1855, 33 8 -33 9 . 
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Later th e y settled a little further riorth at Gobabis or 
Elephant's Fountain. 
2.4.4 The Berseba People 
Berseba was established similarly to the settlements at 
Bethany, Windhoek and Gobabis, but only in the late 1840 s / 
early 1850s. However, less is known about the history 
of the two families who came to assume leadership posi-
tions in the community. Here, as in Windhoek, Gobabis 
and We s ley Vale, the establishment of a community which 
came to act in its own right was linked to the 'acqui sitio~ 
of a missionary. When Knudsen of the Rhenish Mission Society was 
a mis s ionary at Bethany, he had a series of 'outstations' 
and werfts surrounding Betha ny which he served . Part 
of his circuit was Gulbrand s dalen and also the place of 
Christoph Tibet . Unfortunately the diaries available 
to me do not actually explain where his place was. 
Mtiritz gi ve s the following explanation~ "Christoph 
Tibot, an Orlam from Pel la, had gathered a small 
Christi a n community around him after Schmelen l eft 
Betha ny" . 70 Knudsen noted in Nov e mber 1843 that he 
travelled with Ti bo t to his settlement at the Fish River, 
menti onin g Paul Go liath for the first time. "The day 
before Paul Gol iat h had come with part of his people for 
70. Moritz Knud se n 1845, 157 (footnote); also BRMG 
-] -o--r:y.--1- ? 5 
• 0..) f ' <- • 
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a v i sit He was baptised formerl y an d is a kind of 
lcapte in over Ti bot ' s people. They were dre ssed very 
decently, and many of them spoke Dutch 11 • 7 l These two 
groups, together with people from Gulbrandsdale n then 
u 
formed the congregat ion at Berseba in 1 850 under Samuel 
Hahn which soon became a firm ly established community. 72 
2.4.5 Kido Witbooi ' s People 
The people who were with old Kido Witbooi when he settled 
at Gibeon with missionary Knau er followed a very similar 
pattern. At the beginning of the century the Witbooi 
family was living at Pella, in Little Namaqualand. As 
.Bachert noted it wa s the unfavourable terrain and the 
British annexation of the Cape Col ony which forced the 
Witbooi fami ly to leave Pell a and to look for a more 
sui t abl e place of settlement. 73 They made unsuccessful 
attempts to settl e in Griqualand and among the Tswanas 74 
and had been living in scattered little groups in Nama l and 
sinc e the mid-1850s . When a suitable place for settle -
ment and, what seems more important , a missionary was 
71 . Qu e llen, 3a, Nov . 1843. 
. 7 2 . Q~ e ll en , 3a , p .110 . 
73. Bachert : ' The Witboois' , 22. 
7 i.i • Ibid . 
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found in the early 1860s they established a more closely-
knit community at Gibeon. 
It seems to me that their settlement at Gibeon in 1863 
must be seen in the perspective of the political up-
heavals of that period. The decision to accept a 
missionary then meant making a definite political commit-
ment which those years of sharply polarised conflict 
demanded of every Kaptein. 75 However, more about these 
processes will be said in Chapter~-
60 
In the next chapter, I will consider the years of contact and 
clash be tween these komma .ndo groups and the . inha bi tan ts of 
Namaland. 
---·-- -----···-------
75. See Chapter 9. 
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NAMALAND IN THE PERIOD 1800-1835 
3.1 THE INVASION OF NAMALAND BY ORLAM KOMMANDOS, 1 8 00-1835 
When the kommando groups from the Cape pushed northwards 
and crossed the Orange River, they met with pastoral 
Nama-sp~aking peoples owning large herds of cattle. 
This early period of contact can be roughly divided into 
three pha ses (although distinctions between th e phases 
are blurred) . The first phase was characterised by 
occasional skirmishes and clashes between those Nama-sp eakers 
. and Orlam kommandos. In this phase, it b_ecame clear that 
the Namas although much more numerous, were militarily 
inferior to the Orlam raiding parties as they did not own 
guns and horses. Also, due to their large cattle herds~ 
they were probably not as mobile as the Orlam kommandos. 
In the second phase, Orlam leaders took over rights to 
waterholes and pastures (apart from raiding cattle herds) 
and thus must be s e en as conquerors. This phase lasted 
up until. 1835. The third period, largely coinciding 
with the second phase, was marked by the establishment 
of an alliance between the most powe rful Orlam-kaptein 
and the mo s t senior Nama chief. These were Jonker 
Afrikane r and the head of the Gai-//khaun (probably 
Oa sib) r es pectively. 
Any attempt to elucidate the early relation s betwee n 
Nama and Orlam groups north of the Orange River is 
hampere d by the scarcity and inad equacy of a vailabl e 
written sources. For about ten y e ars, from 1825 to 1835, 
there was no European resident in Na maland. Furthermore, 
at least until mid-century, these we re completel y un-
discovered wilderne s $eS from a European point of vi ew , 
with "strange, even terrific" inhabitants. Therefor e , 
our outline of the Orlam invasion of Nam a l an d must remain 
sketchy. 
3.1.1 Occasional Skirmishes and Clashes Be tween Orl ams 
and Namas 
62 
The contacts through raiding and tr ading be tween Orlams, 
other Khoisan groups and even farm e rs on both sid es of the 
Oi'ange . River viere .. well developed "lon g .before Jage r Afrikaner 
settled - at Blydeverwacht. During the 1790s, Jage r had 
been temporarily located on an i s l and in th~ Orang e River . 1 
In a recent paper, de Bruyn has dat e d a campaign of Klaas 
Afrikaner and his followers, involving a skirmish with 
the farmer Guilliam Visagie, to 1793. 2 La t e r r epor ts 
by Ridsd a le and Knudsen indicate that thi s man's f arm 
was situated near Ke etman shoop, i . e . almost 300 km north 
-- ---------
l. M. Legassick: ' Emerge nce ' , 26 1 . 
2. .J. du Bruyn : 'The Oor lam Afrikaners ', 6 . 
of the Orange River. 3 There are frequ en t early refer-
ences to Narr- a s living far to the north of the Orange River 
being afraid of the 'hat-wearers 1 • 4 The Albrechts noted 
in their jour nal of 1809: "One of our difficulties with 
th e Namaquas is their prejudice against foreigners, 
particularly against the Hot ten tots, (Or lams, B. L. ) , some 
of whom we are obliged to hire in our services as they 
are far better acquainted with agriculture and the build-
ing of houses. From this cause (sic) many quarrels have 
arisen which ... retarded our success ... 11 • 5 
3.1.2 The Orlam Kommandos as Conqu eror s 
The dividing line between phase one and phase two is not 
clear. While between 1806 and 1822 three missionary 
settlements existed in Great Namaqualand, all missionary 
endeavours ceased after that for almost 15 years. 
These fifteen or twenty years must be seen as an era of 
conquest and intense struggle for territorial rightsJ 
3. Ridsdale: Scen es , 275; Moritz Knudsen, 1845, 158. 
4. Such anxiety was expressed by a Narn a chief east of 
the Li ver Rive r , see CA LMS Journals, Kitchingman, 
1820, 13. 
5 . CA LMS Journ a ls, 4 Feb. 1809. 
""i"(frcat Namaquas ' Here nsuch as 
peasa nts among the Christians, 
consj.de red as more cj_ vilised n, 
rHottentots' unlike 
have lived with the 
and are therefore 
TLMS III, 27. 
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water holes and for people. Missionary efforts ceased 
becau se it was no longer possible for a European to be 
resident in Nama land. Conflict s were spontaneous with 
no apparent pattern - mainly Orl am against Namas, but 
also Orlam group against Orlam group. This friction was 
widespread and entire ly unmediat ed by any European form 
of problem-solving (such as treaties). Many communities 
were uprooted, nothing was established any longer, and 
every right h ad to be fought for. In the process Nama 
groups lost claims to water holes and pastures as well as 
probably many thousands of head of cattle. Our knowledge 
of these violent and tumultous years is dependent on very 
sporadic accounts indeed. 
Importantlyr even this time of conquest was marked by a 
combination of subjection and alliance. The missi.on 
station at Warmbad was razed to the ground by the Afrikaners 
under Jager and Titus in 1812. About Klaas Afrikaner's 
place itself, Moffat noted that a Nama chLef had ceded 
to him his dominion in Namaland and "it henceforth became 
his by right, as well as by conqu e st. 116 This should 
probably be regarded as an attempt by Orlam Kapteins to 
prevent any Nama groups from gaining acces s to a mis s ion-
ary, the latter being of great political significance. 
6. Moffat : Labours, 76. 
Kobus Boois, proba bly r~presents a similar case of a 
combination of alli a nce andconquest. Apparently he paid 
four rolls of tobacco to a Narna chief for being allowed 
to settle at Be t hany. 7 Although he had invited Schmelen 
to stay, he soon be g an raids on "Namaquas by the Fish 
River".
8 
Schmelen, for his part, soon started to serve outposts 
and kraals of Gai-//khaun who . had moved near him, as well 
as other Na mas. 9 This was not tolerated by the Orlam 
leacters at Bethany. They incited people at the station 
in a successful bid to oust Schmelen. The missionary 
had to le a ve after he "almost begged them upon my knees 
that they should come to church but they would not 11 • 10 
When Schm e len had travelled to Bethany in 1814, he asked 
Aimap, a Na.ma chief (probably of the Veldskoendraee)whether 
7. TLMS IV, 161. 
8. CA LMS Journals, Kitchingman, 1820, 9-10. 
9. CA LMS Journa ls, Schmelen, 1819, 8, 9; 
18"15-1816, 26, 27, 28. 
10. See Sc hme len's detailed account of the 'civil war' 
situ a t i on , CA LMS Letters Schmelen, 26 
Se pt. 1822. Schm e len u n d e rstood that the irnm e -· 
diat e cau se was his r e l µc t anc q t Q f'urnj_sh th~ 
peo p l e with mci r e gunpowd e r, but do e s not seem 
to have be e n a wa r e of th e ove rall political and 




it was safe for him to r~turn along'the Fish River. 
Aimap, after having talked about nothing but "the wars 
and fightings in this country" advised him not to do 
so. "He said if I went that way I must expect to fight, 
for the people are now under no subjection 11 • 11 
S6me years later Moffat, travelling south-east of Bethany, 
remarked that the 'wild i~amaquas' were very apprehensive of 
the 'hat wearers', and of Titus Afrikaner. Also, a man 
from the north arrived and "gave a sorry account of the 
12 country". 
For Missionary Schmelen, his initial impressions and 
information did not change during his times at Bethany. 
He travelled north once from the station for almost two 
months but did not get to the sea. Concluding his 
account. he noted: "I was entirely surrounded with war 
After he was force~ to leave the station, he wrote to the 
Governor saying that he would not go back there nor 
continue to translate things into ~~ma "excepting that 
the Government would assist us in obtaining some kind of 
order amongst the different tribes" . 11t 
11. TLMS IV, 323-326. 
12. Ibid., 127. 
13. CA LMS Letters, Schmelen, 29 July 1814. 
14. Ibid., 26 Sept., 1822. 
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Missionary Archbell was expelled from Bush Fountain 
tnl822, where he had worked briefly among the Gai-//khaun. 
William Tnrelfall / the last missionary for a long time to 
I 
come who tried to work in Namaland shortly.afterwards, 
was actually murdered. Shaw .quoted him as writing in 
one of his last letters in August 1824: t"We had some 
alarming accounts of the state of the natives and country 
beyond the Orange River. They say that Gammap (head 
of the Gai-//khaun, B.L.) and another chief are dead ... 
1 
They said all they could to discourage Jacob and Johannes 
111 5 
and his two assistants from travelling beyond Warmba1. 
Later he wrote to Shaw that: "Tsaumap (of the Gai-//khaun 
B. L. ) ... had given him much information respecting 
the tribes northward. That the old chief was very poor, 
having been robbed of all his cattle, not by Afrikaner's 
people, as had been reported, but by some of the dis-
16 affected people of Bethany". Threlfal 1 's murder was 
related to a refusal of the Orlam Kapteins to co-operate 
with him.· He appeared to have suffered a gradual 
deprivation of guides, food and oxen17 so that he was 
left without protection. 
Finally Schmelen, on a last visit to these regions, wrote 
from Bethany in 1828: nwe hear of nothing but oppr·ession 
67 
15. Shaw: Memo r i al s . of · So tl th Afr i ca , · London 18}(~ 2 7 7 - 2 7 8 
------~·; ---·-------~--
16. Ibid . , 27 8. 
17. S. Broadbent: 
land_, London, 
The Missionary Martyr in Namaqua-1135·7 .----·-·.---------~----·-·· 
and persecution. The poor Nama are often so badly 
treated by the Orlams that my heart bleeds (for them). 
The Afrikaners and most of my people treat the natives 
in an abominable manner, not only by depriving them of 
everythj_ng, but also, by using the women and children as 
whores and by treating them worse than slaves. If we 
cannot close off the coast ori this side, so that the ~hale 
fishermen cease selling gunpowder there, then I believe 
that little good will be done in the future. 1118 This 
illuminating piece of evidence also gives us insights 
into the sources of ammunition in times when no trader 
from the Cape would make his way up there. 
3.1.3 Jonker's Alliance with the Head of the Gai-//khaun 
Jonker Afrikaner, with a group of men and women, soon 
established himself as the most successful koYiimando 
leader and moved furthest to the north of Namaland. 
Between 1825 and ·1835 he struck an alliance with the 
head of the Gai-//khaun, the most senior Nama group. 
This alliance is important because firstly it lent poli-
tical legitimacy to the presence of Orlams in Namaland. 
Secondly, it was ~he terms and circumstances of this 
18. Schmelen to Kitchingman, 28 March 1828, B. le 




alliance which secured Jonker and his associates the 
'hegemonic' position they held for many years in Namaland. 
In this period, Jonker and his peciple moved to the Windhoek-
Reho.both area, soon followed by a large group of Gai-/ /khaun 
with their chief who left the Lion and Fish rive~ area. 19 
Although it is impossible without extensive archaeological 
research to establish the circumstances of .the Afrikaner's 
move to the north of Namaland, it emerges from the written 
historical record that they were allowed to settle in the 
Windhoek area by the mid-1820s. 20 They were also given 
the right to incorporate whole groups of Herero speakers 
into their network of dependants or followers. Thus, 
they were given a kind of monopoly access to Herera-
labo~r;-~ Even if the Gai-//khaun also started to raid 
Herera-speakers, it was only Jonker and his associates 
who originally had acknowledged rights over Damaraland and 
its inhabitants. These avenues of surplus appropriation 
constituted the basis of Jonker's powerful position. 
(Yet, as we shall see in a later section, Jonker's power 
position was not left entirely uncontested by the head 
of the Gai-//khaun.) 21 
Little is known about the years when the Afrjkaners first 
established themselves at Windhoek. Apparently they 
----·--·-·--------·------
19. See map 2. 
20. Schmclen visited him there in 1825, see Moritz 
Schmelen 1832, 221. 
21. See below, Chapter 7. 
did not 'conquer' the Gai-//khaun: because there is no 
evidence of tributary· or exploitative ~elations between 
them.· Rather the Kaptains were on friendly terms. 
As mentioned, the head of the Gai-//khaun with large numbers 
of followers left the Fish River area an~ as Jonke0 also 
moved northwards to live in an area only a few days from 
Windhoek. By the 1840s, Oasib and many others were 
22 living in the Kubakob, i.e. in Jonker!s immediate 
I 23 neighbourhood, and in fact moved even closer to him. 
The fact that Rehoboth and Tsebris, both formerly occupied 
by the Afrikaners
24 
and only 80 km from Windhoek, were 
made the headquarters of the Nama Kaptein Huiseb, later 
Willem Swartbooi, is especially significant. It clearly· 
indicates that we are dealing with an alliance. 
The Afrikaners had to ensure· that Herera chiefs would not 
extend their pastures south of the Swakop. In return, 
they were given substantial rights over•territories and 
people in the area between the Swakop and Kuiseb rivers, 
as previously noted. Thus Palgrave contended before a 
Cape Government commission in the 1880s, when land blaims 
22. C.H. Hahn: 'Aus Alt-Sudwestafrika', AH 1961, 106. 
23. See Ibid., 112. Andersson, about ·a day from 
Windhoek, reported in 1851 that the Ga~-//khaun 
!'have been lying all about here", .WA AP 2, 30 
Aug. 1851. 
?4 Al d ~· II, 18~,'. "- . exan er: uiscovery, See also Moritz 
Schmelen, 18]2, 221. 
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by Piet Haibib of the Topnaars were discussed, that 
before 1863 Jonker was the 'suzerain' of Piet Haibib. 
"Prior to that the country had been claimed to the east 
(of Walvis Bay, B.L.) by the red nation: but by an 
agreement between the chief of the red nation and old 
Jonker Afrikaner, all that portion about Walvis Bay 
reverted to Jonker". 25 
An agreement between Jonker and Oasib in 1858 after a 
great d~al of conflict (which we shall consider only in 
Chapters 7 and 8) 26 confirmed and possibly clarified the 
terms of the original alliance. Oasib agreed to consider 
Jonker. as an independent Kaptein who was equal to him 
in status. Jonker was the overlord ~f Hereroland and it 
was agreed that Oasib's territory should reach to the 
Auas Mountains. The border line between their territories 
was to be the Kuiseb River. 2 7 
Thus, this alliance certainly must be seen as a crucial 
point in the history of Namaland and its inhabitants, 
even if its timing is not altogether clear. By way of 
illuminating the nature of the early contacts between 
25. CA G. H. 21/19, q. No.1151. 
26. The more immediate causes of this conflict revolved 
around fees and royalties frbm the cop~er com~anies 
which b~gan to exploit copper reserves in Central 
Na~ibia in the mid-1850s. See below, Chapters 7 
and 8. 
27. CA HP 9, 22 April 1858. 
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Nama and Orlam further I shall now briefly consider 
some aspects of social and political organisation among 
the original Nama groups. 
3.2 AN OUTLINE OF THE EARLY NAMA SOCIAL FORMATION, 
1800 - 1820 
In this section I shall present the historical evidence 
demonstrating that the original Nama groups (the 
'genuine Namaquas' as they are sometimes called in the 
sources) were pastoral peoples involved in pre-capitalist 
forms of production similar to those of many other peoples 
in southern Africa. 28 
3.2.1 Settlement Patterns 
This is clearly suggested by our data on early settlement 
patterns. An analysis of waterholes and cattle posts, 
based on very early sources, shows unmistakably that 
until the 1840s certain groups did blaim specific places 
for themselves as Hoernl§ argues. 29 However, this was 
28. This discussion will be limited by the scarcity of 
ethnological data in the few early sources which 
exist. Thus, I will be able to expose certain funda-
mental features of these pre-capitalist formations 
but not their inner dynamic. 
29. Hoernl~: 'The Social Organisation of the Nama 
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estimated that the Bondelswa~ts numbered about 1 400 
and the !Gornen Boo, 31 Schmelen reckoned that the 
Gai-//khaun numbered between 5 000 and 6 000 people.3 2 
On his travels, he passed cattle posts of the Veldskoen-
draers and other Nama chiefs with populations of a 
thousand people or more7 33 Furthermore, he often 
/ 
visited cattle posts .or werfts of 100, 130 or 150 houses. 34 
The total Nama population was also much larger than the 
number of incoming Orlams. Later ~stimates indicate a 
figure of 10 000 or more. For instance, Hugo Hahn 
compiled the following list:35 
Bondelswarts: 4 000 
74 
(illegible) 4 000 (probably Gai- I ikhaun) 
Veldskoendraers: 1 000 
Fransmann'sche: 1 000 
Willem Swartbooi: 1 500 
Topnaars: 800 
12 300 
31. CA LMS Letters, A. Albrecht: 'Observations', 
n.d. ca 1809. 
32. TLMS IV, 324-325. 
33. Ibid. 
34. CA LMS Journals, Schmelen 1816, 21; 1819, B; 
CALMS Journals, Kitchingman 1820, 11. This means 
·a--nurnber of 'up t~o 1 000 people/ see Chapter ii. 
35. CA HP 9, diary 3, last page. H. Tindall's estimate 
was 9 100 ex~l. To~naars at the Bay, Two Lectures, 33-38. 
........ 
3.2.3 Major Branches of Production: Cattle Breeding, 
Vel.dkos Co!lection, Hunting 1 Tobacco Cultivation 
These people practised a pastoralist existence with 
their herds of cattle, sheep and goats in the area between 
the Orange and Upper reaches of the Fish River. Their 
staple foods were sour milk, veldkos and game.3 6 The 
evidence gives no indication of the importance of hunting 
in the social process. 
However, there are descriptions of the hunting techniques 
used. The Albrechts once (ca~ 1808) accompanied the 
chief of the Bondelswarts on a hunt, together with about 
80 men. They noted: 11 The men were separated into two 
divi~ions and so far from each other that one division 
could hardly see the other. The individuals themselves 
were about a stone's throw from each other, and placed 
in the form of a crescent. At a given sign, they ran 
towards a point in such a manner that they surrounded 
the game in a circle." The weapons used were assegais 
and occasionally a musket. 37 Agriculture was not 
75 
practised apart from the cultivation of tobacco and dagga. 38 
36. TLMS III, 209; B. Shaw: 'Accounti, WMN, 3, 1821, 
119-120; CA LMS .Journals, Al brechts, 25 May 1808. 
37. TLMS III, 319. For a similar description, see 
·Shaw: 'Account 1 , WMN, 1821, l.21. · 
38. TLMS IV, 161, Shaw, Op.cit., 121, CALMS Journals 




The early Nama were also incomparably richer in cattle. 
Thus, we have frequent references to numerous herds and 
an "abundance of milk 11 • 39 Barnabas Shaw, who visited 
Gamma Tsawoeb, head of the Gai-//khaun and other Nama 
chiefs in 1820, left this illuminating description: 
"Some of them (Namas, B.L.) may properly be called rich, 
as they possess immense numbers of horned cattle, besides 
·goats and sheep. We were frequently surprised at the 
return of their cows and oxen from the fields: clouds 
of dust, seen floating in the air on every side of the 
village ... they delight much in their cattle, and, like 
the Caffers, they turn the horns of their favourite ones 
in every direction which fancy suggests to them as 
' 40 
ornamental. 
The terrain was apparently quite suitable for tobacco 
cultivation, h~nti~g and large-scale cattle raising. 
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/ 
Shaw noted in his commentary on Namaland, that "some parts 
... are mountainous and barren in the extreme, while 
others produce plenty of grass for innumerable multitudes 
of cattle. 1141 Missj_onary Archbell reported that in the 
. 
Bethany area, "A scarcity of water on the station wj_ll 
never be known, as in addition to eight fountains, the 
39. Thus, Kitchingmari noted that in Nama kraals meat 
was "frequently cooked.in milk", op.cit., 10. 
l~-0. Shaw: 'Account', WMN, 1821, 119. 
41 . - Ibid. 
77 
River Untup (Hutup, B.L.) is_ distant from us about 
half a day's journey, which will supply us ·abundantly 
with timber for building, and also prove a great blessing 
. 1-1-2 
on account of its grass and water 11 • 
(i) Notes on Domestic Production 
The domestic production of these Nama~sp~aking pastoralists 
was rich and diverse. It exhibited a kind of self-
generating 'adequacy' which allowed groups to exist 
without becoming dependent on European imports. 
There was a strict sexual division of labour. Married 
women were the main producers as they milked the cattle, 
and thus produced the staple food, a kind of yoghurt . 
. This was supplemented by veldkos which they collected. 
They also made mats and built huts constructed from these 
43 mats. Also, it was their childreri, mostly uninitiated 
young ~enJwho would perform tasks related to cattle-
tending such as herding and watering. Hunting and the 
conduct of political affai~s was the domain of men. 
The men made their own weapons, namely assegais, bows, 
42. WMN 3, 1882, 338. 
43. TLMS Iv; 212-213, For a description of the 
labour orocess involved in mat making in the 
1840s: ~ee chapter 5. 
·~ .... · -
arrows, a quiver to hold them and also the poison to 
enhance their effectiveness. 44 The Albrechts noted 
·that there were two sorts of assega_is: one type was 
barbed like a harpoon, and the other was plain. 45 
Apparently both men and women made their own clothing, 46 
consisting of different types of aprons, k~rosses, skin 
cap~ and sometimes beasts' maws. 47 Lavish decorations, 
deserving special ~ention for their diversity and sophis-
tication, were part of the outfit. Apart from rubbing 
their bodies with red powder and fat, 48 it was noted that: 
49 11 They have ornaments of ivory, copper and.iron ring::; 
on their legs and arms, and are much attracted to beads to 
put on their wrists and necks and waists. Many had 
their hair adorned with small shells, in which the figure 
of the star seemed to have preference. A red powder 
mingled with fat, and profusely la.id on the head, forms 
in their estimation a rich pomatum. Some of their 
heads appeared as if overlaid with red pastry - those of 
44. Shaw: 'Account', WMN, 1821, 120. 
45. TLMS III, 211. 
46. H. C. Knudsen: 
Nama', AH, 
'Nachrichten Gber die Damara und 
1963, 111. 
47. CA LMS Journals, Kitchingman, 1820, 14-15. 
48. Ibid, 13-14. The iron was apparently produred 
from meteors, see Ibid., 9, as well as '~rom 
people where the sun comes up", i.e. Ban'cu-
speakers frorG the east, see Shaw: 'Account' , WMN, 
1821, 1 122. 
49. Shaw, op.cit., 120. 
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others resembled a mop for washing floors - and some 
had the resemblance of the quills of the porcupine. 
Their app~arance is curious, wild, and, to a stranger, 
even terrific. The ladies use various sorts of paints 
with which they daub their cheeks. Here a difference 
of taste is displayed, some using red, others brown, 
and some jet black, being a composition of charcoal 
and fat, blended together." Kitchingman made an 
additional note about the laboriousness of pounding bark 
. 50 
for the various powders made and used by women. 
However, there were many other aspects of domestic produc-
tion: clay pots were manufactured (and, as early as 1808~. 
iron pots were traded "from the colonists"). Pipes were 
made of a green stone hollowed out in a conical form 
and pierced at the pointed part· .•• "not being provided 
with such pipes, they make shift with an emptied marrow 
51 bone". Albrechts noted that industry included the 
preparing of calabashes for milk, and the making of 
wooden buckets, cups and basins, and skin bags for personal 
52 effects. The brewing of honey-beer as amongst the 
50. It was noted at a Nama chief's kraal: "This 
morning we were disturbed of our rest by som~ 
women who were up long before day, beating camel 
thorriwood to powder, to powder their hair. It 
is astonishing what labour these people make to be 
dirty''. CA: LMS Journals, Kitchingman, 1820, 12. 
51. TLMS III, 213. 
52. Ibid., 213-214. 
79 
the Orlams, was popular. 53 
3 .2 .1~ Central Aspect~_££__So~jal and Economic Organisation. 
!!:!._EarlL_~ama Groups 
Information about the social relations structuring 
these activities is scarce. It appears that decision-
making processes, the organisation of the cattle posts 
system, and the distribution of power in these groups, 
were structured by kinship relations. 54 Although a 
detailed analysis cannot be constructed, we have some 
early accounts which give illuminating insights into 
forms of Nama organisation~which as we shall see later, 
vanished under the impact of the Orlam invasion. 
(i) The Position of the Chief 
Shaw made the following observations about the political 
organisation: "Each tribe or clan is governed by a chief 
.~.the chief receives the hind part of every· bullock 
which is slaughtered; this he distributes amongst the 
males of his village, all of whom are called his soldiers. 
He also collects·a sufficiency of milk at the door of his 
53. CA LMS Journals, Kitchingman, 1820, 12. 
B:- Shaw: Mem9rial s_, 129. 
54. The theoretical and empirical works whose conclu-
sions underlie this presentation are mainly those 
of French economic anthropologist, see Chapter 1, 
footnote ~s 
so 
hut, to deal out amongst the· poor and the needy~ On 
the death of his wife, every male who has arrived at 
years of maturity, gives him a cow, which, after a 
certain number of years, is returned. 1155 This indicates 
not only social practices of reciprocity characteristic 
of African pre-capitalist societies, but also a system 
of surplus appropriation and the encouragement of followers 
to become dependent on their chiefs, which helped to 
buttress chiefly power. We are also dealing with a 
form of accumulation that is pre-capitalist in nature, 
in that its purpose was to increase, not the number of 
commodities of exchange, but the numbers of followers 
or dependants. 56 
As Shaw noted, . "A part of every animal taken in hunting 
is required by the chief, and though it should be in a 
state of putrefaction before it can be brought to him, 
he nevertheless demands his rightn. 5 7 Abraham Albrecht. 
added that, in cases of disobedience, the chief was able 
to call a group of armed men together and 11unexpectedly 
surprises the offender in his kraal ... and takes away 
all his cattle. This being effected, the offender is 
obliged to ask the Kaptein's pardon and to submit, in 
55. Shaw: 'Account'; WMN, 1821, 120. 
56. See for example Jeff Guys' analysis of such pre-
capitalist accumulation in The Destruction of the 
Zulu Kingdom, London, 1980 ,-·clis-:---·-:-·c and· 2. 
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58 order to have his cattle restored to him 11 • 
(ii)· Surplus Appropriation of Uninitiated ~?ung Men 
The labour of uninitiated young men was directed towards 
the strenuous task of cattle raising. Referring to 
"the young men" who, upon coming of age, will not milk 
cows any longer, Albrechts noted that "One of the most 
laborious tasks in which they are occasionally employed 
is to procure water for their cattle during the hot 
season of the year. They are obliged to dig large and 
deep holes, in or on the banks ot the periodical rivers 
to the depth someti~es of 20 feet, and from 10 to 12 feet 
wide. Instead of a spade, they make use of the shoulder. 
bone of an ox, but as ~uch holes do not fill with water, 
they cannot suffer the cattle to walk down to it, but are 
obliged to draw out the water that, at a time, is requi-
site for quenching the thirst of the animals. They 
therefore lay down two large blocks of wood, near the 
waterpit, and cover them with a sheep's skin, which is to 
serve as a kind of watering trough; then they draw out 
the water in a bamboo, which one hands up to the other. 
This labour sometimes occupies the men half a day, during 
suffocating heat ... ".59 
58. CA LMS Letters,. A. Albrecht, 'Observations' , n. d. 
59. TLMS III, 212. See also Campbell: Travels, London, 
1815, 308, who noted about the 'Great Namaqua': "They 
abound in horned cattle, goats and sheep, taking 
care of which is the only task ascj_gncd to their 
children." 
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(iii)· The Control of ~atrimony 
The ability to allocate the labour of these young males 
seems to have derived from control over matrimony. Thus, 
a man with more than one wife could attract more followers 
because additional wives increased the productive 
capacity of his family and dependQnts. Wives provided 
both labour and future labour in the form of children; 
more cattle could be milked in the evening and more 
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children were available to herd the cattle. Thus, more food 
could be produced and more cattle could be lent to followers 
through the cattle post system. Similarly, to withhold 
a wife from a young man meant that he had to do many more 
years of cattle-tending for an adult male owner. 
A. Albrecht made the following observations about the 
'Great Namaquas': "Polygamy is predominant in this 
nation. Even those who are poor generally have two, 
but those who are rich have three, four or more wives. 
Not more than two live in each hut together, but if a 
man happens to have m6re than two wives, he keeps them 
separate at such places as he uses to visit occasionally. 
A man having a liking to such or such a girl, 
first of all speaks to her parents, and declares to them 
what his intentions are. If the parent or guardian 
give their consent to the marriage, the young man makes 
a present to them, and then a day for the wedding is 
agreed upon between them. On this day, the two families 
assemble, the bridegroom kills a:·buffalo, and the whole 
party feasts and makes merry, as long as the provisions 
made by the bridegroom will last, after which the two 
people are considered as being united ... In case the 
parents of the bride are in good circumstances, they 
return to their son-in-law a present of the same value 
as they have received from him. If the parents were 
poor, the return is not made. Sometimes it happens 
that a married woman runs away from her husband; in 
'1-'.J: 
this case the husband immediately applies to her parents 
for the restoration of the present given by him previous 
to his marriage. If the present is returned to the 
satisfaction of the offended husband, the affair is at 
an end. If the present is not returned because the 
parents are unwilling or too poor, conflict ensues, often 
60 violent and long-term." 
(iv) Other Forms of Pre-Capitalist Surplus Extraction 
However, it was not only the sons and daughters of a 
family who would look after the cattle, but also the 
servants. They were reported "to watch their cattle by 
day''· Little is known about the kind of exploitative 
relationships tying the so-called Damaras (Hau-Khoi) to 
60. CA LMS Letters, A. Albrecht, 'Observations', n. d. 
Campbell, op .cit., 308, noted briefly: 11 When 
they marry, the husband gives cattle to the 
parents of the female, and also slaughters some 
for a feast 11 • 
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Namas as cattle herders. Probably the relations here 
were similar to those that structured the cattle post 
t . 0 1 . t. 61 sys em in r am communi ,ies. Damaras were also reported 
t k . . 62 . . d t f' o ma e iron rings, assegais an copper ornamen·s _or 
Nam as, and "tho' he (the Nama master, B. L.) can do 
nothing himself, yet he beats the Damara when he does 
not work to his mind. 116 3 
3.2.5 Aspects of _Cosmology 
All early missionaries amongst the Nama commented on the 
various dances and the hole-game·, 'hous' as Alexander 
called it. 64 Various dances were popular: the Pot 
D.ance, and the Great Reed dance - the former involving 
85 
men exclusively, the latter apparently only women dancers. 65 
Typically, Albrechts noted that these dances were ''always 
66 accompanied with vices and the corruption of morals 11 • 
61. See Chapter 4. 
62. Shaw: 'Account', WMN, 1821, 121; CALMS Journals 
Kitchingman, 1820, 15. 
63. Shaw, Op.cit.,; Kitchingman, Op.cit. 
65. On the Reed Dance, see Alexander, ibid., 233-234; 
on the Pot Dance, CA LMS Journals, Albrechts, 5 
Jan. 1809. 
66. Albrechts, Ibid. 




Sometimes up to 20 reeds would be played 
The women would sing~ clap their hands 
and circle the male reed players in a dance, and sometimes 
the reed players would form a circle around the dancing 
women, who often displayed considerable endurance. 68 
86 
The role of women in the Pot Dance is not clear; apparently 
here a sheep was slaughtered as the men danced around 
69 the pot. 
We als~ have accounts of a regular system of healing by 
'witchdoctors' who produced little pieces of wood out of 
the patients' flesh, sucked wounds, made incisions, 70 
and cut off the joint of the little finger for good luck 
or health. 71 There was also the famous legend of man's 
mortality: the story of the hare and the moon which 
·involved a strict taboo prohibiting adult men from eating 
the flesh of the hare. 72 Although all references to a 
supreme deity called Heit.Si -Eibib are of a much later date, 
67. CA LMS Letters, A. Al~recht: 'Observations', n.d. 
68. Alexander: Discovery I, 234. 
69. Moritz Backhouse, 1840, 236. 
70. Campbell: Travels, 308; Shaw: 
1821' 120 '-121-. -. -
71. Shaw, Ibid. , 121. 
'Account' , WMN, 
72. See CA LMS Journals, Schmelen: 1815, 3; also WA 
AP 10,(x). 
.• :f 
~/he was not mentioned by the Albrechts, Shaw, Kitchingman 
or Schmelen), extensive burial rites existed. The 
custom of throwing stones on a grave one was passing by 
7? 
was widely practised. ~ The old and infirm were 
customarily placed in an enclosure with a little food 
and water and left to die there~ The functionalism of 
87 
this practice can be seen in terms of the essential seasonal 
·migrations, but it outraged the missionaries. 74 It will 
be demonstrated below that pastoral habits declined during 
the course ~f the century, and so did this custom. 
'Most interesting in this respect is the initiation of 
meri and women into adulthood. Men became what missionary 
Shaw called, the "chief's soldierstt. The entrance into 
maturity was understandably linked to matrimony; the 
borrowing and owning of various types of cattle. Thus 
initiation was a vital step towards any position of 
power for males. Consequently initiation rituals were 
elaborate, of great social significance . "When their 
sons are declared to be men, the7erect a shell, kill an 
animal, and tie its fat on his head and round his neck, 
which, according to custom,· he must wear till it rots 
and falls off. They likewise cut several strokes on his 
73~ For instance, Schmelen recorded a burial among 
Veldskoendraers that went on for days, CA 
LMS Journals, Schmelen, 1815i 34; also-I.3. 
Shaw: 1 Account', WMN, 1821 1 75. 
74. Shaw, Ibid., 
·A. Al bi·echt, 
121-122; see also CA LMS Letters, 
'Observations', n.d~ 
breast with a sharp instrument. They also collect all 
the milk belortng to a kraal (to dance and feast, 
B.L.). The entrails of the animal which was killed as 
the announcement of the ceremony, being dried and pounded 
into a powder, are now mixed with water with which the 
initiate is rubbed all over, and he is then declared to be 
a man in the presence of the whole kraa1. 1175 Shaw 
reported that the women had something called ''another 
slaughter, or another sacrifice. For this particular 
cattle, and none but particular persons are allowed to· 
partake thereof, the males are altogether excluded. I 
doubt not that this custom·has in former ages been 
intended as a sort of religious ordinance. 1• 76 
These accounts do not provide a complete analysis of the 
Nama production process. They do indicate, however, that 
these social formations had rich and diversified forms 
of production and cultural expression. It has also 
become clear that Nama society existed and ~eproduced 
itself independently of the Cape trading nexus. 
However, it would be mislea4ing ·to assume that by the 
time Namas and Orlams clashed, Nama groups were still 
entirely unaware of the expansion of the Cape Colony, or 
the significance of the commodities that found their way 
75. ,Campbell: Tra_ve1 s_, 310 ff. 
?6. B. Shaw, Op.cit., 121. 
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northwards. We may note here that some guns were 
owned by members of the Bondelswarts Namas in 1808. 77 
They also traded with the colonists on the other side 
of the Orange River by then, and were even reported to 
go on raiding and plundering expeditions to the ''Tamara 
nation" (probably Herero-speakers). 79 By 1820, Gamma 
Tsawoeb, head of the Gai-//khaun, was quite aware of 
. p-olitical power relations extending far beyond Namaland. 
Thus, when missionary Kitchingman refused to give him the 
shirt he requested, he said: "It is a strange thing that 
my people can get such things and I cannot, since there 
. ) G 80 is no-one greater than I or the \Cape ·overnor". 
The two groups of p~ople who met when the Orlams migrated 
into Namaland were fundamentally different. Unlike 
the Namas, Orlam kommandos were dependent for reproduction 
.on their links with the Cape. Furthermore, their social 
77. TLMS III, 319. Also, Kitchingman noted that 
the head of the Gai-//khaun desired guns as 
much as beads, see CA, LMS Journals, Kj_ tchingman, 
1820,15. 
78. TLMS III, 210. 
79. CA, LMS Journals, Albrechts, !\Feb., 1809. 
80. CALMS Journals~ Kitchingman, 1820, 16. 
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relations were infused with notions of commodity 
exchange derived from practices in the Colony. · This 
will become morec.e~id~nt in the next chapter, where I 
shall analyse the social forces op~rative in Orlam 
communities which were established largely in the 
1840s, after the phase of original alliances and conquest 
had come to an end. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ASPECTS OF THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORGANISATION OF ORLAM GROUPS 
In the preceding chapters we saw how kommando groups 
emerged in the Cape, pushed northwards across the Orange 
·River and heavily clashed with the pastoral Nama-speaking 
inhabitants of these areas. The Orlam invasion resulted 
in a tumultuous period mainly characterised by concquest 
but also by alliances between Nama and Orlam groups. 
This came to a conclusion around the mid·~l830s, when Orlam 
groups began to cluster around certain lea~ing families. 
They carved out territories for th~mselves and began to 
settle at 'headquarters'. 
In this chapter I shall analyse major aspects of political, 
social and economic relations of these communities 
as they emerged in the period from 1835 to 1850. Some 
of my material will be taken fro~ the two communities 
which existed in the earlier years of the century 
already, namely the people of Bethany and the Afrikaners 
at Jerusalem. Still, the process I shall analyse must 
largely be situat~d in the period 1835-1850. 
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4.1 THE SIZE AND POPULATION OF ORLAM GROUPS 
The size of the groups we are dealing with here ~s extreme-
ly difficult to assess, because missionaries and travelle~s 
were often unsure about the total number of outposts 
belonging to a settlement. Thus, Ander;sson once noted that 
Jonker's werft consisted of about 200 huts. "Of those 
there were perhaps 50 belonging to Darnaras and Bergdamaras. 
I should much like to know what portion of Jonk~f 's people 
this is. It is a rare thing, I believe, to see so many 
people together in one place 11 • 1 Generally,the 
missionaries were more concerned with the number of people 
at the main settlement rather than with the total figure 
of people claiming to belong to one particular group. 
Still, some very rough estimat5 are possible. An Orlam 
settlement did not usually have more than 1 000 people and 
often considerably fewer. As we will see later, there were 
probably economic reasons for such strict limitations on 
size. In the 1830s, it was estimated that the pop~lation 
of Titus Afrikaner's groups at Blydeverwacht and a nearby 
2 outpost amounted to 300-400 people. 
1. WA AP 2, 20 Feb. 1852. 
2. Cook: The ModerD:.' 75. 
Several years 
previously, Jonker had left this community with almost 
300 armed men and possibly an equal number of women to 
establish himself at Windhoek. 3 In 1815, it was noticed 
that the Bethany settlement consisted .of 100 huts, 
"sometimes more and sometimes less 11 • 4 This indicates the 
presence of at least 500 people. 5 At Amraal's place 
(first at Wesley Vale and then to the north at Gobabis) 
there were 400~600 people in the 184os6 , and the group,at 
Berseba under Paul Goliath was reported to number 700 
people. 7 Only under···Jonl{er Afrikaner was a larger scale 
settlement achieved, be it at Ni~is, Tsebris or Windhoek. 
In 1836 it was estimated that Niais was a town of l,~200 
8 
people, and in 1842 Windhoek was a settlement of 2.'000 
inhabitants. One thousand of these lived in Windhoek 
and another 1 000 'dependants' lived on its outskirts. 9 
3. G. Thompson: 
mentioned. 
Travels 291. ____,, The women were rarely 
4. CA LMS Journals Schmelen 1816, 32. 
5. CA HP 9, 19 Dec. 1848. 
6. J. Tindall: .Ib..e........Joµrnal, 129; Moritz. Cook to 
Backhouse;24 Aug.·1840,· 239. 
7. BRMG 1852,313. 
8. J. Alexander: JJ~..Q.QJl.fil"-¥..., London 1836 11, 154. 
9. t~orit_~ Klein;:":\chrr.itdt 1842, · 256; Hahn reported the 
same figure although at his time of writing there 
were only 700 people at the station, BRMG 1843,25. 
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The church which was built in Windhoek for 500-600 people 
10 was often reported to be "too ·small". . 
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In the following decades, howeve~ Orlam and Nama communities 
split up and contracted. For example, in the l~te 1850s 
Kaptein Amraal arrived at Hoachanas with 60 of his men, and 
11 these were considered to be "almost all his people". 
But I will examine this in greater detail at a later 
stage. 
~.2 THE KOMMANDO 
----4--;-2. 1 Numerical Strength __ of ~he Kommando 
As has been indicated in the last chapter, the institution 
of the kommando was a crucial instrument of surplus 
appropriation among Orlams. Furthermore, structures of 
subordination, political organisation and property 
relations arising out of the linkages with the Cape nexus 
were also·concentrated in the kommando. 
The kornmando usually consisted of only 10-50 armed men 
on horseback. Thus, Abraham· Albrecht· ·mentioned· the 
10. H.H. Diehl: 'Carl Hugo Hahn in Suidwest-Afrika', 
M.A., R.A.U. 19731 37. 
11. Quellen 5, 4 Jan. 1858. 
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depredations of nine armed Afrikaners. 12 Cook met Chief Bendel· 
with 20 men, armed and on horseback as .early as 1836. 1 3 
Similarly, missionary Tindall encountered Willem Swartbooi 
lLJ with 20 armed men. At another time, a Herera village 
was raided by 50 armed 'Namaquas' , 15 and a kommando of 
Jonker's was reported as passing Otjimbingwe with 20 men 
on horseback and 20 on oxen. 15 Sometimes, the kommando was 
larger" For example, Jonker went to Ovamboland with a 
kommando of "at least" 200 men. 17 At times, there was an 
iDsufficient number of men to ensure a successful raid.· 
Missionary Tindall reported that a "small kommando", having 
only two guns with them, tried to raid a Herera village but 
was unsuccessful; another of six armed men and some una~med 
'assistants' was also unsuccessfui. 18 
4.2.2 The Economics 6f Cattle Raiding 
The kommando's tasks, according to Legassick, "were 
simultaneously political and economic. It drew from both 
the indigenous and colonial systems but, as a band of 
t . l d f. d 1 1.- • • t . ff 
1 9 armed re ainers, 1a ·eu a c11aracterJ.s ics .. At the 
12. TLMS 111, 1127. 
13. Cook: ~f_h e m ~.s!.? .. T n_ , 62. 
14. J. Tindall: Tt1e .Journa 1, jO 
15. BRMG 1852, 29. 
16. BRMG 1853, 37. 
-------~ 
17. BRMG 18~) 3' 379. 
·~-. 
i.8 ~~- J. Tindall: ~Dye __ '.!_ournal, 142 
19. M. Legassick: '!Emergence' , 27 4 
level of social and economic organisation, the kommando 
replaced the kinship group. 
The spoils of raiding could be considerable indeed. 
Missionary Schmelen reported in 1814 that Titus Afrikaner 
had raided several kraals "of the Great Namaquas" and 
"robbed several thousand of sheep and cattle from them 11 • 20 
The scale of Jonker's gains among groups of Herera-speakers 
sometimes was immense. Hahn mentioned that 12 000 oxen were 
captured in one ra.id. 21 In another, Andersson estimated the 
number of stolen cattle at 18 ooo. 22 Similarly, when 
Jonker Afrikaner raided the Mbanden..r (the eastern section 
of Herera-speakers) in early 1846, his booty was about 
2 000-4 000 head of cattle. 2 3 
Raiding never involved large-scale violence. The following 
isa vivid and typical account. Moffat, wondering at the 
·success of a "small and inconsiderable body of banditti", 
reflected on their mode of warfare. "··· on one accasion 
Berend's party •.. unexpectedly carried off every ox and cow 
belonging to Afrikaner •.• After a desperate though unequal 
contest for a whole ~ay, having repeatedly taken and lost 
20. CA Ln1$Letters Schmelen 29 July 181Lf. -
21. CA HP 9; .31 Ma~ch 1852, 
22. WA AP 1, 6 Feb. 1851. 
23. CA ·Hp 9, 16 March 1846'. 
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thei~ cattle, they (the Afrikaners, B.L.) returned home''· It 
w01s only !3.fter a tactically very clever ambush that the cattle 
. 24 
could be retrieved again by the Afrikaners under Jager. 
The frequency of raids is even harder to assess than 
population figures and numbers of captured cattle: Yet 
it is possible to show that cattle raids were regular and 
took up a very considerable amount of the total labour time 
available. None of the Orlam communities settled in 
Namaland managed to sustain themselves for more than 
about five years without cattle raj.ding. For instance, 
when the Afrikaners ~nder Jager ·acquired a missionary.in 
1815 25 and Jager was baptised, the 'depredations' appear to 
have stopped for a time. This might not have been unrelated 
to the fact that people at Jerusalem received material 
-+\.e, 
t f . . d . 1 . . t 1 . d 2 6 supper romAm1ss1onary an· not on y sp1r1 ua gu1 ance. 
However, as early as 1818, Schmelen reported new raids by 
Titus. 27 As soon as Jager died.in 1823, regular raiding 
started anew under Jonker and his brother. 28 
24. R. Moffat: LabOl!:_!::.33,79-80. 
25. The decision to have a missionary, the need for one 
and its implications for the groups concerned will 
be dealt with in Chapter 6. 
26. Ebner: Reise, 298. 
27. CA LMS Letters Schmelen 6 Nov; 1818. 







Similarly, when Schmelen began his missionary activity among 
the Boois fEmily at Bethany in 181~, he did so only under 
the condition 0f 'peace' prevailing. 29 By 1819 Schmelen 
reported that a group. led by the chief's son had left 
the station to purchase guns from a sailor at Angra 
~ 
Pequena. On their way, however, they "began to quarrel 
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· 6 30 
with the natives and took an abundance of cattle and sheep. 
The same pattern can be observed for the communities in later 
years. When Knudsen began his missionary labours among 
the Orlams of Bethany in 1842, there were many baptisms and 
no cattle raids for a number of years. In 1847, Knudsen 
left for the Cape and the settlement at Bethany disintegrat-
ed. 31 By 1850 there were two houses left, and soon after 
Knudsen had returned he was expellect. 32 Kapt~in David 
Christian and his leading families only came back to 
settle at Bethany in 1855, under missionary Kreft. This 
was partly due to the fact that the weather in those years 
was extremely favourable and pastures abundant. Also, 
missionary Kreft cultivated tobacco for a number of years to 
attract people to the station. 33 However, only a few years 
later, conflict in Namaland accelerated when the so-called 
29. TLMS IV, 161. 
30. CA LMS Journals, Schrnelen 1819, 3. 
31. Quellen 3a, 13 March 1848. 
32. Ibid., 16 March 1850. 
33. BRMG 1856~ 2-12. 
/~// 
'Orlam-war' began in 1863, involving many cattle raids by 
the Bethany people and others.3 4 
The Berseba people followed the same pattern with only three 
1• raiding-free ti years. 35 So did Amraal 's group at Wesley 
Vale and Gobabis. After four years of 'peace: raiding 
began again in 1848, apparently even against Kaptein 
Amraal's wil1. 36 Likewise, Jonker managed to obtain a 
missionary after 17 years of settlement. From 1842-1846, 
Windhoek appeared to be a blossoming mission station under 
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a very peaceably inclined Kaptein. Yet, by the end of 1846, 
Jonker had incurred heavy debts which obliged him to under-
take a series of raids of the Mbanderu Herera; the 'peaceful' 
. times never returned.3 7 
It is difficult to establish how many raids would be 
carried out by a kommando in a given time period as raiding 
was not seasonally structured. The missionaries probably 
did ntt record every raid of the people they lived with. 
. ~ 
Also, missionaries were often absent on trips to the Cape, 
or to oth~r missionaries. Still, Tindall recorded at least 
34. see chapter 9 . 
35. Quellen 3a, 8 Jan. 1853. ----
36. J. Tindall: The Journal, 115. 
- ~···" 37. CA·HP 9' 1'6, Ma.rch 18Li6·. 
·" 
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one raid by Amraal's kommando each year from 1848 to 
1851. 38 Schmelen noted several raids by the people at 
Bethany in 1819. 39 There were also raids in 1820 and 1822. 40 
Schmelen himself had to leave the station and _Namaland shortly 
afterwards but remarked about 'war' and 'disorder' in almost 
every report of his sporadic visits until 1828. 41 
The assessment of Jonker's raiding activity presents more 
difficulties. The Afrikaner Orlams established relations 
of domination and subordination over substantial numbers 
of people living between the Kuiseb and Swakop Rivers. Thus 
what was called a 'raid' was often nothing but the collection 
of taxes or tribute. Still, even those operations were 
carried out by kommandos which moreover often traversed 
. d bl d. . 42 very cons1 era e isLances. The activity of Afrikaner 
38~ J. Tindall: The Journal, Cape Town 1859, 115, 131, 
141, 146. As these people's staple food, namely sour 
milk, was available all year round, it does not appear 
that raiding would be related to seasons and possible 
'hunger-gaps' as are known from agricultural societies 
in Southern Africa. 
39. CA LMS Journals, Schmelen 1819, 3.4. 
40. Ibid., ntchingman 1820, 9-10; Scb.melen·, 1821I1822, 
.22 March 1822. 
41. Ibid., Schmelen 1827, 1-2; CALMS Letters, Schmelen 
18 Oct. 1822. 
42T The distance from Windhoek to Walfish Bay is at least 
300 km depending on the route. Also, in the late 1850s 
Jonker began extensive raiding among groups of Ovambo-
speakers, more than 700 km distant from his head-
quarters, RMS KP March 1859: Petermanns Mitteilungen 
1860, 356,l10 author. 
,_. .. 
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kommandos was considerable. The missionaries reported not 
merely one or two, but se'veral cattle procuring kommandos 
each from 1848-1849. 43 Between 1850 and 1852, at least three 
to four Afrikaner kommandos were constantly 
themselves with catile. 44 
4.2.3 Hunting and the Kommando 
providing 
Another major activity of kommando groups was hunting. As 
I shall demonstrate later, hunting became increasingly 
structured by relati6ns of exchange based at the Cape. It 
involved larger number,sof people and always required a 
greater investment of time and energy than cattle raiding. 
This was probably due to the fact that communities either 
sent out cattle raiding kommandos (~hich meant conflict with 
their neighbours), or they went on long, drawn-o~t hunting 
expeditions. Both activities were alternative ways of 
procuring means with which to pay for European trade goods. 
43. Figures for 1846 in BRMG 1849, 122-125; BRMG Feb. 1847, 
13; CA HP 9,28 Feb. 1848; Quellen 20, 15 Apr. 1849; 
J. Tlndall: The Journal_, lrr::-·---
4 4 . CA HP 9 , 3 March 18 5 2 ; ibid . , 2 5 , March 18 5 2 ; i bid 31 
. ·March 1852; 
WA AP 2. 7 Apr. 1852. 
CA HP 9, 3 Aug .. 1850; 4 Sep. 1850; 30 Nov. 1850 ;. 20 
Aug. 1851; 20 Sep. 1851; WA AP 1, 6 Feb. 1851. 
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Although hunting for local consumption existed and will 
be looked at more closely in the following paragraphs, the 
example of Jonker demonstrates that hunting as early as the 
1840s was an activity similar to cattle-raiding both in 
its form and in its purpose. Both were vital in 
procuring commodities. Hunting pits, shooting enciosures 
at waterholes and other labour-intensive forms of huntlhg 
were never mentioned in connection with the Afrikaners, 
Hunting involved a high degree of capitalisation and even 
technology. As a missionary remarked in 1847: "Jonl<er 
Afrikaner ... today went away with all his kommando men to 
hunt elephants. He was accompanied by his friend Jan 
Laspert; a Bastard from Pella, ... who had given him a new 
wagon and horses and was promised tusks in return:'. ... " 
!15 
They stayed away for four weeks.· Some years lat~r, Jonker 
had extended his elephant hunting grounds as far north as 
Ot . d. 46 JOZOn JUpa. 
Dun±ng the 1860s, it was·· noted that the "big elephant 
hunt 11 led by Amraal from Gobabis could take ·up to six 
mon~hs under normal conditions. 47 The kommando went into 
the veld ~ith 50 riders on horse-back and spare hors~s, 
more than 20 wagons and was accompanied by ''a large number 
45. Moritz Kleinschmidt 1843, 224. 
46. WA AP 2, 15 Aug. 1851. 
47. BRMG 1863, 275. 
...... -
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of Damaras" Cs.ervants, B.L.) ~ Two weeks before they 
returned a ·trader artived in order to ''sell his powder 
and cash in the people's debts". Two other traders also 
arrived soon afterwards. They left Gobabis with 6 000 
. 48 
pounds of ivory altogether. 
These examples show clearly that hunting had become an 
activity similar to cattle-raiding. The value of tusks 
lay first and f~,most in the fact that they could be 
exchanged for other commodities. Thus, hunting was also 
firmly integrated into the Cape nexus. 
4.3 THE EFFECTS OF COMMODITY EXCHANGE ON ORLAM POLITICAL SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS-
The social and economic relations of the k·ornmando were 
fundamentally determined ·by commodity exchange with the 
Cape. This introd0ced a dynamic into the kommando which, 
as an institution, was largely, although not entirely, 
responsible for the patterning of wider social relations 
within the Orlam groups. 
The dynamics of incipient class relations were characterised 
by two connected factors of control. The one was that the 
centre of political power always rested with a relatively 
small, highly trained group of military men, (probably 




numbering between 18-50) who were the ones to organise 
'49 kommandos, gained most of the booty, . sent their wives 
and children to school and church, and displayed their 
superior status in what could be called 'conspicuous 
150 consumption. The terms generally applied to actual· 
control or policing functions were 'corporals' and 
104. 
'cornets'; the name Amraal itself was considered to be 
derived from the military term of 'Admiral 1 • 51 The military 
nature of organisation was a core feature that dictated 
the structure of many other aspects cif social organisation. 
The position of the Kaptein and his raad, the leaders of the 
kommando, was thus primarily based on their military 
skills in securing access to specific commodities like guns 
~nd horses or taxes and booty in cattle (which had a 
commodity aspect). In some instances, the Kaptein as leader 
of the kommando was able to extract tolls for the use of 
roads, royalties from European mining ventures, and fees 
for giving access to hunting velds. 52 This consolidated 
the Kaptein's power position within the kommando. 
49. ·For example, it ~as noted once that the people manning 
a kommando led · by Jan and Jacobus Boois were left 
highly dissatisfied, "because Jan and Jacobus have 
shar~d everything among themselves''· Quellen 3b, Sept. 
1866 (no day gi~en). 
50. cf. C. Frey: 'Jonker Afrikaner and his time', Journ~f 
the S.W.A. Scientific Societ~, 1, 1925-26. 
51. Kitchingman made remarks to this effect in 1825, see 
Kitchingman Papers, B.Le Cordeur and C. Saunders (eds), 
71; Loth: Mission, ·18. Explanations for Amraal'i name 
are in. J. Tindall: The Jou~nal, 58 (footnote by the 
editor). 




At the same time, military skills, which were acquired out-
side of any kinship structures, could be used by followers 
to gain access to sucih means of production as guns. Often, 
the leaders of the kommando were not able to control this 
process fully as they might have wished. 
On the other hand, this small military group. often controlled 
many thousan~of people around them. The r~lations of 
·surplus labour appropriation between these groups and the 
kommando were structured by pre-capitalist institutions 
as I shall demonstrate below. The power of the Kaptein was 
thus partly based on pre-capitalist forms of surplus 
extraction. In the following paragraph I ~hall try and 
elucidate this further. Some of these aspects of political 
and economic control will be examined only in chapters 8 and 9. 
An important reflection of the social and political structure 
of Orlam groups is the constitution or ''Ryksboek' which was 
first adopted in 1847 by the Orlam group at ~ethany. 
Similar constitutions were later adopted by Orlam groups 
at Berseba, and Windhoek as well as by Nama groups at 
53 Warmbad and Rehoboth. 
In accordance with the military nature of the kommando, 
the Ryksboek was characterised by strictLy patriarchal 
53. Ryksboek, bevattende alle wetten en regten van het 
kapi tei.nskap te Bethanie;bes taande uj_ t drie Boeken: 
1. Het Boek der Ryks-Geskiecienis 
2. Het Baek der Wetten, en 3. 
Bet Baek van Aanmerking~n. Typed copy WA A.8, 
Rust-Collection. Or.iginal in the :HMS: teiil"porarily 
.lost. For Ber seb& see Quellen, Jan-1853. 
For Warmbad & Rehoboth see Ch. 4. For ' Windhoek, 
see Chapter 8. 
t. 
notions. In contrast to the practice of original Nama 
groups 54 it was explicitl~ stated that Kapteinship i was to 
106 
be inherited by the 'next' or oldest· man in the Kaptein's 
family / be he brother, son or uncle. Under no ·circumstances 
was it to pass on to a woman. The Ryksboek contained 21 
paragraphs dealing with questions of political organisation. 
A'third part contained a large number· of 'laws'. These 
were mostly taken straight frcim the Old Testament but also 
from the New Testament. The harsh, unyielding and 
puritanical spirit of the old Israel te~emerged here to 
act both as a guide line and as justification for what 
already existed. At the same time, notions from biblical 
Israel were mixed with ideas derived from the experience of 
missionaries in their industrialised homelands and 
ideologies shaped by the expanding m~rchant capital. These 
various influences reflected upon the constitution and 
produced tensions that were maintained right through the 
decides under discussion here. 
Although leadership was largely defined outside of 
democratic processes (the Kaptein had the right to select 
two assisfants for life long service) ·democratic notions were 
apparent. Thus, all 'family heads' were given the right 
to refuse any of the seven members of the raad or council 
which was the actual governing body. Thei could present 
alternative mpn on the day when the raad was to be elected; 
women had no vote on this occasion. Among them there was 
-·-......--. ............ 
54. K~F.H. Budack; 'Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Gai-//khaun 
(Ro~e Nation)~ AH 1970, pp.49-62. 
( 
to be at least o~e 'elderly' (evangelist) and one 
interpreter. The Kaptein had no right to give any orders 
contrary to this and God's law •. The death sentence was 
mandatory for murder. The drinking of honey beer and 
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brandy and dagga smoking were forbidden. Council sitting~ 
were 'public' (excluding women)' and decisions had to be 
based on the majority of the 10 raadsmen. Marriages had to be 
monogamous; any wife othe~ tha~ the first was to be 
renounced. Also, married couples were n~t allowed to beat 
or bite each other. Yet the husband could accuse his 
wife in front of the raad cf unlawfulness. The raad had 
powers to sentence her to seven lashes and a day in the 
pillory. 'Masters' were allowed to flog their servant.::~ 
The maximum punishment was 40 lashes. 55 A whole section was 
devoted to the 1 Krygswetten' and also the 'Church Laws', 
indicating a strictli hierarchical structure. For example, 
there were different laws for the "overheid", for kings, 
. 56 
masters, fathers and men. 
This consititution did not work as it was intended to do. 
For insta~ce, it seems that the fi ve-yearf1 meetings and 
general electiomin Janu~ry, stipulated in it. did not take 
place very regularly. Certainly t~e death sentence was 
never carried ou_t, very much to the dismay bf the resident 
missionary. The drinking of honey beer and brandy as well 
as dagga smoking did not seem to ·have been stopped by these 
55. WI~ Ryksboek 2, paragraph 1--J.9. 
56. Ibid, ~lso Ryksboek 3. 
laws which constituted a constant source of conflict 
between the missionary and his 'supporters', and other 
members of the ·congregation. 57 Similarly, the pillory 
was probably more a threat than an actual practice. 
References to this punishment for women only are very 
rare indeed. These and other parts of the constitution 
attempted to provide a moral framework informed.by 
Christian principles and supported by clauses such as 
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those ensuring that at least one evangelist be a member of 
the raad. 
Most importantly, :this constitution clearly expressed in-
cipient class destinctiornand a form of democracy in 
political relations that is foreign to pre-capitalist 
kinship-based societies. 
Europeans have often noted these features and commented on 
them. Missionary SchBneberg, for instance, noted about 
the Afrikaners: "The sons of the desert enjoy an achievement 
that many in our fatherland strive for in vain .... they 
are part of th~ decision-mak~ng machinery and are not 
11 58 . 
treated by their chief as children. Likewise the 
traveller Galton noted that "neither Jonker nor any other 
Hottentot has supreme power in his tribe: for these people 
are most tenacious republicans .... 1159 The mere fact of 
---· -· --
57. See David Christian's case, chapter 8' 
58. BRMG 1853, 247-248. 
59. F. Gal ton: Narrative, 116. 
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asking ~ European to provide a cbherent legal framework 
for the ordering of social relations is significant. 
'Public' meetings open to all the men, the right to 
reject raads.._,men, the 'Krygswetten' with their laws for 
"kings, masters, fathers and men", must be seen as attempts 
to frame a generally valid code for fundamental definitions 
of power outside of any kinship structures. 
This is also borne out by the evidence on matr~momy. In 
pre-capitalist societies these relations of dominatio'n are 
most firmly embedded in kinship structures. The quest-for monogamy 
reflected in the constitution is highly significant. This 
must be seen as a clear indication that the accufuulation 
of followers, centered around the quest for wives and 
female dependants as producers and mothers 60 ~had. __ lost its 
centrality as the basis of accumulation. The basis of 
acc~mulation was moving rapidly towards the procuring of 
cattle and hunting produce for their value as exchangeable 
r 
commodities. The importanc.e of the latter was that it 
• J 
I I . 
could be exchang~ for guns, horses, wagons and other goods . ·, 
f 
that entrenched the dominance of the kommando within the 
political economy of the indiv~dual Orlam groups. 
--------------·--
60. On women's production, see below. Here as in early 
N~ma groups women would fuilk the cattle and their 
b~ilildren would herd them. Cf. chapter 3 
Monogamy was largely an actual practice that w~s confirmed 
in the constitutions rather than being a distant social 
ideal. For example, Moffat noted about 1820 that Titus 
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Afrikaner, Jonker's uncle, at Blyd~verwacht, "was the only 
individual of influence on the station who had two wive~11 61 
Knudsen stated about· Bethany in 1841i: 11 As far as polygamy ... 
is concerned I am glad that I am almost free of this 
difficulty.• There is nobody here anymore and only one 
man ih Gulbrandsdalen (who has two wives, B.L.). Of him 
I also hope that he will succumb to the prevailing mood 
62 and lawful feeling and will only keep the old woman}1 
The dominant factor of production was embodied in the 
kommando structure and not in pre-capitalist institutions. 
This can be demonstrated when one of the main bases of 
political office, namely cattle wealth, is examined. In 
contrast to pre-capitalist societies, wealth, in the 
context of the kommando groups, had acquired a specific 
character. Largely, it meant having adequate f.esources 
in terms of gurts, horses,and personal leadership qualitjes 
to mobilise a kommando and carry out successful raiding and 
hunting expeditions. However, it also meant holding cattle 
I 
as private proprrty- and n9 longer merely as magnet for 
the--·accumula tion of large numbers of followers. 
·-----··--------------
61. R. Moffat: Labours, 110 
62v Quellen 3a, 25 Oct. 1844 
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Thus, although David ,Christiani the second son of Kapt~in 
Kobus Bobi had ~nough followers to compete for the 
chieftaincy in 1842, his brother Jan was considered the 
richer of the two as he owned about 1 000 head of cattle.
63 
' Wagons, guns and horses 1n particular were purchased 
individually. This also indicates the importance of 
private ownership of commodities and means of production. 
The missionaries noted in 1849 that every ''financially 
6 ll 
sound Namaqua" would possess his own wagon. This sense 
of property status was als0 expressed in territorial terms. 
Urilike earlier practices among the original Nama groups.
65 
the Orlam settlements were all characterised by firm 
notions of 1territoriality.
66 
63. Moritz Kleinschmidt 1842, 250. 
64. RMS KP Apr. 1849 
65. See map 1... 
66. CA HP 9, 22 Apr. 1858, where Hahn related that Jonker 
Afrikaner desired to have borders to his territory 
established. Also, Amraal's people once fined some 
Veldskoendraers for having traversed Ttheir' territory 
without having asked permission, see J. Tj_ndall : The 
Journal, 35-~36. He also used to· mention 11 tl1e terri:tories 
of Amraal 11 , see Ibid, 87. 
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Political office was not only a function of military skill. 
The leaders of kommando groups as well'as their immediate mal~ 
family members were skilled iron workers and craftsmen. 
This was import~nt for servicing •. and rep airing wagons and 
guns, keeping horses, casting bullets and the like. 
These vital tasks required a thorough knowledge of Sali thing. 
Raadsmen apparently were 'naturally' smiths as we11. 67 
The brothers of David Christian, as well as Titus Afrikaner, 
Amraal (who was called a 'master builder') and Christoph 
Tibet who was second only to the Kaptein at Berseba, were 
all known as outstanding craftsmen. 68 
Thus political office was largely tied to areas of 
commodity exchange and not primarily to a process of social 
production centred within the community itself. This 
encouraged instability which manifested itself in weakness 
of controls. This is reflected in the tenuousness of 
political power, the conflicts characterising kommando 
I 
groups andthe ~ack of sanctions to conttol'breaches of 
social discipline, 
I 
Fo~ example, a kommando that went out to raid or to 
hunt was often ridden with conflict when it came to dividing 
~ 
the spoils. Kranlein in Berseba noted thatAhunting party, 
67. Moritz Kleinschmfdt 1843, 225. 
68. J. Ebner: Reise, 297; BRMG 1854, 125; E. Cook: The 
·modern, l 03, 123; j. Tindall: The Journal, 50; 
Quellen 3b, 28 Sept. 1853. · 
., 
who had just come back ffom'the Kalahari desert, had had 
mighty quarrels and had split into two groups: 6 9 Weber 
noted that at Gobabis it happened "very rarely" that a 
hunt was completed without serious quarreling.70 
Alternatively, people upon whom a Kaptein and his raad had 
counted would simply desert. 71 Similarly, as will be 
dealt wi. th in greater detail in chapter 8, Kaptei.n 's could 
not control access to arms and ammunition and tightly as 
they wished. 
There are other examples demonstr~titig difficulties of 
social control. A man in Arnraal 's group was once called 
to the Kaptein and received 23 lashes for being 
"determined to have two wives''· Then, because of 
"improper expression used during the infliction 
69. BRMG 1858, 108 
70. BRMG 1863, 272 
71. There must have ~xisted something like 'politics of 
desertion' about which we know very little because 
the missionaries were quite unconcerned about 
the relations between masters and servants at their 
settlement. However, Hahn once recorded having met 
some of Jonker's former people who had deserted him, 
CA HP 9, 21t July 1852. Andersson hoted that "many of 
113 
his Bergdamara and Namaqua have of late broken loose ... ", 
WA AP 2, 16 Aug. 1851. 
4.3.1 
--..__ 
of p~nishment, (he) was caught by a horseman and suffered 
45 additonal stripes which exhorted a promise of sub-
jection." 72 In another case, the raad ·"sat for three 
114 
.. 
days" to discuss the case, of a few stolen cows. 73 However, 
the clearest evidence of the inability of leadership of 
these groups to exert effective political control is 
provided by cases in the 1860~ when und~r 0 severe political 
pressure every Orlam settlement fragmented ,into two or 
mor\e·-factions and appeared to be at the point of 
disintegration. 74 
Relations of Domination and Subordination and the. Bol~. 
of the Cattle Post System 
Social relations were affected by processes of commodicisa-
tion in a crucial way as we saw. Yet social forms ex-
pressing pre~capitalist relations of production remained 
part and parcel of the kommando group. Labour processes 
still embedded in those relations continued to be important. 
I 
This created inherent contradictions and.tensions which 
were nevei;- solved by the grouos in question. I shall 
demonstrate later how merchant capital affected and 
subordinated these relations in Orlam (but also Nama) 
formations without ever becoming truly integrated. 
73. Ibid, 135 
74. See chapter 9 
J.15 
Thus a complete breakaway from pre-capitalist ~elations 
; 
was never achieved. This will become clearer when 
examining Orlam relations of domination and exploj.tation; 
the surplus labour appropriation of 'dependants~. 
Some of these relations found expression in the cattle 
post system. At the level of material consumption, cattle 
products together with veldkos, provided the mainstay for 
the subsistance of the Orlam settlements. This refers 
mainly to the milk but also to skins, and the meat of 
cattle, sheep and goats. No family possessing cattle 
would keep them all at 6ne kraal but rather distribute 
them i.n various outpo.s1's under the care of 'servants' or 
dependants. This was for a number of reasons. One was 
geographical; the scatcity of surface water resources 
made it difficult to keep very'large herds in one place. 
Secondly, the risk of loss through raiding, theft or ·the 
outbreak of a contageous disease among the cattle was 
considerably reduced if the cattle was scattered at 
different outposts. Also, the cattle posts made it easier 
to keep a record of numbe~ and natural increase. Lastly 
the cattle post system served as an important means of 
social control as it attracted a.no maintained the loyalty of 
followers and dependants. These were allotted a number of 
cattle to·look after and had the right to" live off the 
produce of the animals. This need for subservient labour 
meant that cattle owners were obliged to attract followers 
rather than accumulate commodities. It was the dependants· 
116 
I 
who counted in this system and not primarily the number 
of cattle. 
Cattle needed for consumption and breeding purposes, as 
well and. trade, would be kept at these outposts. Backhouse 
-
has furnished us with a description of an Orlam cattle 
post system in southern Namaland in 1840 which is similar 
to accounts of Khoi cattle keeping of earlier per~ods 75 
and also to that of pastoral groups Herero-speakers. 76 
It was noted that some Orlams "have considerable goat and 
cattle herds as well as many poor relatives who do service 
with them for payment which usually consists in cattle or 
hides. One ox or one cow, or two or three sheep, or 
goats in addition to fo6d, is the usual payment for one 
year's continued service. 1177 The missionaries noted in 
1852 about Bethany: "Some gen~lemen, like Cornelius 
(brother or Kaptein D.avid Christian, B.L.) had seven huts 
lying around their own one in which their Bushmen, that is 
their herdsmen, lived~ 11 7 8 
75. R. Elphick: Kraal and Castle, Yale University Press 
1977. 
76. W. Werner:'Investigation', 62-70. 
77. Moritz Backhouse 1840, 230. 
78. BRMG 1852, 309. 
Where those relations of dominance were established with 
Hau-khoi and Herero-speakers, this was due to the military 
superiority of the Orlam kommandos. For instance, it was 
reported that members of the Topnaar group had · 11 placed 
themselves under the protection of Jonker, and by herding 
his cattle many of them gained a competency.u79 The 
missionaries stated in 1852: "When meeting a Bergdamara 
herding cattle, these herds belong to the Narnaqua who 
have ordered or coerced these black people to be their 
80 herdsmen." Similarly, Tindall noted in 1846 while 
travelling," ... halted among rich and poor Cattle Dar:taras. 
81 The latter are cattle herds for Amraal and his people. 11 
Latter he went on to say: "Unyoked 'at a Cattle farm of 
·~ 
Amraal's. The village contained sixty-nine huts of Cattle 
t•82 
and Berg Damaras, and also Bushmen. At times, Herero 
servants were even employed to "regularly ... seek food in 
the field" for their masters and were· "given little or no 
wages. 118 3 Orlams also employed d~pendants to grow tobacco 
79. J. Tindall: The Journal, 39. 
80. BRMG,1852, 211. 
81. J. Tindall; op.cit., 90. 
82. ibid, 96. Similarly Keinschmidt noted about well-
to-do people in the veld of Bethany that they gave 
sheep and goats to Bergdamara herds who could keep 
the milk, Moritz Kleinschmidt 1842, 253. 
83. J. Tindall, op.cit., 143. 
117 
81.! 
for them and make copper ornaments. 
However, dependants were employed on other than these 
directly productive tasks. They had to be available fo~ 
118 
. . k d . . d 85 . d .c>. ht 86 service in omman 9s, as carriers, gui es an iig -ers, 
for road-building an~ repairing87 (which was crucial for 
. 88 
trade), for the collection and payment of taxes, as 
mess~ngers 89 and as guardians of a settlement's women and 
I 
children when most of the other men were absent raiding 
or hunting. 90 
Often there was a very substantial number of dependants 
involved. For instance Cbok noted in 1840 about Amraal's 
place that Amraal lived there with about 400 people. Th~n 
"there were servants and poor people,numbering 200, working 
1-10 miles away from the village (as well as) Bushmen and 
84. BRMG 1860, 214; CA HP 9, 1 Aug. 1846; Moritz Knudsen 
184 ' 143. ~ 
85. H. Knudsen: 'Nachrichten fiber die Damara und Nama', 
Afrikanischer Heimatkalender, 1963, 109. 
86. BRM~ 1852, 213; BRMG 1855, 51. 
87. BRMG 1849,201; E. Cook: The Moder~, 127; Moritz Hahn 
1846,226. 
88. T. Baines: Explorations in South West Africa, London 
1864' 73-74. 
89. BRMG 1969, 263, 270. 
90. CA HP 9, 26 July 1846. 
Hottentbtdependants who did not possess any cattle and 
lived near them in constant traffic with them, numbering 
a thousand. A thousand Bergdamara were .in a similar 
position. Amraal reighs over these people of different 
tribes as a little king ... 1191 Also, references to whole 
villages "belonging" to one or other of the Orlam Kapteins 
are quite frequent. Thus, Galton noted in 1851 that ''hardly 
a Hottento~ lived at Elephant Fountain• but there were 
large werfts of Bergdamara there who of course belong~d 
to Amira1. 1192 Andersson in 1854 counted the people of -
Jonker' :!i place and concluded "that the aggregate of 
Namaquas cap~ble of carrying arms did not exceed five 
hundred. The servants, or rather sl~ves, .on the other-
119 
hand, consisting of bushmen, Hill Damaras and impoverished 
Damaras, were probably three to four times as numerous. 119 3 
Here we can see clearly how a rather small group of men 
was able to establish relations of domination and 
exploitation over large numbers of dependants·, in a 
way reminiscent of feudal and other non-capitalist forms of 
extraction in Europe and other parts of Africa. 
91. Moritz Cook 1840, 239. Elsewhere, Cook stated that 
li"Within a day's journey" from l\.mraal's place one 
would find 1 000 people, The m~der:E._, 119. 
92. F. Galton: Narr~tive, 263; similarly, Kleinschmidt 
mentioned aHau-Kho1 werft of in huts which was 
"subject to Jonker" k1or::_:!:tz 1842, 254. 
93. C. J. Andersson: Lake Ngami, London 1856, 286. 
·..: 
Here we must also consider the relations that the 
Afrikaners established with various groups of Herera~ 
speakers. These were exceptional as far as Namaland 
120~ 
was conce~ned and formed the basis of Jonker's ·hegemonic 
position. The Afrikaners extracted tribute in labour 
services and cattle from these groups for several decades. 
However, these relations will be considered in detail only 
in chapter 7. 
Yet, even these relations of surplus appropriation embodied 
in the cattle post system were dependent for their repro-
duction on the Cape trading nexus. This was because the 
cattle wealth which attracted and kept followers consisted 
of raided cattle or was acquired as a form of taxation from 
Herera-speakers. Such wealth could not have been main-
tained without a constant supply of horses and arms and 
ammunition. Thus, even in an examination of the pre-
capitalist relations which formed some kind of 1 productive 
base= for Orlam groups, the overriding importance of the 
factor of exchange cannot be overlooked. 
4.3.2 Notes on Cosmolog~ 
.~ 
At the superstructural level, surviving remnants of pre-
capitalist rituals and customs inherited from pastoral 
Khoi groups were combined with social practices borrowed 
from the westernised lifestyle of the Cape colony. We 
find little or no evidence of rites that would serve 
to reproduce a society based on pre -capitalist processes 
of production structured by kinship. There were no cults 
of reverence to the chief among Orlams other than a 
brief reference to the chief being given the best piece 
of meat of slaughter animals. 94 Similarly, there was 
only a single reference to lbbola among Orlam groups. 
This was recorded by Ebner in 1815 at Jerusalem where, 
if any of Titus Afrikaner's men wanted to marry, "his 
121 
father goes to a family which seems decent to him, chooses 
a partner for him and asks the parents whether they are 
prepared to give their daughter to his son in marriage. 11 
The bridegroom then gave his bride's parents "a present 
. 05 
of a few head of cattle. 11 .7 
These rites were not very elaborate when compared to 
those of other pastoral peoples.The number of cattle was 
not specified but seems to have been negligeable (mehr 
oder weniger Stack Vieh) . This means that.by the 1820s 
this custom had been stripped of its social-economic 
significance and only retained symbolic value. 
·-----------------~--.. --
94. H.C. Knudsen: 'Notizen', GC SAPL, n.d., 24. One of 
the great difficulties of finding evidence on Orlam 
customs is that by the time missionaries and tra-
vellers sat down to write about them, the differences 
between them and the original Nama inhabitants had 
become sufficiently blurred to make them talk about 
'Namaquas' rather than specifying. 
There is very little evidence of initiation rituals. 
Knudson did record that the youth to be initiated had to 
--
shoot one head of game. The father then struck a piece 
of iron and said to his son: stand motionless like the 
Great Brukaros. The girl to be initiated had to sit with 
her back to the mat hut and apparently the intestines. of 
slaughtered cattle were placed arounrl her body. 96 A 
similar procedure was applied, according to Tindall, when 
it was suspected that a woman was pregnant with twins. 97 
Yet certain Khoi customs were known in Or lam communities, 
even if many of them were supplanted by other habits in 
the course of decades. For instance, the story of the 
hare and the moon was widely known. The taboo on eating 
122 
the hare demanded by the myth was still observed in Bethany 
in 1815. 98 Also, at Niais- in 1836 the women still wore 
skin head-coverings 99 and the tradition of dancing 
96. Knudsen: I Notizen I' GC SAPL' n .d., 8 
97. J. 1'indall: Th~_ Journal, 133 
98. CA LMS Journals S6hrnelen 1815/1816, 3, noted that 
when Bethany people find a hare in the field "they 
will tore them (sic) to pieces and say, It is your 
fault that I do not become alive again." 
99. J. Alexander: Discovery, 11, 183. 
.... ii .. 
o: .. .µ 
the reed-dance and the pot dance was very much alive 
at least until the 1860s in Orlam communities. 100 
Similarly, the 'hous', a game played with holes in the 
ground and beads long retained its popularity. 101 
Christianity and commoditisation processes eroded not 
123 
only the pre-capitalist base but also the beliefs in magic 
·and skill in healing which it had sustained. The practice 
or removingllittle objects from a sick person's body, 
p~rformed by a 'witchdoctor' was still prevalent among 
the Afrikaners in Windhoek in the 1840s. 103 The"wide-
spread presence of 'witchdoctors' was often deplored by 
missionaries. In later years they were usually encoun~ 
. 
tered as individuals wandering from settlement to settle-
ment and no longer established within any single group. 
There was the case of 'witchdoctor' Kullmann near Berseba who 
to the missionary's great dismay, had 'infiltrated' his 
congregation. Kr6nlein described the operations that were 
performed on a dying man in Beseba by Kullmann: his body 
was greased with red ochre and fat, then a string of beads 
was placed around his body and he was lightly flagellatect 104 
100. J. Alexander, Ibid., 162, 183; BRMG 1854, 179 
about dancing at Jonker's place; CA HP 9, 7 March 
1853; cf. also the remarks about the- 'musician of 
Bethany', BRMG 1855. 
101. BRMG 1855, 280. These remarks should be·compar~d 
with the section on Nama rites and customs, Chapter 3-
102. Moritz Backhouse l840, 235. 
103. '. CA HP 9, -13 Oct.. 1845. 
I 
104. BRMG 1862, 225. 
124 
with little sticks. 
An interesting description of a practice of the 19th 
century wab ·~iven by Artdersson. He explained that by aiform 
of ~accinationr initiates either had to drink animal 
poison,· be bit ten by a snake or another poisonous 
animal, or else had to have the poison "cut into their 
b d . II 105 o ies . He went on to say that "a shirt, a hand-
kerchief, a cap ... worn by such persons till they became 
perfectly black, is considered by these people as the best 
and surest remedy against all diseases, poisonous bites 
etc. A corner of it is put into water and washed clean. 
The water is then given to the patient - be it man or 
. 106 
beast - to drink." This is a example of how a 
potentially highly effective and skilled healing device 
(the vaccinated man could obviously suck the venom from 
snake bites without danger to himself) was subverted 
into a fake. 
4 ·• 4 EFFECT$ OF COMMODITISATION ON BRANCHES OF PRODUCTION 
Those domestic industries and labour processes which had 
been most clearly linked pre-capit~list relations of 
----------------------~---------··--·-· ----
105. WA AP 2, 7 OCt. 1851; Knudsen reported the same 
practice, 1 Notizen 1 GC SAPL, n. d., 27. 
106 WA AP 2, 1 Oct. 1851. 
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production, like cattle breeding and hunting, were not 
only affected by the modes of commodity exchange 
expressed in the komm~ndo structure, but in fact became 
subordinated to them. An examination of such processes of 
subordination will a]ow us to see more blearly the extent 
to which the kommando form of commoditisation was truly 
locked into the ~ocial dynamic of these communities. The 
kommando system produced a dynamic which not only bred 
large~scale conflict but most seriously undermined ~he 
weak 'inner' productive base set up by the ruling groups. 
4.4.1 The declining importance of cattle breeding skills 
A strong point in favour of this argument is provided 
by the evidence of cattle breeding. Successful cattle 
breeding in Namaland and Damaraland involved a certain set 
of technical skills, which were socially defined. In this 
case, as in developed capitalist societies, technical 
knowledge must be seen as a social relationship; cattle 
breeding was essentially a social skill. It goes almost 
without saying that specific controls had to be ex9rcised 
. 
to enforce the appropriation of the surplus labour 
needed for such"labour-intensive activities as the watering 
of cattle. 
These social skills were not developed in the kommando 
groups. In the process· of accumulation for commodity 
exchange these cattle breeding skills had either been 
• 
126 
lost or were otherwise lacking. On a social and political 
level their importance was supplanted by skills of a 
different nature: cattle raiding and bush warfare by 
strictJ.y disciplined and purposefully led kommandos. 
---. _____ _ 
Thus the number of cattle owned by Orlams was invariably 
much smaller than the estimates given for original Nama, 
· 1 • 
or Herera, herds. No Orlam Kaptein was ever said to own 
the."great numbers of cattle" and the "abundance of milk" 
which Kitchingman noted at a kraal of the Gai-//Khaun 
near Bethany in 1820. 107 The 400 oxen which Jonker 
apparently called his own in the 1840s108 (together with 
100 oxen grazing at the Bay among Topnaars) 109 seem 
negligeable compared to the 4 000 or 12 000 he was supposed 
to have carried off as tribute from Herero-speakers. 110 
\ 
107. CALMS Journals Kitchingman 1820, 15. 
108. Moritz Hahn 1846, 209. 
109. BRMG 1855, 204. It·i$ ·interesting to note in this 
respect that it was estimated that a fa~ily of five 
persons (incl. children) would need an average of 
five cows, 15 goats and 15 sheep to subsist. CA HP 
9, 4 May 1856. If there were only 1 000 people 
around Windhoek in the 1830s and 1840s (wh;~ is an 
extremely moderate gues~, they would have required 
5 000 head of cattle, 15 000 goats and 15 000 sheep 
for subsistance alone, let alone trade guns, wagons 
and horsesw This may serve as an indication of the 
scale and nature of Orlam indebtedness. 
110. c~ ftns. 20 and 21. Interestingly, Arldersson and 
Calton .once tried to work out how much cattle 
Herera-speakers in the north possessed - that is, those 
they knew of, excl. the eastern section. Andersson 
concluded that they had "only" about 80 000. WA AP 
1, 6 Feb. 1851. 
The 1 000 head of cattle owned by Jan Boois of Bethany, 
the richest of old Kobus' sons, 111 did not compare 
with the 10 000 head of cattle which Oasib and his Nama 
dependants still owned in the 1850s. 112 
Furthermore, Orlam communities, in contrast to Nama or. 
Herera groups, did not dig wellsOto water their cattle, 
because they had become military men rather than cattle 
breeders. The extremely laborious and time consuming 
task of well digging was accomplished with primitive 
127 
tools before the watering of each and every head of cattle 
113 I could even be started. ts accomplishment obviously 
required a very high degree of labour coercion, control 
and general social energy focussed on it. In Orlam 
groups these energies were. directed at raiding, rather 
than at tending cattle. It was only Herera servants 
or dependants; (forced at the barrel of a gun traded 
from the Cape!) who would water the cattle from wells. 
When Tindall had his cattle watered at one of Amraal's 
outposts, he noted: "The Damaras were standing in the 
wells, ladling the water out with deep wooden vessels, 
111. BRMG 1849, 209. 
112. Quellen 5, 4 June, 1854. 
113. A. Albrecht offered a detailed description of thi~ 
see TLMS III, 212;cfalso Andersson's notes on cattle 
tending among Herero-speake~s, Lake, 316-318. 
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and pouring it into troughs out of which the cattle 
drank. Several hundred ... were watered in about an 
hour and a half 11 • 114 At the same time, he was "borne 
down with grief in every place where I met with Hottentots 
to see their cattle crowding in great numbers into mud 
holes to drink, and the people drinking out of the same 
shallow pools, when a few hours of digging would produce 
. 115 0 
a supply of pure clean water." 
This had consequences. For instance, it made permanent 
settlements virtually impossible and greatly increased. 
dependence on supplies of surface water, which was 
rarely avail~ble in Nama- and Damaral~nd. Also, under 
such circumstances, pastures around surface water were 
bound to become quickly exhausted and unable to support 
stock. We::·encounter · frequent:~referen:ces to pastures 
~xhausted after only a decade or so of settlemen~ 
. 11- d . . t t. 116 espec1a y aroun mission s a ions. Knudsen recorded 
in 1844 that "the cattle Damara digs de~p holes next 
to riverbeds and draws water out of them quite unlike 
the Namaqua (sic., Orlam) who migrates to a different 
place or a fountain as soon as the water in the river 
114. J. Tindall: The Journal, 91. 
115. Ibid., 87. 
116. On Berseba, see BRMG 1854, 113; BRMG 1858, 158; on 
the veld of Bethany, see Quellen 3b, 10 June 1853; 29 
Dec. 1862. By 1861 all Nama stations were collect-
ively called "bad" although the missionaries had 
made sure originally that water, springs and 
·.~pastures were abundantly available. RMS KP 
June 1861, paragraph 3. 
bed is exhausted. 11117 To quote just one further 
example, Wesley Vale, which was initially praised by 
both Tindall and Cook in the 1840s 118 for its abundance 
of game and its "many fountains which are all being 
cleared by the people "1 was abandoned only a few years 
later. Moreover, these had been years of relatively 
good or very good rainfall. 119 Rapidly exhaust~d of 
its resources, Wesley Vale was considered "useless" as 
a station; 120 its fountain was apparently "too small" 
and this caused Amraal
1 
and his group to move north. 121 
117. Mo~itz Knudsen 1844, 155. Knudsen only worked 
129 
among Orlams and by the 1840s no longer distinguished 
between Orlams and Namas. 
118. Cook: The Modern, 119, 165; J. Tindall: The. 
Journal, 38. 
119. Cook reported excellent rainfalls at Wesley Vale 
in October 1842, op.cit., 163, 166. J. Tindall 
stated that in 1846 rains were so good that the 
Nosop was even flowing for many days, op.cit., 
98. In a similar vein, the year 1848 seems to 
have been one of fantastic rains,BRMG 1848, 97-102. 
120. F. Galton: Narrative, 255. By that time, the 
climate had apparently dried out considerably, 
see Ibid., 253, 299; Andersson: Lake, 324, BRMG 
1852' 124. 
121. .E.MS- KP March 1856, paragraph 1:5. Even in the 
1840s, under Tindall, Amraal and most of his 
community had moved away to Gobabis, and could 
only live in' Wesley Vale by constructing dams, 
J. Tindall: The Journal, 112, 125, 128. 
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The tending of cattle in fact was such a low-ranking 
task among Orlam'groups that even those precious surface 
waters like fountains, springs or river pools were 
allowed to become clogged by dirt, mud or vegetation. 
They were not cleared except on missionaries' initiative. 
Thus, Samuel Hahn once helped Tibet's congrega6ion to 
clear their fountains. 122 Similarly, i-lhen Kleinschmidt 
visited Jan Booi and his people east of Rehoboth, he 
found all the men absent. He commented that "hearing 
the rumour of my arrival they had quickly begun to open 
and clean a fountain three hours southwards from here'' 
so that Kleinschmidt might be impressed enough to settle 
with them there. 123 Knudsen actually reported having 
had to blast a rock in order to "enlarge" the local 
spring. 124 
The missionaries in 1852 explained that the 'Namaquas' 
(here meaning the Afrikaners) were arrogant and vain 
but no real pastoralists: " with their bad house-
keeping, their clothes are soon in rags. They don't have 
any income and have to satisfy all their needs from their 
herds, and those are not very big, especially since they 
care little for their cattle. 
122. Quellen 3a, 29 March 1848. 
123~ BRMG 1861, 72. 
124. Quellen 3a, 10 Feb. 1E44. 
To put any effort into 
his cattle other than to move it from one place to the 
125 next does not easily go into a Namaqua's head ~--"· 
Similarly, Knudsen noted about Tibet's group (later 
part of Berseba): "If they have cattle, this is their 
only mainstay; if their herds get depleted, their life 
131 
goes, or they become Bushmen again". This was happening, 
0 
he went on to explain, due to a lack of pasture when 
people lived at a mission station, and also through 
"the purchase of clothing, etc. Those who have any 
possessions (in cattle, B. L.) mos ti/ hang on to it greedily 
but they must have powder and lead at any cost and must 
..• , pay dearly for it. The native may see something he 
likes ... a silk scarf or so, and even if he had to give 
his last sheep for it he has to have it ... ". 126 Hahn 
'summed up his observations of 20 years in a very similar 
way. Having noted that their water holes were dirty, 
he explained that 'the Namaquas' decidedly were not 
t 1 . t r 11 127 pas ora lS S av a . 
125. BRMG 1852, 28. 
126. Moritz Knudsen, 1845, 158. 
127. Quellen 30, Hahn's Heimreise, 1873. 
Thus there is almost a circulo virt·uosis here in that 
the lack of skill or care in cattle breeding increased 
the importa.nce of raidin~ so that relations of exploi-
tation could be produced. This in turn not only 
accentuated social and political disinterest in pastoral 
skills, but also depleted natural resources in a most 
fundamental and irreparable way. Similar dynamics 
132 
and pressures become obvious when we look at the relations 
between hunting for consumption and commodity· exchang~. 
~.4.2 The Transition From Hunting for Local Consumption 
To Hunting for Trade 
Trade, especially of a local nature in skins, hides and 
other animal products, probably took place among many 
communities. It also seems that still ip. ., •· the 1840s 
(and even before that) hunting was undertaken mainly for 
the purpose of consumption. This is even more likely 
when considering the general pressures on cattle breeding. 
Thus, Galton's typical description does not show hunting 
as being part of exchange relations with the Cape. 
He noted that Kaptein Amraal and 40 of his men used 
to "take their wagons with them for some days and then 
make an encampment, whence they journey short distances 
on ride-oxen and shoot what they can, bringing the 




it can dry in the sun, B.L.). 
128 
Al though·,not directly linked to the accumulation of 
exchange goods, this kind of hunt still led to a very 
massive depletion of game resources. Andersson, for 
instance, noted in 1854 east of Windhoek: "From the 
' 
number of bleached bones of rhinoceroses, giraffes and 
other wild beasts scattered about, it was evident that· 
game had at one time been abundant in these parts 
11129 
Similarly, while Cook and Tindall had commented frequently 
th b d f . 11 h. l 3° h . on e a un ance o game, especia y r inos, w en 
visiting Amraal only ten years later, the traveller 
Galton had to trek several days eastward to meet his 
first rhinoceros.· He also observed that the whole 
central area of northern Namaland was sorely depleted 
. 131 
of game. From their big hunt of 1858 into the 
Kalahari, the Bethany Kommando brought back 32 elands, 
40 gemsbok and 20 zebras. This was considered very 
. 132 
satisfactory. Obviously; the veld arm~nd Bethany, 
which extended right to the seashore, no longer yielded 
128. G. Galt6n: Narrative, 258. There are more references 
to hunting for consumption, see BRMG 1855, 86, on 
the annual hunt for game "to the east"; also Quellen 
3a 29 Sep. 1848; BRMG 1858, 106. 
129. Andersson: Lake, 368. 
130. Cook: The Modern, 129. 
131. F. Galton: Narrativ~, 255 ff. 
132. BRMG 1858, 106. 
0 
anything approaching these numbers. 1.33 
However, even ih ·th~:~840s hunting linked to the trade 
nexus based at the Cape was practised by Jonker who 
controlled access to the northern hunting veld 13 4 
and who often engaged in elephant hunting together with 
his associates. Even then Jonker and his kommando had 
134 
I33. It is interesting to note in this respect that 
people who were usually subjected to an exploitative 
relationship with Orlams and Namas, Hau-khoi and 
so-called Bushmen,were repeatedly reported to be 
engaged in making pitfalls and.huge hunting appa-
ratuses from fencing with thorn bushes, apparently 
even as late as 1866. Thus, Andersson, on 
approaching Swartbooi's werft in the Erongo 
mountains, noted "immense fences for game (which) 
met our eyes ~n every side, and I was stupid enough 
to attribute their-construction at first to the 
Namaqua, but of course they would be too lazy 
for such exertion. Indeed, the labour must have 
been gigantic. The Bergdam~ra, as usual~ are 
the constructors ... " WA AP 11, 13 Nov. 1866. 
For similar references aS-well as on 'shooting 
houses' near waterholes and pitfalls, see H. Tindall: 
Two Lectures on Great Namaaualand and its Inha-
bitants, Cape Town, 1856, j1; BRMG 1849, 202; 
J. Tindall: The Journal, 38, 68; BRMG 1852, 
211; BRMG 1800, 209; Quellen 5, 24 June 1857. 
Most unfortunately, there is absolutely no indi-
cation as to whether the exploits of this 'non-
kommando' type hunting WQ~ part of the exploita-
tive relations established between Orlams and 
their 'dependants', although this appears to be 
very likely. 
134. Moritz Kleinschmidt 1843, 224. Kleinschmidt 
added: ''· .. The elephant hunt in these areas 
is entirely in Jonker's hands". 
0 
to travel at least eight days to meet elephants. 
Obviously the animals had already ~tarted to retreat 
into the interior. 135 A year later Saul and Petrus 
Boois (of the Kaptein's family at Bethany) planned to 
join Jonker in an elephant hunt but apparently stayed 
at Bethany. 136 . In the 1850s Amraal, the Kaptein 
located next to the elephant hunting grounds, was 
"visited annually by trading caravans from the Bechuana 
tribes in the northwest of Lake Ngami 11137 and also 
planned to go on a big elephant hunt. 138 
In the 1850s leading men from Bethany began to hunt 
135 
elephants in: ·the north "instead of raiding" for the first 
time. - David Christian defended them against the mission-
aries' allegations, saying that they were not going on 
a raiding kommando, they "went only to get the tusks 
and hides of the elephants in order to sell them so that 
. 13q 
he would finally have some money in his hands". -
However, when the Cape traders became increasingly 
interested in elephants' tusks and especially in ostrich 
135. Moritz Kleinschmidt 1843, 224, op .. cit. 
136. Moritz Knudsen 1844, 152 
137. JBRMG 26, 23 
138. BRMG 1856, 236. 
139 .· Quellen 3b, 15 Oct. 1853. "' -----
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feathers, a boom set in. The importance of hunting 
for consumption fell well behind the need to produce 
hunting goods for trade. Thus, F. Kreft noted in 
January 1863, for the Bethany area: "At the beginning 
of the year the men had gone to hunt ostriches for four 
to five weeks. For some years now the ostriches are 
hunted in great quantities because the feathers are so 
precious. They are chased to death in the noon heat. 
Many a horse loses its life this way 11 • 140 A little later 
he reported: "After New Year 1864 almost all men went 
to hunt ostriches, because the traders shout for f8athers 
only~141 This hunting was so extensive that the ostr~ch 
flocks became seriously depleted: "The local people have 
been on a hunt 6 - 8 days northwards from here because 
the ostriches in this area are already nearly extinct 11 ~ 42 
Kreft commented. However, this did not make the 
143 hunt for elephants less attractive to many groups. 
These ~xamples demonstrate that even activities that 
were formerly steeped in pre-capitalist relations arid 
geared to the self-sufficiency of the community, changed 
140. Ibid., Jan. 1863 (no.day given). 
1111. Ibid., Sep. 1861~. 
142. Ibid., 18 Nov. 1869. 
143. For example, the k&mmando froc ·Berseba planned to 
join Amraal in an elephant hunt, BRMG 1861, 259-260; 
Jonker and others were reported to organise hunts 
togeth~r with Amraal, BRMG 1862, 48; BRMG 1863, 
277 .. 
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radically in character under the pressures of commoditi-
sation. This then served to tighten the exchange nexus 
with the Cape and consequently people became more 
dependent on hunting for their daily existence. 
4.4 .3 The Un.viability ... of Domestic Production 
It was not only in hunting and cattle breeding but also 
in most other productive activities within 9r1am com-
munities that labour time was directed away from produc-
tion and repraduction. It was now being invested in areas 
closely connected with the Cape trade nexus. 
In the same way that cattle breeding skills were lacking~ 
or being lost, the production of household items appears 
to have become subordinate to the production of goods 
for their exchange value. The importation of European 
manufactures became increasingly important. Skills 
that were no longer handed down from one generation to 
the next became lost so ·chat the .dep~~sJ.~nce. on trade 
items from the Cape was considerably increased. Andersson 
drew Jonker's daughter in her 'native dress' in 1851 1 
k k t t 144 h"l wearing as in apron, a s in ha , beads, e c. 1 w 1 e 
Alexander reported 15. years earlier that the women at 
144. WA AP 2, 22 Aug. 1851. 
( 
138 
Niais were wearing aprons and skin hats. 145 Twenty 
odd years later photographs of Jan Afrikaner, his raad 
and a group of women from Jan Afrikaner's werft do not 
show a single piece of clothing made from local materials, 
let alone in 'native' or 'traditional' style. 146 
From the 1840s onwards, we can observe an 'in-between' 
stage where European style clothing became the rule 
although it was still largely local~y produced. 
Thus it was reported about Jan Booi that he was wearing 
"skin trousers and a skin jacket, a white night cap under 
his grey hat, a pair of local veldskoen but no shirt 11 • 147 
A similar process is apparent in the production of house-
hold items. Among the few items manufactured by men 
even as late as the 1840s were wooden bowls, skin buckets 
for water and milk 148 and pipes made from soapstone 
145. Alexander: Discovery, II, 183. 
ing the use of richly decorated 
and aprons among the Afrikaners 
Ebner: Reise, 135. 
See also Ebner describ-
sheepskin __ karosses 
in Jerusalem, 
146. See Appendix A. 
lli7. Moritz Knudsen 1842, 138; Knudsen: 'Notizen', GC SAPL 
n.d. 20; Moritz Backhouse 1840, 231; B: ~idsdale: 
Scenes and Adventures in Great Namaqualand, London 
1883, 177. At the same time, material from Europe 
became a very important trade item, see RMS KP 
Aug. 1845, appendix. This contains a list of 
the most important import articles totalling 49 of 
which 15 are materials and sowing articles. 
148. Moritz Kleinschmidt, 142, 249. 
0 
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(which could apparently be produred at several places 
in Namaland and were part of a countrywide industry). 149 
There was still a limited degree of craftwork being 
practised. 150 However, all references to this limited 
domestic production are centred around the early 
decades of the century: by the 1860s and '70s such things 
are never mentioned while the import of European pots 
and pans had already become significant by the 1840s. 151 
0 
On the other hand, the brewing of honey beer gained in 
importance and was supplemented by the distilling of 
brandy, from the mid-1850s onwards. To make brandy 
149. Ebner, op.cit., 134: The stone was also found on 
the way from Angra Pequena to Bethany, Quellen 3b, 
9 July 185~and pipes were made by people as far 
north as Jan Booi and his group, BRMG, 1859, 
28. The social relations structuring this 
particular industry and local trade i tern. remain 
quite obscure after extensive research. We can 
assume that certain exploitative relationships 
established by Or~am and Nama groups incorporated 
pipe-making but there are other instances where 
exploited groups maintained a degree of autonomy 
through trading these pipes, see Gurich: 
Deutsch Sudwest-Afrika. Reisebilder und Skizzen 
aus den Jahren 1888 and 1889. Hamburg, 1891, 141. 
150. See footnote 142, also Moritz Backhouse 1840, 235. 
151. RMS~KP Aug. 1845, Appendix. 
140 
a liquid had to be pressed from 'reseintje berries' 
(which had formerly been a staple foodstuff because 
of their high nutritious value). 152 "The liquid is 
boiled in an iron pot, with a wooden lid, in which an 
opening is cut, and a common kettle is inverted upon it; 
to the point of the kettle a gun-barrel, from which th~ 
breech has been removed, is attached; around this clothes 
are wrapped which are kept constantly wet with cold 
water; every apperture at which vapour might escape 
is carefully sealed with clay, and a vessel placed at 
11 153 the end of the tube receives the liquid. Alcohol 
b · t t 154 I 1 t h b d ecame very impor an . n a er years, w en ran y 
·was not available from traders and the natural reserves of 
honey or berries wereadepleted, people started to buy 
sugar from traders to make their beer. 155 Drinking, 
dancing and smoking appear to have been very widely 
practised, which does not seem to reflect the missionary 
152. BRMG ,1855, 19. 
153. H. Tindall: Two Lectures, 43. His father noted 
that by 1849 people at Amraal's place had taken 
to brandy drinking, having "acquired the art of 
distilling from the colonial farmers who formerly 
held some of them in bondage". J. Tindall : The 
Journal, 130. Jonker and the people around Jan 
Booi were also reported to have distilleries 
going, CA HP 9, 2 Jan. 1859; Ibid., 6 July 1856. 
154. For example, Ibid., 4 Sep. 1845. See also the 
'Ryksboek' WA A.8, where honey beer, brandy and 
dagga were summarily forbidden. 
155. Qucllen 30, Hahn's Heimreise, 1873. 
141 
sensitivities expressed in the sources. Hahn, for 
instance, noted that at Jonker's place there had been 
a big party again: "From New Year's till January 4 they 
had not stopped boozing, dancing -- 111 5 6 Such festivities 
played an increasingly important role in discouraging 
disaffected followers from deserting to other groups. 
This trend clearly demonstrates how positively ·labour was 
locked into the sphere of exchange relations with the 
Cape. Large resources of labour were invested in iron-
working, roadbuilding and repairing. The importance 
of maintaining wagons, guns and horses h~~'already been 
commented upon. 157 In addition, .bullets had to be cast. 
Tindall noted at Amraal's place: "At the forge craftsmen 
are manufacturing iron bullets to use against the 
Damaras". 158 
0 
Road-building and repairing in Namaland had to be done 
with primitive tools and no blasting technolog~ and was 
therefore extremely labour-intensive. Jonker had two 
important roads built by the mid- 140s - one across the 
Auas mountains (which traders from the Cape had to cross) 
156. CA HP 9, 5 Jan. 1857. 
original. 
157. See footnotes 70 and 71. 
Interpunctuation in the 
158~ J. Tindall: The Journal, 138. 
··' 
and another one several hundred kilometers long to 
W 1 . B 159 a vis ay. 
The missionaries commented on the road from Bethany to 
Berseba (through Mountain Gross Brukaros) and called it 
a "masterpiece".
160 "When one considers how people 
,. 
had not only thrown away all movable ·stones, be they 
big or small, on the four-day long mountainous road, 
142 
but also had removed even rocks, one of them 15 foot long, 
without adequate tools, then one cannot justly agree 
any more that the Namaquas ... are stupid and lazy ... 11 ~ 61 
The Kaptein and his raad at Bethany had been involved in 
organising road-building before, especially to the port 
162 of Angra Pequena. 
0 
The same dynamic . was apparent in attempts at gardening 
which the Kapteins made in order to break the dependence 
on widely scattered cattle posts for subsistence. 







Ibid., 36; Moritz Hahn 1842, 256; Moritz Hahn 
1844, 186. 
Moritz Samuel Hahn 13 Sep. 1850, 246 (footnote). 
BRMG 1852, 332 - 333. 
CALMS Journals, Schmelen 1819, 7. 
Missionaries talked about the "most abundant 
gardens" in Windhoek, BRMG 1849, 117. 
Yet when Orlam chiefs at Windhoek complained to Galton 
in 1850 about the state of the country and asked him 
for advice, they said that: "No planting or sowing was 
going on ... there was no law in the country ... 11164 
Rath also noted that the numerous and "abundant" gardens 
in Windhoek had ceased to exist. 165 In later years, 
attempts at gardening were abandoned. Bethany was 
another example. While Knudsen and S. Hahn in the 1840s 
battled with some success (and chiefly support) to 
establish agricultural production, 166 Kreft only had his 
own gardens for which not even fencing was provided by 
the Kaptein . 167 
4.4 .4 Women's Production 
Women's production, unlike othe9 branches of production, 
was not subordinated to the pressures of .merchant capital 
penetration. Throughout .the decades under discussion 
the women were responsible for the bringing up of the 
children of a settlement, went out daily to collect 
veldkos, and milked the cattle every evening. They 
164. F. Galton: Narrative, 122 
165. BRMG 1852, 27. 
166. BRMG 1949, 317; Quellen 3a, 6 Jan. 1844, Ibid., 
1 Dec. 1848. 
167. BRMG i861, 325 + 326. 
143 
144 
prepared the food and made the mats with which their 
houses were constructed. The ease with which these 
houses could be dismalltled and assembled ensured the 
mobility of the Orlam and Nama communities. Thus they 
were vital to the continuity of individual households 
and families. The provision of a form of shelter that 
was readily adaptable to the needs of seasonal 
was of the highest priority. 168 
migrations 
The making of mats was a highly skilled activity. ___,,,The 
mats, sometimes more than six to eight feet long, 169 
were made from reeds or rushes which were collected, 
dried and put into hot water to soften. Then every 
member of the family took a piece into the mouth to 
chew it. The reeds were then made into a cord by being 
0 
t·urned on the naked leg. Finally, the mats were woven 
with the same technique that today is used in basket 
making. 170 ·The collection of reeds often necessitated 
week-long excursions involving.many women and sometimes 
171: up to 13 wagons. 
Women were repeatedly mentioned vis-a-vis the missionary. 
It was mostly worn-en who demanded a missionary and it 
168 .·- The'. col'lection· of :iveldkos· ·was. a'.'highly skilled 
activity; apparently t'h-ere are about 30 types of 
veldkos in Namaland, see H. Vedder, Die Bergdama, 67. 
169. · SAPL GC Knudsen: 'Notizen', n .d. 21, 
170. For a detailed description, see WA AP 1.IO, xi. 
171. BRMG 1854, 224-226. 
seems possible to establish significant connections 
between women's productive roles (which were the only 
relations whose reproduction was 'independent of the 
kommando structure as indicated) and the intricate 
involvement of these groups with missionaries. Thus 
it can be argued that the ideological stability and 
continuity which the missionary and Christian teachings 
could offer the dislocated Orlam groups, was desired 
by the ruling groups m~inly in order to retain the loyal 
adherence of the women. However, these were not 
clear-cut issues. Although Christian teachings were 
145 
used by the ruling group: as a means of control, Christia-
nity and the missionaries at times also came to be 
'refuges' for oppressed ~roups and provided them with 
an independence which the Kapteins did not want them 
to have. 
As these processes developed on very similar lines among 
Orlam and Nama groups, my treatment of these issues will 
combine both groups in Chapter 5,. 
In the next chapter my analysis of the characteristic 
features of the Orlam·kommando 8roup in Namaland will 
serve as a blueprint for my argument that the original 
Nama 'tribes' under the impact of the Orlam migration 
became transformed. By the mid~l9th century, they 
were rnoti ved by · · .· identical dynamics as those of th·e 
~:ommando structure. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE KOMMANDO IN 
NAMA GROUPS, 1835-1850 
5.1 THE FORMATION OF KOMMANDOS BY NAMA GROUPS 
J 
The traveller, Campbell noted in 1812 that "some of the 
Great Namaquas have travelled as far as Cape Town, have 
wondered at what they saw there, but none have ever 
attempted to imitate anything which they saw, for they 
have no ambition to differ in anything from the manners 
and customs of their forefathers ... 111 This situation 
146 
was, in-the following decades, to change in a fundamental 
way. In this chapter I want to demonstrate that 
Namaland was transformed by the Orlam migration. 
In the course of time it was not only the Orlam's guns 
and wagons that were 'adopted' by the original Nama 
inhabitants, but their social relations as well. As 
I ~ill attempt to show, pre-capitalist relations of 
production dissolved, the old material culture dis-
integrated or was abandoned, 'discretionary' consumption 
became 'necessary' consumption, and relations of exchange 
with the Cape assumed the same determining position 
in the overall process of production and reproduction 
as was the case .with Orlam groups. By the late 1850s 
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a fundament~l transition had taken place. The direction 
and inner dynamic of Nama 'tribal' groupings had 
altered, commoditisation had become .locked into the 
social processes of these groups. Capitalist penetra-
tion under the dominance of commodity export through 
Orlam agents led to the unleashing of processes of 
underdevelopment and socio-economic differences between 
Orlams and Namas vanished. 
The kommando groups' need for social and political sta-
bility (which was reproduced by Nama groups as we will 
see) at times led to responses and experiments which 
were creative and showed great political acumen. 
Their well-developed awareness of the threatening nature 
of imperialism long continued to be a serious obstacle 
to colonial domination. 2 Thus, in looking at processes 
of social disintegration and underdevelopment, it is 
crucial to bear in mind that at the same time the foun-
dations for new traditions and cultural expressions 
were being laid. 
2. See, for example, Legassick: 'Emergence', foot-
note 87. Jonker Afrikaner's powerful political 
position is a case in point which will be 
closely examined in Chapters 7 and 9. ~lso, I 
would like to refer to Hendrik Witbooi's 
sustained struggle against German colonial rule 
in this context, see Horst Drechsler: Let Us 
Die Fi~hting, London, 1980. 
Merchant capital penetration by Orlam agents led to 
the emergence among original Namas of a state of 
dependence on the Cape nexus which we have seen emerge 
among Orlam groups. This exercised an important 
148' 
influence in determining their reproduction requirements. 
Commoditisation came to be 'locked' into their social 
processes, and gradually the distinctions between 
incoming Orlams and original Namas vanished. After 
less than half a century a process of assimilation had 
run its full course: the focus of Nama production 
changed and became directed towards trade links with 
the Cape and cattle-raiding. The force behind it was 
linked to the specific phase of merchant capital pene-
tration, which is analysed in Chapter 1. Gamma Tsawoe.b 
summarised this in a succinctly apt metaphor. In 1820 
he "said to Brother Schmelen that he had cleaned his 
head of powder (locally made bark, B.L.) and now prepared 
for a hat. 113 
5.1.1 Nama Cattle Raiding and the Kommando 
.... 
By the ·mid-1850~s kommandos, using the same techniques 
as the Orlams, were being set up as institutions of 
major importance among original Narnas. Guns and 
horses were used and the cattle raided were largely those 
of Herero-speakers. The scale was massive . Gal ton 
3. CA LMS Journals, Kitchingrnan, 1820, 16. 
149 
claimed that Oasib, chief of the Gai-//khaurl.Jcould 
. 4 
"now muster 1 000 guns". 
Henry Tindall summarised the state of the country to 
a Gape Town audience in 1856. He meticulously identified 
who was 'marauding' and ·who· was not. Thus, the Bondel-
swarts were "rich in wagons, horses, cattle and sheep" 
but did not go on raiding expeditions. 5 They were, 
however, paid by the Cape Governor for not doing so and 
for acting as· 'border police' . 6 The people under 
Hendrick Hendricks (Veldskoendraers) Tindall charged 
with making "frequent forays amongst the Damaras and the 
Mationa~ (Bechu~nas to the east, B.L.). The tribe is 
well provided with fire-arms, horses and wagons ... 117 
Worst of all, in his view, were the Gai-//khaun. "They 
were notorious above all others for their extensive and 
unceasing depredations on the Damaras. They have been 
4 •. F. Galton: Narrative, 69 
5. H. Tindall: Two Lectures, 33. 
6. See Cook: The Modern 53, who mentioned the 
) "liberal present" which chief Bendel had obtained 
from the Cape Governor; letters by the chief himself 
to the Governor express his policing functions 
very clearly, se~ CA G ·H 14/1, Abraham Bendel to 
Governor, 8 Aug. 1'838; Ibid., 26 Aug. 1845. 
This special position vis-a-vis the Cape Gove~n-
ment set this group apart from the other communi-
ties in Namaland. For the period under discussion 
here they stayed mostly outside of the conflicts 
of the 1850s and 1860s. 
7. H. Tindall: Two Lectur$~, 36 
150 
known to make as many as fifteen forays during a year 
The wealth which they have thus acquired has 
enable~ them to produre a large supply of fire-arms 
. 8 
and to keep up their stock of horses ... " 
Even Nama groups ·not falling into this pattern can be 
shown empirically to have come to depend on some kind 
of raiding or other special source of income. Reference 
has already been made to the people under Abraham 
Christian. The Swartboois went on raids - even if they 
called these 'trade expeditions' or "looking for new 
fountains~ - which the-missionaries clearly identified 
for what they were. 9 Not only guns, ammunition, horses 
and wagons were bought with the raided cattle, but other 
commodities as well, such a's clothing, lO European 
beads, chairs, tables, rough bedsteads and boxes. 11 
5.1.2 Hunting and the Kommando 
The focus in hunting apparently changed as well, because 
the social implications of cattle raiding came to be 
an integral part of hunting as well. Th~s is exempli-
fied by the use of horses in hunting by the Namas. 
8. Ibid., 37. See also Quellen 3a., 8 Jan. 1852, oti 
several raids by Willem Fransmann's kommando. 
9. BRMG 1853, 310; 1854, 28, 186. 
10. See below. 
11. H. Tindall: Two Lectures, 42. 
'151 
Some missionaries wanted to travel from Hoachanas, the 
'headquarters' ~f the chief of the Gai-//khaun, .to 
Bethany. Their purpose was to buy ho~ses, but they were 
informed:·'.tha.i>:gettinghorses represented much effort and 
financial outlay, "as all of them were set aside for 
hunting 11 • 12 Hunting was on the way to achieving 
'kommando' status. 
5.2 SOCIAL RELATIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE KOMMANDO 
Here we are not only dealing with a new branch of 
production or a new form of trade, nor were these 
simply differ~nt and probably better production tech-
niques, due to the efficiency of guns vis-a-vis assegais. 
These manifestations of involvement in the Cape nexus 
signalled a major change of focus of productive activities. 
The exchange relationship came to acquire the same 
·determining power in social and political processes 
that was observed in Orlam groups. 
This shift was reflected at the level of social and 
political control. Kinship structures and the old 
12. RMS KP 1861, paragraph 2. Also, Hahn once noted 
that he met "a whole party of Rehobothers numbering 
40 (who) arrived partly on horses, partly on ox-. 
back. They wanted to hunt lions nearby". CA 
HP 9, 20 July 1859. . 
f52 
social sanctions of chiefly power were eroded. Due to 
the overlap of production and commodity exchange rela-
tionships so characteristic of the kommando strutture, 
the democracy of the market place had begun to penetrate 
political organisation. 
Eloquent examples of this development are provided by 
the Swartboois in Rehoboth under Missionary Kleinschmirlt 
and by the Gai-//khaun under Vollmer. Their significance 
rests on two reasons. Firstly, Kleinschmidt's continuous 
~ 
involvement with~Rehobothers stretched over a period 
of 19 years and produced a substantial quanti~y of data. 
Secondly, he was married to Schmelen's daughter, Hanna, 
herself of Nama descent, who spoke Nama fluently and 
was more actively involved wit~ the community than any 
other missionary's wife. After overcoming their initial 
corttempt at hearing a woman of their own kind and not 
a male __ E_uropea°:_ missionary preach to them, 13 (Hanna would 
translate Kleinschmidt's-sermons and prayers), the 
~ehobothers prided themselves on having "almost" two 
missionaries rather than a m~re one~4 Thus, Hanna 
came to be a well accepted and highly esteemed person 
among the Swartboois . 
.. I 
13. BRMG 1847, 232 
ll~:; BRM~ 1863, lOil-108 
' .. i 
153 
In addition, the remarkably good relationship between the 
couple allowed for sufficient communication between them 
for Hanna to share her insights into the community with 
her husband. Since she was not only of Nama descent, 
but could communicate with the women of the settlement, 
these insights were often penetrating and in one case 
even decisive. Thus Kleinschmidt's informative reports 
and letters have a quality quite unparallel~d by other 
missionaries. It was probably precisely for these 
reasons that more of his accounts than those of other 
missionaries were published in the Journal. In contrr.i.st, 
Vollmer's accounts lack this perception, a deficiency 
of insight which is mostly due to the fact that his 
involvement with Oasib, head of the Gai-//khaun at 
Hoachanas, was very tenuous. Oasib was·never able to 
establish himself with a sizeable community at Hoachanas 
with any degree of permanency. 
5.2.1 The Erosion of Kinship Structures and the Adoption 
Of Legal Codes and Constitutions 
At Warmbad, we can identify political relations based 
on notions of commodity exchange rather than on kinship 
by the mid-1830s already. Cook reported in 1835 in 
connection with the Bondelswarts: "The-male part of 
the people were called together to hear the proposed 
regulations for the government of the station, to which 
they assented, where nine of the most eiegible of the 
people, with the chief, myself and Peter Links, were 
appointed to superintend their administration 11 • 15 
In 1840, a new council was apparently e~ected by the 
' 16 
chief and his 'principal men' as well as others. 
A few years later, Ridsdale noted that the raadsmen 
"are nominated in the first instance by the chief, al-
though, should he wish to introduce an unacceptable 
member, the raadsmen have a right to object. 111 7 
154 
The clearest example of the erosion of kinship structures 
and, the establishment of a kommando organisation identical 
t6 the one observed in Orlam groups, was provided by 
the Swartboois at Rehoboth. After four years at 
Rehoboth, Kleinschmidt authorised a 'Code of Law' for 
the Rehobothers, patterned on the Ryksboek of the 
18 Orlams of Bethany. However, it was much more specj.fic 
when it came to legal matters. It clearly highlighted 
the class structure of this community. Patriarchy 
" 
was entrenched by this code as by the Ryksboek of 
'....J·' ,, l 
15. Cook: The-Modern 41. 
. J 
16. Ibid., 112. 
17. R. Ridsdale: Scenes, 83 
18. Quellen 30, Law for Rehoboth, 25 Aug. 1849. 
Bethany. It stated that chieftaincy was hereditary, 
the eldest son following his father. The chief had 
two riounsellors assisting him as well a~ 10 judges. 
If possible, the latter should be important family 
1'55 
heads and men of good moral standing. If matters should 
become 'too difficult' for them, they had to be re-
ferred back to the chief. A new set -Of judges had to 
be re-elected or exchanged after every two years, and 
in the case of 'bad behaviour', they were to be sus-
pended from their office. Then followed a set of 
regulations for "citizens, bywoners and servants": 
a citizen could only be a male person who owned.at 
least one gun, five cows, and fifty sheep and goats, was 
no rebel, and obedient to the law. At a general meeting 
( 
11 Volksversamm'1ung") a citizen had a vote on decisions 
affecting war or peace. Citizens were obliged to do 
military service and labour on public works if so 
required. 
Bywoners were those who did not possess the wealth neces-
sary to qualify for citizenship but who were their own 
masters and had some movable possessions. However, 
they had no vote and were not liable to taxes except 
in an emergency. Judges could not be chosen from 
their ranks as from among the citizens. 
Servants were also 'free' people, but couid not arbitrarily 
abandon their masters. They had to discuss. the matter 
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with them or present their cases to the judges. Under 
the abovementioned circumstances, servants could even 
become citizens. These rules and classifications 
appear~to have excluded wom~n. 
These sections of the Rehoboth constitution were followed 
by a body of laws. The death sentence could not be 
f d h t th d . f th . . . . 19 en orce , very muc o e ismay o e missionary. 
Marriages had to be monogamous. If a woman performed 
an abortion on herself or on another woman, she was to 
be flogged and had to stand in .the pillory for three 
days. For adultery and pre-marital relations the 
punishment was 40~blows, for rape, 80. If somebody 
stole cattle he had to return double the amount, not 
merely the stolen animals. If he could not either 
return the original number stolen or double, he had 
to.work for what he owed, at the following rate: half 
a year per head of cattle, 1 month per goat or sheep. 
If he could not work he received 39 blows per head of 
cattle and 20 per goat or sheep. This meant that the 
punishment for stealing two head of cattle or raping 
a woman was roughly the same. 
was injured would be paid for; 
A borrowed ox which 
20 a rented ox, not. 
19. See, for instance, BRMG 1852, 824 
20. Quellen 30, Law for Rehoboth, 25 Aug. 1849. 
These were very strict and very precisely formulated 
laws which not only show the importance of cattle, but 
also the newly-recognised importance of indi vi.dual 
ownership of cattle. 
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Thus this code gives a clear indication of inci~ient 
class relationships that were based on the private owner-
ship of means of production, namely guns and cattle. 
The politico-economic relations that were confirmed 
by this constitution were far removed from the relations 
of surplus labour appropriation in the pre-capitalist N~ma 
social formations considered in the preceding paragraphs. 
Furthermore, Christian principles have begun to play 
an important role in the ideological make-up of the 
communities. We will examine this in more detail 
in the next chapter. In this light, we must consider 
aspects of the constitution such as citizenshipi carry-
ing with it a kind of 'qualified franchise', the quest 
for monogamous marriages, rotating offices of judges 
or raadsmen, specifications about borrowirig or renting 
oxen and others. 
5.2.2 The Rejection of Polygamy 
The impression of a transformation of politico-economic 
relations in Nama groups is substantiated by briefly 
considering evidence on polygamy. Polygamy was a 
....... ~ . 
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crucial institution of pre-capitalist surplus appro-
priation in the old Nama groups. By the late 1840s, it 
had almost ceased to exist in Nama communities. 
Kleinschmidt wrote in a letter dated 17 November 1851: 
"Polygamy is a difficult question ... we are freed from 
this evil in s9 far as our Kapteins do not allow a man ,.· 
to have more tha-n one wife When Andersson wrote 
his short notes on Namas, ·there was no remaining evidence 
of bri.de-price as a- social institution: "When a man 
wants to marry, he demands the girl from her father, 
aod if he is favourable to the match it may be considered 
as settled. On this occasion an ox or cow must be 
killed outside the door of her home ..• If a man. 
grows tired of his wife, he simply returns her to the 
parental roof without the least ceremony. Although 
she may ~rood over such proceeding~, there is no remedy. 
Widows are left to care for themselves. 1122 
Similarly, H. Tindall noted in his lectures: "Polygamy 
does not appear to have prevaiied to the. same extent 
among the 1'!t:1.1Y10.~u.a51as with the Damar as and other African 
tribes 11 • 23 Still, his sudden use of the past tense 
here indicates that we are not dealing with abrupt 
and sudden changes. 
21. Quell en, 30. 
22. WA AP 10, x. The words in brackets were illegible 
in the orj_ginal. 
23. H. Tindall: Two Lectures, 41. 
/ 
Even by the mid-1850s there was no clear dividing line 
between polygamous and monogamous structures in Nama 
groups. We can only trace tendencies. Thus, Kaptein 
Oasib still had two wives in 1860 and intended to take 
a third. 24 In the mid-1850s the judges at Rehoboth 
all began to take more wives, and Kaptein Swartbooi 
himself expelled his wife, Anatje and took five others 
in a bid to re-create the polygamous power structures 
needed to control the young men. 25 However, as the 
case indicates, old social sanctions had lost their 
power to such extent that women and girls could no 
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longer be forced to accept incorporation into a polygamous 
household; they resisted and many of them did so success-
fully, backed by the missionary. 26 
The gradual dissolution of polygamy without being neatly 
replaced by monogamous structures; was accompanied 
by social disintegration. Thus, Hahn noted several 
times that 'indecency' was prevalent among N3.mas and 
even spoke of "the dissolution of monogamous marriage". 
11Sins of the flesh", he argued, were ·'the rule and not 
the exception, especially among those who were 
24. BRMG 1860, 52. 
25. BRMG 1855, 376-378. See especially chapter 6. 
26. Ibid. 
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baptised. 27 There is also evidence to show that not 
only the institution of marriage changed considerably, 
away from polygamy, but also the values surrounding 
it. Thus, Swartbooi's son Johannes was sent to 
Berseba to look for a bride, and Kleinschmidt commented: 
"A Christian Orlam girl he must have, that's what the 
old man thinks; our Namaqua girls have not yet pro-
greased in the ways df ci~ilisation as far as these, 
and Berseba has a good 28 name". . 
5.2.3 The Replacement of Kinship Controls by Kommando 
Controls 
Oasib's case may serve as an example of the typical 
difficulties of political control in the kommando 
organisation as observed among Orlam groups. Power 
no longer meant control over kinship structures but 
was related to access to commodities. In the absence 
of laws and sanctions supported by a-resident missionary, 
Oasib's hold over his 'subjects' appeared to be dwindling. 
In 1847 Tindall recorded that Oasib had told him "that 
against his will a number of his people, headed by 
subordinate chiefs, had plundered Damara villages for 
27. CA HP 9, 10 Jan. 1859. However, we must note 
that this may be exaggerated as Hahn was an 
adamant adversary of all Nama-speaking groups 
and ver~ biased in his mostly negative assessments. 
28. BRMG 1863, 99. 
the sole purpose of enriching themselves. I advised 
him to make them restore the stolen cattle. He ~aid 
he had not the power to do so; but requested me to use 
my influence to prevent the parties concerned getting 
horses, guns and amniunitiion." 29 
The missionaries reported one case in the early 1850s 
when a cattle post belonging to inhabitants of the 
I 
mission station at Otjimbingwe was raided by a party 
made up partly of impoverished Herero-speakers, partly 
of 'run-away' subjects of Oasib, and partly of Topnaars. 
Oasib wen out with 60 to 70 people to apprehend these 
robbers and rounded up the people plus 15 guns and 
ammunition. The stolen cattle ~ere not returned to 
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the Otjimbingwe cattle post, though, but kept by Oasib 
after each of his assistants had been rewarded with one. 30 
Ho~ many other cases may there have been which did not end 
as successfully for Oasib3 1 , who repeatedly tried to 
exercise his old rights of seniority over Swartbooi 
29. J. Tindall: The Journal, 111. 
30. BRMG 1853, 372-375. 
31. In this case, they not only had missionary 
support (as Otjimbingwe was concerned) but 
also Jonker's because this was 'his' territory 
for raiding and tribute collection. Also, 
Jonker considered the missionaries as too 
important to raid one of their establishments, 
or even be under the suspicion of having done 
so. Thus, he offered them a written confirma-
tion that he was not involved in this incident. 
See BRMG 1853, 53, 248-249. 
I 
and his group~ Generally he was less successfu1. 32 
When he wanted to establish·a missionary settlement, 
Oasib was not supported by many of his followers. 
Being unable to exercise 'traditional' controls, he 
could not even enforce his will by using more modern 
persuasions. As we saw in Chapter 4, such weaknesses 
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of control were characteristic of the kommando structure. 
Oas~b and his son arrived at Hoachanas with two wagons, 
each loaded with the belongings of five households. 
That was all. His followers from the Kubakop told him 
flatly that they did not want to go to Hoachanas and 
they were not interested in a missionary, nor did they 
wish to see their children instructed. 33 Vollmer 
noted that Oasib had "given out orders to all sides 
that more people must come here ... if they did not 
come, they would not get any more clothes, powder and 
ammunition~. 34 This threat did not solve his problem, 
probably because many of his followers could acquire 
guns and ammunition from elsewhere. Right into the 
1860s, Vollmer did not have more than 100 people at 
most on the station and often far fewer - with the 
exception of March 1858 (the climax of the rainy 
season) when he counted 90 huts. However, by October 
32. BRMG, 1855, 324. 
33. Quellen 5, 26 July 1853. 
34. Ibid. 
of the ~ame year, the station had emptied again.35 
This evidence sugge'sts that Oasi b had to depend on 
his access to key commodities to~control his subjects. 
As we saw, he was still followed as the leader of a 
kommando but not when it came to settling at Hoachanas. 
5.2.4 The Emergence of Political Identification Outside 
of Kinship Structures 
The examination of the processes of community formation 
also reveals how control over kinship structures came 
to be replaced by individual access to resources that 
were indirectly or directly related to processes of 
commoditisation under merchant capital penetration. 
By mid-century in Nama, as in Orlam groups as well, the 
settlement of families at or n~ar mission stations and 
the acceptance of 'sovereignty' of a certain 'Kaptein·, 
35. In Quellen 5, 15 Feb. 1854J Vollmer noted 50-100 
churchgoers; on 21 May 1855, he recorded only 
seven huts at Hoachanas because Oasib and 
others were at Rehoboth; on 18 December 1856 
there were 100 people at Hoachanas; on 14 April 
1857 the station was abandoned with the 
exception of 60 women; in December 1858 (no 
day given) he recorded his first three male 
baptisms; in March 1858 (no day given) there 
were ca. 350 people at the station, but he 
recorded on 13 October 1858 that most of them 
had left again. 
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were no longer dependent on genealogical connections, 
nor dhlpeople consider themselves to be genealogically 
connected. 36 The case of the Namas under Kapt~in Tseib 
of Zwartmorast (later Keetmanshoop) will illustrate 
this. 
The Tseib'schen Hottentots only came into existence as 
a group in the late 1840s or early 1850s and were an 
off-shoot of the Gai-//khaun. The fact that Tseib 
split from Oasib does not necessarily indicate a loss 
of political power on Oasib's part, due to overall 
processes of social transformation. Nama groups were 
known to have split into sub-groups long before merchant 
capital penetration of the territory. 37 However, this 
case seems to have been something other than simply a 
lineage split, leading to the establishment of a new 
kraal. Knudsen wrote about Zwartmorast in 1845: 
36~ The best example here is Bethany where, at one 
stage, Jacobus Boois, Amraal Lambert and 
Willem Swartbooi lived with their followers, 
see Chapter 2. Similarly Oasib and several 
of his associates once lived at Rehoboth 
for a time in 1855. Kleinschmidt noted that 
he was prepared to excuse a lot about him 
because he kept "all the outside rabble who 
stay here with him" in control, BRMG 1856, 344. 
37. See Budack: 'Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
Gai-//khaun', AH 1970. 
1. 6 4 
...... 
"The present Kaptein of Zwartmorast is a very rough 
Namaqua ... and only has his next of kin with him. 
But his people, which are scattered with their cattle, 
would be many if collected together. 1138 Tseib's 
income was not derived from tribute, cattle-raising or 
other pastoral pursuits. Goats and sheep could not 
even be kept on Zwartmorast because of the 'Blood 
ziekte' prevalent there. 39 Rather, it came from 
payments for letting other people's horses graze at his 
settlement during the dangerous season. 40 As Knudsen 
noted, the site was not gcod for cattle. "Zwartmorast 
is healthy enough to accommodate horses from afar 
during the 'dying season'. Tseib, however, demands 
h f f ' . t d 1141 T . b 1 uge ees or n1s wa er an grass ... se1 a so 
said that, with regard to the formation of a missionary 
settlement, he "had been quite willing to live together:-
with Tibet's people to share their spiritual goods, 
but his brother (sic) was against this and wanted them 
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to look for their own teacher to form their own people. 1142 
38. Moritz Knudsen 1845, 157 (footnote). 
39. Moritz Knudsen 1845, 158. 
40. See Chapter 8. 
41. Moritz Knudsen 1845, 158. 
42. Moritz Knudsen 1845, 158. 
A brief look at the general interrelationship between 
older Nama and immigrant Orlam groups by the 1840s 
and 1850s will demonstrate this point further. Thus, 
the missionaries noted. that the Orlam Jan Booi, with 
all the people around him, was part of the Rehoboth 
community. 43 Kleinschmidt, the missionary to the 
Rehoboth Namas, would often visit Jan Booi's werft. 44 
Jonker and Oasib, although. involved ~n a continuous 
power struggle, did not hesitate to organise communal 
raiding expeditions against Herera-speakers, a practice 
1(t6 
also common between Veldskoendraers and some of Amraal's 
people. 45 
With reference to the Bondelswarts, Cook offered comments 
such as: "A considerable number of people have arrived 
l 
at the station ' bringing their families, cattle, horses, 
t . 1146 e c. More importantly, by the mid-century, the 
Boois from Bethany, the Gai-//khaun, the Swartboois, 
43. JBRMG 19, 1848, 52. 
44. JBRMG 26, 1855, 21. 
45. BRMG 1852, 19. Apparently Oasib was arranging 
raids with Amraal, see J. Tindall: The 
Journal, 115. Also, Hahn once found Jonker 
and his people living together with a large 
part of the Piet Kopper people, see BRMG 
1860, 187, also CA HP 9, 10 Jan. 1859. 
46. Cook: The V.oder-n, 50. 
\ 
Jonker, Oasib and Am~aal's people, were all intimately 
.. -
connected through marriages, and not only in the 
leading families. 47 To cite a few specific cases, 
we may note that Chief Abraham Bondel married Jonker's 
sister48 . Jonker was a son-in-law of Jan Boois 49 
as was David Willem Swartbooi's son. 50 Furthermore, 
one of Jan Boois' men was married to a sister of 
Willem Swa.rt booi 51 and Swart booi 's daughter was married 
to one of Amraal's men. 52 
In terms of the Orlam's social origins, this meant 
that such concepts as lineages and homesteads had 
largely lost their validity. 
Thus, the patterns of conflict and alliances made by 
the various groups from mid-century onwards, cannot 
be understood in genealogical or any other kinship 
terms. Such notions ceased to exist or retained 
marginal significance in diplomatic relations between 
47. This was noted in the BRMG 1855, 34. 
48. Moritz Kleinschmidt~l843, 222. 
49. Quell en 20, 18 Sept. 1842. 
50. BRMG 1856, 334. 
51. BRMG 1859, 26. 
52. BRMG 1855, 19. 
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the Kapteins. 53 
Finally, it is specifically the tendency of travellers, 
missionaries and traders to refer to 'the Namaquas' 
and to make no further distinction between Namas and 
Orlams from the 1840s onwards (except by way of 
referring to a situation of the past) which indicates 
how thorough the process Of assimilation was by that 
time. 54 
5.3 PRODUCTION, COMMODITISATION AND THE RISE OF 
THE KOMMANDO 
,In the following section, I shall outline a process of 
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restructuring and re-allocation of labour in Nama groups. 
Here, the 'underdeveloping' qualities of the kommando 
dynamic will become evident. As I shall demonstrate, 
53~ It was a case in point when Oasib fell out with 
Jonker in 1855 and expected Willem Swartbooi 
on these grounds to ally with him/ BRMG 1855, 
18. Another case, though taken from a 
different political context that we cannot 
elucidate here, is given by D. Christian's 
testimony to Palgrave with whom he travelled 
to Rehoboth in 1878. Palgrave noted: 
"He came, he said, to remove from the Kuiseb 
the Boois tribe ... as being run-aways from 
Dav1d Christian's tribe." CA BBNA 1879, 
Palgrave to Secretary for Native Affairs, 26 
June 1878. Thus, he attempted to make claims 
on people or properties which had not been made 
for 50 years. 
54. For example, see Wl\. AP 10, x; Knudsen: 
'Nachrichten', AH ,.~- 1963, 109. 
( 
the Orlam invasion set in motion a process by which 
the Nama groups became increasingly dependent on the 
Cape nexus. I shall begin by considering how the 
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emphasis of labour processes was turned away from 
production towards the reproduction of exchange relations 
with the Cape. 
5.3.1 The Relations Between Labour Allocation and the 
Cape Exchange Nexus 
Hahn once made the following observation when he 
visited Oasi b' s werft in the Ku bakop river: "The 
Red Nation have established a kind of police about 
a year ago, which is concerned to provide strangers, 
Namaquas, Bastards or Europeans, with all sorts of 
comforts. When a traveller dismounts his horse, or 
outspans, the~e are certain officers who take his 
horse or ox, lead it~ unsaddle, water and graze it 
and make sure in the evening that lions don't get 
at it. ·.:·.<They ·take care that the traveller receives 
sufficient milk, often meat too, water and food, 
that the children or others don't disturb him ... 
When the traveller is alone, somebody must sleep with 
him to maintain the fire or do other services ... 
As soon as the traveller wants to l~ave; he lets one 
of the officers know and at the required time 
his ox or horse will surely be ready, albeit in the 
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middle of the night. 115 5 . 
As with Orlam groups, road-building became important. 
Ridsdale, referring to Veldskoendraers, noted that 
"new roads have been made and old ones repaired. 1156 He 
also recorded that Veldskoendraers had made " a clear 
open road for a wagon, of many miles in length 11 •57 
Swartbooi was recorded to have left with some men to 
make a road. 58 Smithery, the repairing of guns and 
wagons became crucially important. The brother of 
Willem Swartbooi was reported to be a skilled craftsman 
as a repairer of guns. 59 Rehoboth even had a proper 
forge, and for a while, a resideht smith who was, of 
60 course, not the only metal worker there. Ridsdale 
claimed that the Bondelswarts at Warmbad did not spend 
much time looking after their cattle, but rather on 
smithery work connected with their guns and wagons, 
although here, as in Rehoboth, an 'outside' expert was 
61 employed. 
55. Moritz Hahn 1844, 191. 
56. Ridsdale: Scenes, ·264. 
57. [bid. ' 275. 
58. Quell en 5, 2 May 1848. 
59. Quell en 5' 17 Sept. 1848; Quellen 20, 
23 Mai-1847. 
60. BRMG 1855, 372. 
61. R. Ridsdale: Scenes, 87; also BRMG 1860, 24, 
about wagon works at Hoachanas. 
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5.3.2 The Loss of Cattle Breeding Skills 
Thus, labour processes were restructed in a fundamental 
way. The focus of total social production moved away 
from cattle breeding towards cattle raiding and exchange 
links with the Cape. The social sanctions required 
to coerce young men into carrying out the strenuous 
tasks of cattle tending had lost their power. With 
the rejection of polygamy, 'juniors' became men who 
would join the Kaptein in a kommando. The allocation 
of labour time became increasingly directed towards 
the maintenance of exchange relations with the Cape . 
. This initiated a dynamic leading to social and political 
dependence on the Cape exchange nexus. 
From the 1840s we find no more evidence that Namas 
continued to water their cattle from laboriously dug 
wells. Instead, the data suggest the same 
decline of cattle breeding skills that was 
so noticeable afuongst the Orlam groups. 
Now, rather than engaging in such heavy labour tasks 
as digging wells, Nama grotlps came to depend on surface 
water for their cattle. Persistently they searched 
for 'stronger fountains' or 'more springs' as soon as 
the surface water holes were exhausted. Willem 
Swartbooi was reported.to be desperate for a new site 
with more surface water and want~d to move away from 
' 62 
Rehoboth. The wider veld around the station at 
Hoachanas and Rehoboth was soon ruined through over-
. 63 grazing. The Topnaars at the Bay were particularly 
hard hit because all the cattle destined for the Cape 
via the sea, fed from the Kuiseb pastures and severely 
64 depleted them. These changed conditions clearly 
no longer had anything to do with the seasons. 
As with the Orlams, the dependence on fountains in 
the absence of well~ was great. Yet here, too, the 
effort put into clearing and maintaining them was quite 
inadequate. Thus Vollmer noted that the Rehoboth 
springs were soiled by women and children because of 
their red colours and the cleaning was 1 difficult 1 • 65 
Vollmer also noted in 1855 that Oasib, at that time 
living at the Rehoboth station, wanted to leave because 
the water there did not agree with his wife o Vollmer 
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comm_ented, "many others, too, becam_e sick after drinking 
the water 11 • 66 
A further contributory factor was that cattle posts 
62. BRMG 1854, 149 ff. 
63. JBRMG 26, 22; BRMG 1860, 53. 
64. CA HP 9, 8 Jan. 1858. -
65. Quellen 5 ' 2 July 1851. 
66. Ibid., 23 Nov., 1854. 
appear to have become smaller and the dimensions of 
kraals and settlements shrank. Kraals of 100 to 
150 houses were no longer common. 67 Hoachanas had 
an average of 100 people. In the Warmbad area, Rids-
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dale visited some Bondelswarts outposts and kraals in the 
1840s~ Although these were missionary 'sub~c~ntres' 
with resident evangelists at them, he found no more 
than 150 to 200 people at each centre. 68 Rehoboth 
itself certainly never had more than 500 churchgoers. 69 
5.3.3 The Loss of Hunting Skills 
The hunting veld also appears to have been depleted 
due to the same lack of application of skill. In 
the early 1850s the Gai-//khaun had to extend it as 
far north as.the Omatako Mountains in order to supply 
their game needs~- Andersson noted that after having 
crossed those mountains he came across a "large enclosure 
where several pitfalls were dug for wild animals. 
The guide told us they belonged to Red People and Berg 
Damaras". 70 Interestingly, in this context, hunting 
skills apparently d~cayed in the same way as cattle 
breeding techniques. 
67. See above. 
68. R. Ridsdale: Scenes, 130, 163, 167. 
69. cf .. Quellen 20. -----
70. WA AP , 27 April 1851. _._, 
Whilst travelling with some Rehobothers who lost 
their way, Kleinschmidt was astonished to find that 
only a "young bushman coul4 trace the wagon road 
again· . I was amazed to see that my young Namaquas 
are· so far back in this art compared to their fathers 
for this became obvious several times on the trip 
· ·arown up mostly in the school and on the station, 
their senses and thoughts must have taken a different 
direction otherwise I cannot explain this."7l 
-; 
5.3.4 The Transformation of Settlement Patterns 
Related to these changes were changes in the pattern 
of movement and settlement. As map 2 shows, it was 
not really possible to define distinct territories 
for each of the Nama groups. The head of the 
Gai-//khaun exercised rights over certain undemarcated 
territories without having first claims to all the 
waterholes in these territories. When Missionary 
Schmelen arrived at Bethany and learnt from Kaptein 
Kobus Boois that the latter had ''bought the place 
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for five rolls of tobacco lD years ago" 72 he had probably 
done so in acknowledgement of the prior rights of a 
71. BRMG, 1861, 66. 
72~ TLMS, IV, 161 
.~ 
Nama chief . 73 However, these rights soon lost their 
meaning and after the 1850s were·only remembered when 
it suited the Kapteins politically; 74 they could 
certainly no longer be enforced. 
Instead there was a move away from social-political 
incorporation to settlements patterns characterised 
by mutal exclusion and a much more definite demarcation 
of group boundaries. Through the Orlam migrations 
these Nama groups acquired new concepts of private 
property, competiticn for resources and commodities. 
These were accompanied by a new market rationality 
and it appears, new needs for settlement and security. 
A$ was customary for Orlam groups, they acquired a 
missionary and established permanent 'headquarters'. 
W~llem Swartbooi, for example, lived near Bethany for 
a long while with many followers. He then moved to 
73. Although we lack direct evidence it appears 
that Jonker Afrikaner himself did not settle 
at Windhoek without the approval of the head 
of the Gai-//khaun. See also Chapter 3. 
74. For example, at a time of most intense power 
struggle with Jonker in the mid-1850s, Oasib 
chose to remind David Christian that the 
waterholes of Bethany were actually his and 
that he demanded a 'fine mare' as rent for it. 
Whether he ever received this rent is not clear. 
See BRMG 1854, 155. Apparently, his rights were 
still respected at a later stage as far as 
unpopulated areas were concerned. Thus Vollmer 
recorded th~t Kido Witbooi was visiting Oasib 
and asking for a place to establish himself 
with a missionary, BRMG 1861, 229. 
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Warmbad. 75 In 1845, however, he moved to Missionary 
Kleinschmidt at Rehoboth and settled there with at 
least 500 people. 76 · Similarly, the .Veldskoendraers 
made Schans Vlakte their 'headquarters' in the 1840s, 
even it if did not last very long. . Ridsdale's account 
of them must be considered typical. He noted 
1W 
in 1844/\"they had !').O place of public worship, and no 
·school~; now they have a ·large stone chapel in course 
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of erection, and 150 children in the Sunday- and weekday-
schools ... they were at that time almost destitute of 
any decent clothing ... but since my first visit 
traders have found their way hither and now a large_ 
number are clothed in articles of European manufacture 
Then they had neither wagon roads nor wagons, 
but now ... they have made a tolerable road and are in 
possession of eight wagons 
Amraal also settled at two centres (Wesley Vale and 
Gobabis) in the 1840s, after a considerable period 
of moving around. Soon he even demanded fees from 
Veldskoendraers who, after raiding Herero-speakers, 
crossed' his' ·territory on their way home. 78 · Oasi b 
~ ... ; 
75. Cook: The Modern, 33. 
76. Quellen, 20, 23 May 1845. 
77. Ridsdale: Scenes, 177-178. 
78. J. Tindall: The JoGrnal, 135. 
and some of his followers resisted the pressure for 
a permanently established missionary longest and 
only moved to Hoachanas in the 1850s. 79 This was a 
process of recognition of territory as against 
waterholes and thus served to reproduce the structures 
' 
of underdevelopment evident in the transformation of 
cattle breeding techniques. 
5.3.5 The Effects of Commoditisation on Domestic Industries 
Similar dynamics became obvious in domestic industries. 
As far as clothing was concerned, the change was neither 
abrupt nor total. As late as 1853 Rehobothers wanted 
to go on a hunting excursion to acquire giraffe skins 
for leather to make sandals. 80 However, the change was 
marked. Evidence such as that provided by Kitchingman 
and Shaw concerning 'traditional' dress, vanishes 
entirely from the sources. What we observe is firstly 
a change to homemade leather trousers, skirts and 
jackets, and then to full European dress. This is 
captured in a remark made by Knudsen in 1844 about the 
'Namaquas': "The men, who do not yet wear leather 
trousers, short jackets with wide-rimmed hats and home 
made veldskoen as is fashionable, now only have a skin 
79. BRMG 1854, 279. 




as wide as a hand in front, and a two stripped skin~ 
81 at the back''· Ridsdale commented, mainly about 
Bondelswarts, that the people were "in general well 
clothed, either in dresses carefully prepared by a 
process of tanning with which they are familiar ... 
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82 
or in moleskins and cotton prints of English manufacture." 
At a later stage, he noted that Namas were "now clothed 
in decent English clothing and appeared more like 
civilized people than they had ever done before. 118 3 
When the mother of H. Hendricks, Kaptein of the Veld-
skoendraers
1
made an appearance in the 1840s in full 
84 'tradi tiona.l' dress, it was a spectacle. . 
'Discretionary' goods, former luxury items such as 
articles of European clothing and brandy, became 
'necessary' . Here, as in Orlam groups, reliance on 
itinerant traders was not longer sufficient, and 
distilleries came into being. This should not be seen 
as an attempt to fight dependence on traders, rather 
traders were unable to then satisfy the growing demand 
for liquor. Kleinschmidt reported that by the mid-
1850s, brandy began to be distilled at Rehoboth: adopting 
a technique similar to the one used by Amraal and Jonker 
81. Knudsen: 'Nachrichten' , AH 1963, 109. -
82. Ridsdale: Scenes, 82-83. 
83. Ibid., 255. 
84. Ibid. , 166. 
.. -
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and their followers. The actual master· of distil-
ling, according to Kleinschmidt, was Swartbooi's 
eldest daughter who had learnt the technique at Amraal's 
place when she was married there. 85 
Although wooden vessels were apparently still made by 
Nama men in the 1840s, 86 it seems that European pots 
and pans did replace items of pottery manufacture, as 
there is no further evidence of pottery in the sources. 
Similarly, with firearms being increasingly used, it 
seems that either the labour time or the skill involved 
in making assegais, was no longer available. These 
skills were lost as they wer~ no longer practised or 
handed down. Anders sort's form11 la ti?n·s, if not his 
evidence, illustrate this. 
only-:weapons of the Namas 
they used bows and arrows 
Talking about guns as the 
Andersson added: "Originally 
Tindall and Hahn 
both noted that among Oasib's kommandos assegais had 
. 88 
become sought after items of booty. 
Processes of commoditisation came to determine forms 
of production. Yet these changes and processes of u.nder-
development were not complete. Nama culture was not 
85. BRMG 1855, 19. 
86. Ibid. , 85; also H. Tindall: Two Lecturs, 42. 
87. WA AP 10, ...,. .n. • --
88. J. Tindall: The Journal, 98; l~k>rif..z·;: Hahn, 
1846, 209-210. 
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·suddenly eradicated. Thus, Andersson gave an 
interesting description of bead and buchu making (but 
offered no evidence ~egarding the division of labour 
that this entailed). His entry for September 18, 
1851 reads: "Saap. General name of all the different 
sorts of scented powder used by th~ Namaquas. One 
kind is a flower which they procure from south of Bethany 
but which as far as is known does not grow south of 
the Orange River. Another they make out of the peel 
of the young 'Coffee' thorn bush, and a third from a 
kind of lichen 11 • 89 He also noted that the Namas 
ornamented themselves "profusely", mostly with copper 
and resin-based beads. 90 
Recent archaeological work suggests, however, that the 
heavy importation of beads of European manufacture 
overflowed the market, changed particularly the·value 
attached to copper beads, and therefore contributed to 
the breakdown of their production and trade. 91 
89. WA AP 2, 18 Sept. 1851. 
90. WA AP 10, xi. 
91. See John Kin~han: 'Recent Copper Working Sites '· 
on the Upper !Kh~iseb Drainage, Namibia', unpu~. 
paper, Windhoek State Museum, 1981. 
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5.3.6 The Conservation of the Sexual Division of Labour 
In Nama, as in Orlam groups, women produced veldkos 
and matting for the houses. They also provided other 
essential services like the construction of houses. 
They were responsible for the transportation of the 
household from one place to another. 92 This was an imper-
tant function. These social activities, unlike all 
others, were not transformed on the new kommando 
-----·· - - -· ·--··---- -----------
structures, as I shall demonstrate. 
Women defended the limited status which the provision 
of these services gave them~ For instance, they had 
rights to the huts ~hey built for themselves and their 
families. They could determine who was to stay in 
them. The missionaries tried to push for the build±ng 
of brick houses, but it was the women, usually the 
closest followers of the missionary, who resisted .. 
For example, Jonker's wife Beetje simply refused to 
live in a three-roomed house which Jonker built for 
92. On women collecting veldkos , see BRMG 1849, 
313; mat-making and house construction, 
see Knudsen: 'Nachrichten', AH 1963, 
108-109; GC SAPL Knudsen: 'Notizen', n .d., 
21; also Ridsdale: Scenes, 87-89. 
. ·. 
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her. At the same time, she and "many (other) women" 
asked Missionary Kleinschmidt to let them go and 
.fetch reeds. 93 This was a clear rejection of brick 
houses, made in a metaphorical form. 
In this one instance, a new division of labour, i.e. 
a fundamental change in the labour process which would 
have involved the men in constructing brick houses, 
did not come about. Here was one area that did not 
succumb to the new pressures and the new directions 
of social energy resulting from commoditisation processes. 
This does not mean that all relations between men and 
women remained unaffected within the new 
class relationships - that we saw emerge in Nama groups.· 
For instance, a 'citizen's' wife in Rehoboth would have 
a number of female servants. 94 If they moved to an 
outpost, she would ride one of the pack oxen while 
female servants and yo~ng people would have to walk. 95 
93. Andersson: 
( 
Lake Ngami, London 1856, 326-327. 
94. BRMG 1849, 101. 
95. Andersson: Lake, 326-327, mentioned the "good 
dame of the house" who would be leisurely 
seated while everybody was busy packing. 
Knudsen noted that "the wife of a Namaqua 
who is so concerned about domestic affairs 
that she builds a mat hou~e will never lead 
the oxen but rides next to her husband as 
gravely as he himself. They are too proud 
and servants they usually have in sufficient 
numbers". See also Knudsen: 'Nachrichten' , 
AH, 1963: 109. 
1. 
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Patr±:arcr1al relations between men and women overrode all 
other differences. (A servant's wife would still 
have to cook and build a house for her husband while 
not being given decision-making powers.) They 
remained unaffected by the processes of underdevelopment 
and destruction of material culture that we observed 
above. 
Women and their production took on a new importance. 
Their demands acquired a weight among the ruling men 
which they probably had not possessed before. This 
became significant in the establishement of relations 
with a missionary. Thus, women's productive role 
had a deep influence on the ideological make-up of the 
kommando group. In the next chapter, these will be 
examined in greater detail. 
5.4 THE TRANSFORMATION OF COSMOLOGY 
Although women's roles as. producers were not fundamentally 
transformed, the most distant corners of the social fabric 
·6r the groups were r~ached by th~ chahges meritioned. 
W{th the dissolution of kinship structures, and the 
focal point of production shifting to exchange relations 
with the Cape, the elaborate set of customs, rites, 
religious and other cultural expressions available to 
old Nama groups faded away or vanished. They were 
partly supplanted-by social institutions linked to 
Christianity or the missionary. 
The extent of these losses was great, indicated by 
Tindall when he noted: "they have no warlike or 
pastoral songs ... 1196 Religious notions, such as . 
that of Heitsi-Eibib and the custom of throwing stones 
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on graves, as well as the healing practice of extracting 
objects from the sick person's body were still reported 
in the 1850s. 97 The eating taboo attached to the 
legend of the hare and the moon w~s also still observed. 98 
Significantly, Andersson's notes on Nama customs 
were allwritten in the past tense, with interpolations 
indicating that things had changed, such as: "In 
olden times it was customary in ·Nam~and to abandon 
M 
old people; or; "Formerly when a chief di~d it was 
the custom to call the whole tribe together II 
followed by a description of intestines and fat being 
placed on the new chief's heact. 99 Andersson maintained 
the past tense in mentioning that· "after a great hunt 
had taken place" choice parts were reserved for the 
police He reported no initiation, mentioning en 
96. H. Tindall : Two. Lecturs, 4 3. 
97. WA AP 10, x. 
98. Ibid. 
99. See above; Chapter 3, for more details on 
these old customs. 
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passant that the day of initiation was a day of 
"great rejoicing". B~rial rites appear to have been 
reduced to a minimum: "Whe.,n a person is dead, some of 
his cattle-are killed and a feast is given".lOO 
Alexander gave a rather unfavourable account of the 
people under Abraham Bandel and a general moral decline 
in the 1830s. "Chastity is of small account among the 
Namaql.ias , the chiefs even wh~n they go to the sea, 
lend their wives to the white men for cotton handker-
chiefs, or brandy; and if a husband has been out 
hunting; and on his·~eturn finds his place occupied, 
he sits down at the door of his hut and, the paramour 
handing him out a bit of tobacco, the injured man 
contentedly smokes it till the other chooses to retire. 11101 
The fading of old cultural practices and belief 
systems did not simply leave the groups with less 
than they had before. Rather, new cosmological relations 
were established, new religious notions adopted. These 
were found in the Christian religion and the person of 
a European missionary. However, in contrast to the 
old cosmology, this meant a deepening of the ties 
100. WA AP 10, x. 
101. J. Alexander: Discovery, I, 196. 
. with the Cape. Also, the importance of the missionary 
often led to intense political conflicts within 
kommando groups as the missionary emerged as a rival 
political power. These relations will be considered 




THE POSITION OF MISSIONARIES IN 
KOMMANDO GROUPS 
In the preceding two chapters I have attempted to 
analyse the dynamics of production and control in Orlam 
communities, and have shown that these were reproduced 
by the original Namas within a few decades of contact. 1 
I demonstrated that the determinant relation of produc-
tion was embodied in the kommando structure. Hitherto, 
my analysis has excluded major ideological aspects of 
the kommando groups which will become more evident when 
the role of missionaries in these groups is examined~ 
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In the next section I shall demonstrate that missionaries 
acquired positions of great importance and political 
power in both Nama and Orlam komman~o groups. 
The absence of the ideblogical sanctions characterising 
kinship-organised societies made Christianity a potent 
instrument in the hands of the leaders when contriving 
the formation and reproduction of their communities. 
The place of the Christian religion in the communities 
will be examined in some detail. 
1. For the first decades of contact between Nama 
and.'Orlams, see above Chapter 3. 
6.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY IN KOMMANDO GROUPS 
By the mid-19th century, ·Christianity had become an 
integral part of ~ocial/political relations in Namaland, 
amongst both Orlam and Nama communities. For example, 
when Kreft met some of Oasib's and Witbooi's followers 
in 1863, he remarked: "I must say of these people t6 
their credit that wherever they live together they 
erect a bush chapel II 2 Moreover, Orlam groups only 
came into existence as units with their own political 
identities when either a missionary came to stay or a 
chapel was built,. or both. The missionary acted as 
anchor for the community. This is true for all the 
Orlam groups; Bethany, Berseba, Wesl~y Vale and later 
Gobabis, Gibeon and Windhoek came into existence as 
mission stations or as places of worship. This was 
the case with Jonker who only acquired a missionary 
after several years of settlement.3 
Jonker himself was known to be an emphatic preacher~ 
of the gospel and held services even in Herero villages 
2. Quellen 3b 1 p. 63 
3. When Kleinschmidt and Hahn came to Windhoek in 
1842, a large white-washed chapel was already 
there, see Mossolow: 'Franz Heinrich Kleinschmidt 
1812-1842; biographischb Skizze~ AH 1971, 39. 
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which otherwise had to provide hi~ with cattle. He 
called this 'evangelising the heathen' . 4 Jan Booi 
was also reported to hold daily prayer sessions. 5 
Afterthe Rhenish missionaries 0ere expelled from Wind-
hoek and Haddy of the W ~sle~a. 11 Missionary So c..··d-y . had 
left, an evangelist from Hahn's station at Neu-Barmen 
regularly went to Windhoek to hold services there. 6 
Similarly, Jonker's wife, her children and other raads-
men's wives occasionally visited Neu-Barmen and 
Rehoboth for lengthy periods of time.7 At Rehoboth, 
4. Moritz Hahn 1843, 180j Moritz Kleinschmidt 1843, 
221. The missionaries also noted abotit the 
years when Jonker was firmly based in Windhoek: 
"Relentlessly he held service and school twice 
daily in the stone chapel ... ", BRMG 1862, 22. 
For an emphasis on evangelising efforts as far 
as Herera-speakers were concerned, see also 
Loth: Mission, 21. · 
5. Quellen 5, 31 Aug. 1848. 
6. CA HP 9, 15 Jan. 1848. 
7. Ibid., 20 May 1856, 6 July 1856, 7 Sept. 1856, 
4 Jan. 1857; BRMG 1858, 118; BRMG 1862, 106. 
Kleinschmidt once visited Jonker when his 
headquarters were at Okahandja and noted: 
'"To my great surprise I found that his two 
daughters who used to stay at Rehoboth with 
their mother for long period~ ... had practised 
"several of our songs in Dutch and Nama with a 
great part of:the youth here." BRMG 1862, 
44. 
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the Kaptein did not hesitate to order thousands of 
bricks to be made over a period of almost two years 
8 for the construction ~f a chapel and school. 
6.2 THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF 
PERMANENTLY ESTABLISHED MISSION STATIONS FOR 
KOMMANDO LEADERS 
The ideological aspects which made the connection to a 
missionary or Christianity so desirable, were linked to 
the kommando structure. Sometimes these links were· 
very direct indeed.- An alliance with a missionary was 
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advantageous for Kapteins and their raads for a variety -
of reasons which often we~e entirely unrelated to the 
preaching of the gospel. For instance, a mission station 
was a military centre as well, in.that the church was 
used as a 'keep'. The missionaries noted that Jonker's 
.stone cha~el "could also be used as a rortress••. 9 In 
the 1860s, the church at Gibeon assumed very similar 
f t
. 10 unc ions. 
Missionaries also played crucial roles not only in 
. establishing but in ma_intain}._ng permanent settlements. 
These were sustained by missionary gardens. In the 
early years of missionary involvement other members of 
8. aRMG 1847, Feb., 11. The same was true for Berseba. 
9. BRMG 1862, 22. 
10. BRMG 1865, 179. 
11 
the community made gardens as well. These agricul-
tural endeavours were often the object of considerable 
financial outlays by the missionaries. For example, 
Samuel Hahn, working at an outpost of Bethany, bought 
two Cape ploughs with eight oxen each and had sown 
12 three morgen of wheat and barley. The advantages 
of such stable settlements were obvious. 
v 
Firstly, 
they acted as a protection against raids through the 
increased organisational capacity for defence. Also, 
Kapteins were usually careful not to antagonise the 
missionaries because of their contacts with other 
Europeans, especially traders. Secondly, they were 
vital to the co-ordination and maintenance of commodity 
exchange. Additionally, the men had more freedom to 
pursue raiding and hunting excusions as the women and 
servants of the settlement were being 'looked after'. 
by the missionary. Kleinschmidt noted once that on 
such an occasion he had to bother himself "with the 
unruly women and the rabble" and "do the job of a 
Kaptein" for four weeks. 13 
11. See Chapter 4. 
12. BRMG 1849, 317. 




As far as the trade nexus with the Cape was concerned, 
missionaries could be of use in many other ways. 
A resident missionary secured access to commodities. 
This was a decisive advantage because kapteins 6ften 
could not rely on the punctual arrival of itinerant 
traders. Usually a missionary would attract such an 
itinerant trader in the first place because his person 
guaranteed the trader's security. Secondly, his own 
access to commodities from the Cape or even Europe was 
available to the Kaptein 6f the place through adding 
his orders to those of the missionary. Furthermore, 
the missionary would act as a trader himself~ Tindall, 
the missionary at Amraal'.s place, noted: "When the 
natives are in want of an article, they apply to a 
t d . . f . t II 14 B f 1840 . t ra er or a missionary or i . e ore · , i 
seems that missionaries were the pr~me suppliers of guns 
and ammunition. At Jerusalem in 1818, Ebner regretted 
the fact that he could not provide Titus Afrikaner with a 
supply of powder and lead as abundant as that provided 
"by the earlier" teachers 11 • 15 Also, he was rather 
critical of the desire of the chief of the Bondelswarts 
for a missionary "because it ~ee~s to me that he is 
more interested in powder, lead and tobacco than in 
16 the teachings of the gospel". Similarly, Schmelen 
14. J. Tindall: The Journal, 92. On the interlinkage 
·between missi~naries and trade, see Loth: · 
Mission, 31-34. 
15. J. Ebner: Reis~, 298 (footno~e), 298. 
16. Ibid., 173. 
recorded the necessity "to furnish some of my people 
. 17 
with arms". Even in later years, the missionary 
provided access to ar.ms and .amrriuni ti on. For example, 
when the export of guns and ammunition from the Cape was 
strictly prohibited due to the Frontier Wars, it was 
Kleinschmidt.J the. : missionary, who provtded Kaptein 
18 Swartbooi with some gunpowder. Vollmer did the same 
for Kaptein Oasib. 19 Later, Vollmer even occasioned 
some kind of internal scandal' in missionary circles 
when he lobbied at the Cape for a considerable supply 
of ammunition for Oasib. 20 
6.2.1 The Missionary·as Trade Nexus Specialist 
A missionary was of additional use to the Kapteins in 
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their dealings with.the Cape. He acted as their infor-
mant on prices and imparted useful skills such as 
reading and writing in Dutch and Nama. Typically, the 
missionary Scheppmann reported that a messenger fro~ 
the Topnaars at the Bay had requested a missionary with 
the words: "I am a stupid Nam~qua and we are all stupid, 
17. CALMS Journals, Schmelen, .1812, 22. 
18. BRMG 1855, 92. 
19. Quellen 5, 15, Sep. 1854 . 
. 20. RMS KP 1861~ paragraph 7. 
but now we wish to have a teacher·so that we may 
develop our minds" (so dass wir zu Verstand kommen). 21 
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The messenger was probably referring· firstly to the 
Kaptein's wish to be informed about prices and secondly 
to his wish that the children should be instructed in 
D)ltch_, the language of the Cape traders. This insistel:).ce 
on instruction in Dutch led to frequent quarrels with 
the missionaries who realised clearly that Christian 
principles could not easily be taught in a foreign 
language. They were not prepared to teach in Dutch 
22 only but insisted on Nama as well. . Vollmer once 
complained about this and added that "instruction in 
Dutch was desired so that the people could deal better 
with-the traders and could say to them: for this sheep 
I want so and so many knives, etc. 112 3 
However, the missionary was often required to assist 
even more directly in dealings with traders. Thus 
Kleinschmidt once provided a very vivid account of an 
incident in Rehoboth. Kaptein Swartbooi decided to 
change the terms of barter, and wanted to pay the trader 
only half of the usual rate for certain goods. He 
asked Kleinschmidt-for support in this. When the 
missionary refused, Swartbooi walked through the village 
21. Moritz Scheppm~nn 1846, 240. 
22. - BRMG 1859, 23. 
23. Quellen 5 April, 1858 
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complaining loudly about the uselessness of missionaries. 
When he solicited consolation from an old aunt, she 
threatened to hit him if he did not leave her house 
immediately. Before retiring to his hut, Swartbooi 
denounced Kleinschmidt's wife who was busy in her 
kitchen. 24 
6.2.2 Christianity as a Tool for ·Political Control 
Most importantly, however, the missionaries and their 
ideologies were transformed into a tool for political 
control, filling the vacuum left by the decline in 
'traditional' sanctions (such as kinship) which had lost 
their power. Referring to the Afrikaners in 1815, 
Ebner noted: "It is only the baptised wh? are allowed 
t th 1125 ... o use e gun. Later he remarked that non-
baptised people bitterly complained about their 
f 
·inferior· 
social pbsitions. 26 Another example is the Ryksboek 
that was developed by the people of Bethany. 27 As I 
showed, this and similar constitutions were far-reaching 
attempts to create legal artd administrative structures 
that were not only informed by Old Testament notions 
of good and evil~- but also provided sanctions for class 
24. BRMG 1859, 22-24. 
25. >~ Ebner : Reise 132. 
J 
26 .. Ibid. , 200-201. 
27. As indicated, this was paralleled by constitu-
tions in Berseba, Rehoboth and Warmbad. See 
Chapter 4. and Chapter 5. 
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distinctions. They sought to entrench patriarchy 
and secure the reproduction of social hierarchies as 
though they were part of the natural order. This was 
mainly due to the fact that those with a sufficient 
number of servants and followers to look after their cattle 
at outposts could spend time with the missionary as le~rning 
to read and write and to commit large portions of Scrip-
ture to memory were tedio~s and time-consuming processes. 
Knudsen once reported proudly that his disciples at 
Bethany knew the catechism, the Ten Commandments, the 
generation register from Adam to Jesus, the legend of 
creation, the 12 sons and tribes of Israel, the 10 
plagues, all prophets and the list. of books in the Old 
d N T t t b heart. 28 I dd. t. th. an ew es amen , y n a i ion, is 
knowledge had to be retained and refurbished from time 
to time. Yet, as I showed earlier, 29 it ~as only by 
such hard-won accomplishments that members of a congre-
gation could become church elders or reach other positions 
of social importance. 
6.2.3 The Missionary as Doctor, Pharmacist, Social 
Worker and Psychologist 
I indicated previously how health services had disinte-
grated when old social relations were transformed.3 1 
?~~~ Quellen 3a, 10 Feb. 1844. 
29. See above, Chapter 4 ' Chapter 5 . 
30. BRMG 1869: 115. 
31. See above, Chapters 4 and 5. 
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However, a kommando leader who wanted to m~intain a 
certain number of followers could do so by providing 
the settlement with a system of health care through the 
missionary . The missionary would act as a doctor, 
... . 
instruct and appoint nurses and community health workers. 
Under Kleinschmidt in Rehoboth, special huts for sick and 
infirm people were erected, and women were appointed 
who would take care of them. 32 Such women would 
sometimes assume counselling functions as well.33 Often, 
the missionary would also run a pharmacy. Jonker once 
explained to Missionary Sch6neberg why he wanted him 
to settle at OtjimbingJNe. He said: "Traders come 
and go, but the missionary stays, and then we know from 
where to get our medicines. 11 3 4 
Missionaries also rendered invaluable service to the 
kommando groups by acting as explorers and pioneers. 
Their. journ~ys were always made in alliance and co-
operation with the Kapteins, 35 who profited by finding 
new pastures and water holes. At the same time, 
32. BRMG 1849, 5-6. 
33. For evidence of this in Berseba and Bethany, 
see BRMG 1854, 122-123; BRMG 1859, 357. 
34. BRMG 1854, 236. On the missionary as pharmacist, 
see also Ridsdale: Scenes, 269; CA HP 9, 6 May, 
1845, 15 May 18li6; 11 August 1849:" 
35. Hahn's and Kleinschmidt's travels to the north of 
Windhoek were ar. exception to this, see also 
Chapter 7. · 
1. 9 s 
these trips were mostly financed by the missionaries' 
society. 
6.2.4 The Missionary as Provider of a Moral Code 
However, it seems that for the groups under discussion, 
the significance of missionary teachings and worship 
practices was mostly in the emotional/moral sphere. 
As I shall demonstrate, this indicates clearly that 
old str~ctures and securities had faded away to make room 
for the kommando organisation in the whole of Namaland. 
Women showed a greater interest in having a missionary 
than men. 36 They also responded strongly to missionary 
teachings. 37 Jonker's wife Beetje stayed in close 
contact with Hahn over a number of years, Amraal's wife 
and other women apparently were the motivating forces 
behind this group's settlement at Wesley Vale with a 
. . . 38 
missionary. Similarly, the women at Bethany decided 
·36 •. David Christian's wife was reported to have 
pressurised her husband so that they would 
stay at Bethany, BRMG, 1856, 4; the same 
was said about Anatje, Willem Swartbooi's wife, 
BRMG 1849, 3. J. Alexander once noted in a 
letter to Hahn: "It was especially the women 
who always cried for a missiona~y''· JBRMG 12, 
27. 
37. For a typical description of weeping and break-
- downs, see Ebner: Reise; 247-2!18. 
38. Cook: The Modern, 61. 
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to make more than 80 mats to cover the church roof. 
The responses to church services were intensely emotional 
and Knudsen once reported: "The people were overcome 
by weeping so strongly that the singing almost stopped 
and only one woman stayed in church (but all the men; 
th~y- do not cry so easily) ... 1139 This can not b~ fully 
accounted for by the fact that women had easier access 
to missionary teachings and had a greater need of 
protection when the station was depleted of men. Rather, 
it tells us something about the subordinate position of 
women in the kommando groups. It also says something 
about emotional conditions in the kommando groups and 
thus provides a key to understanding the power positions 
whi6h missionaries in 19th-century Namibia acquired, 
often by default. 
Although significant, we must not over-emphasise the 
fact that it was the women rather than the men who 
showed such intense emotional responses. As is true 
for patriarchal structures in general, women are usually 
allowed more emotional receptivity and sensitivity than 
the men. This is especially so when the community is 
pri~arily organised on m~lit~ry principles (as wai the 
case with the kommando groups). Thus, women tend to 
exhibit g_eneral emotional needs and often consider their 
39 .· Moritz Knudsen. 1845, 157. 
fulfilment as more important than men. 
My analysis of these groups in Chapters 4 and 5 indi-
cated a great looseness of group boundaries, as 
well as instability. Whatever little security existed 
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could aparently only be derived from raiding and plunder-
ing. This could not be systematised and provided a 
hopelessly inadequate guarantee for the groups' reproduction. 
In terms of the pressures leading to the formation of the 
kommandos, there was no firm moral or eth ical code to 
serve as existential base. This, of course, came to 
be true for Nama groups as well when kinship ideologies 
had lost their power. Any inspirational vision of 
the past or of the future was lacking. In the same 
there was no firm productive within the 
interstices of the community to sustain the political 
and administrative superstructure (which, in Jonker's 
case, was actually quite sophisticated). 
-
Where did this leave the people, and especially the 
women who had to socialise the children and carry out 
special functions in the spiritual reproduction of 
the community? What tradition and 'culture' should 
they~pass on to their children? It was not possible 
to 'raid other people's morals and ways of emotional 
satisfaction in the same way as their· cattle could be 
raided. Here the missionary became important. The 
1 \-
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groups of Namaland (unlike many other communities 
~hich emerged in the course of South African history) 
did establish continuity and tradition, and this was 
partly due to their involvement with a European missionary. 
He offered a coherent moral code, 40 a strong vision of 
a ;:,peaceful future (where commodity exchange would 
lead to self-sustained growth and general wealth) and in 
this he satisfied deep-seated emotional needs. We must 
see the missionary's role here as that of a psychiatrist/ 
community development worker who performed vital social 
functions which could not easily be discharged in any 
other way at that time. 
For example, the typical celebration of Whitsuntide at 
Rehoboth involved a whole week of intensive counselling. 
Kleinschmidt commented: "I do not exaggerate if I say 
that I have sat the whole week from morning to evening, 
to listen to confessions of sins, complaints and 
anxieties, feelings and experiences; then I had to con-
1 t . d t t 1141 so e, o repriman , o correc ..• This was followed 
40. This was laid down in the constitutions adopted 
by many groups as I argued in the preceding 
chapter. It seems to have been most effect-
ive only when the missionary was present. 
Thus, at Berseba several young men were once 
'excommunicated' because they had behaved 
'indecently' while missionary Kr6nlein was 
away at the Cape. On his return, he discovered 
their deeds because the girls had fallen pregnant. 
41 • BRMG 1863, 104. 
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by the administration of the Lord's Supper to underline·· 
the spiritual cleansing and refreshment, and a day of 
42 singing elaborate choruses, praying, repentance, etc. 
Religious concepts are vital for the reproduction of. 
a community. Where they are absent or weak we hear 
of desertion, not only male desertion but female deser-
tion as well. Thus, Andersson noted while travelling 
to Ovamboland in May 1851: "There is a great number of women 
going to the Ovambos. Galton says about 80. Some of 
these go there to sell their belts for which they get 
beads, etc., in exchange. Others will stop there as 
servants 11 • 43 If necessary, religion had to be 'imported'. 
This was what the leaders of the communities 
had been doing when they acquired a missionary. 
A major driving force behind this 'importation' was 
the women. This was one occasion~ when women partici-
pated in and i~fluenced the decision making of the 
leaders. Thus, Kleinschmidt reported a conversation 
with Jonker who said to him: "I have held council, not 
by myself, but with my people, indeed with the women 





WA AP 1, 25 May, 1851. 
44~ Moritz Kleinschmidt 1842, 257. 
Yet, the acquisition of a missionary was organised 
and implemented by the Kapteins and their raad only. 
If large sectors of the community benefitted from the 
social functions he performed, these functions were 
still class-based. It was in the rulers' interest· to 
maintain a framework, to tighten group boundaries and 
to satisfy women's demands. The missionary's skills 
were an 'asset' which the Kapteins were able to offer 
to their followers and especially to their womenfolk 
in order to ensure the reproduction of regular surplus 
labour extraction. 
Women were crucial here, because the products of their 
labour were not locked into the spiralling demands of 
the Cape nexus. 45 Thus the missionary found himself 
in a position of considerable political power. 
Kleinschmidt, for example, was allowed to interfere 
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in punishments and the administration of social sanctions 
soon after settling down with Swartbooi. 46 H. Loth has 
also demonstrated this clearly. However, he omits the 
conside~ation that the missionary's power was rooted in 
the nature of the kommando group, not in his own person. 
45. For this point, see chapters 4 ana· 5: 
46~ BRMG 1849, 9. 
6.3 THE WIDER POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACQUIRING 
A MISSIONARY 
6.3.1 The Rejecti6n of Missionaries as Colonial Agents 
The power position of missionaries led, however, to 
conflicts. It created an ambivalence in the character 
of the alliance between the rulers and the missionary, 
because acquiring a missionary meant for the Kaptein 
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the creation of a rival power. The need for the services 
of a missionary_and the concomitant violation of all 
the values represented by the chief through raiding 
and plundering provided an arena for intense conflict 
which fills the records. Here was a contradiction 
that was never resolved. The establishment of gardens 
under missionary guidance was an attempt to off~r· an 
alternative to raiding. Besides tha~, the powerful posi-
tion that was conceded to a European missionary once 
he had been established was related to the penetration of 
merchant capital and the colonial expansion at the Cape. 
For these reasons, the missionaries were repeatedly 
. rejected by Kapteins even though many advantages could 
be derived from their presence. 
/ 













dangers represented by missionaries. 47 This he 
expressed in the following way: "You are bought by 
others to tame us. You build a house and appear 
friendly and then the traders come, people shoot birds 
and look for spiders (explorers) and the copper diggers. 
You want to do with us what you did with the people in 
48 
Little Namaqualand ·- take our land away." On other 
occasions ·Jonker called the missionaries "landseekers 
who cannot get fed in their fatherland, traitors, 
preachers of lies, ~lasphemous twisters of the g0spel 
Jager Afrikaner had destroyed the mission station at 
Warmbad in 1812. Schmelen had-to leave Bethany in 1822 
because a civil war threatened to develop around him 
and Knudsen was forced by David Christian to lea.ve his 
mission in 1850. Apparently he was even flogged although 
this h&s net been aJbstantiated. In thes8 and otr.e.: 
cases50 we find a two-sided relationship between the · 
¥'( 
47. Thus, although missionary Hahn was stationed 
at Neu-Barmen and not in Windhoek, Jonker's 
contacts with him were close and frequent, 
consisting in letters, present and visits. 
See CA HP 9, diaries 1,. 3 and 4. 
48. BRMG 1856, 132. 
49. BRMG 1855, 62. 
50. To be listed· in Chapter 9 • 
.rulers and the missionaries. This must not be seen 
as primarily based on later missionary attempts to 
consolidate their power positions by controlling and 
even monopolising trade. 51 Rather, it was linked to 
the contradictions inherent in the political, social 
and economic organisation of kommando groups in Namaland. 
6.3.2 The Missionary as a Political Leader Within 
Kommando Groups 
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The conflicts between the desire and need for a missionary 
and the political threat which he constituted, became 
particularly clear in a series of events at Rehoboth 
in the mid-1850s. In accordance with what was in 
essence an alliance with the ruling group, mission~ries 
often stressed those aspects of the Christian religion 
that would support the Kapt~in's power, such as codes 
of conduct or the tolerance of suffering. In the case 
to be related below, essentially democratic tenets of 
Christianity came to the fore., however, and the 
mission~ry became the voice of 'oppressed' groups within 
the community. Splits in the group came to centre 
·-Jt.e., 
aroundAmissionary and Christian issues which were 
powerful enough to constitute a serious threat to the 
Kaptein's power. 
51. Loth argued that this happened when the 
Missionshandelsgesellschaftt was founded in 
1870, see Loth: Mission, 31-34. 
For the people associating with Willem Swartbooi, 
soon each raiding expedition came to be a serious 
political and emotional inconvenience after they 
settled at Rehoboth in 1845. In 1852 a cattle raid 
coincided with Kleinschmidt's journey to the Cape. On 
his return he was assured that all those who had 
participated in the raid were now excluded from the 
congregation. This he accepted and open conflict was 
52 averted. In 1853, a raid was camouflag~d as a 
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trading expedition and Willem Swartbooi :delivered several 
major speeches in his own defence to the missionary. 5 3 
In each case· the danger of a potential split of the 
. 
Swartboois into two factions, for and against raiding, 
was patently feared by the Kaptein. 54 This pattern 
recurred. In 1854 Swartbooi planned to raid Jonker 
but Kleinschmidt advised him not to do so, significantly, 
mainly because of lack of ammunition. After a heated 
argument, Kleinschmidt left the station. The Kaptein 
was now strongly criticised by some members of his raad. 
He had to recall the missionary and make apologies for 
what happened. The expedition against jonker which 
had,not been abandoned, however, turned out to be a 
55 very half-hearted affair and had no apparent effect. 
52. BRMG 1853, 311. 
53. BRMG 1854, 58. For more detail concerning the 
true nature of this 'trading expedition', see 
B. Lau: 'Critique', 35. 
54: BRMG 1855, 24-29, 51-58. 
55. BRMG 1853, 311; BRMG 1855, 58. 
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A few months later Swartbooi proposed to 'look for 
anothe~ spring' near Otjimbingwe, the headquarters of 
the copper diggers at the time. 56 Kleinschmidt, suspecting 
a raid, was able to put pressure on him and ensured 
that the Kaptein was not followed by more than half 
the male population of Rehoboth. Moreover, this group 
frequently halted on the road to discuss the issue 
with the ~esult that they did not get beyond a few 
miles from Rehoboth and soon turned back. , The Kaptein 
felt obliged to apologise profusely to Kleinschmidt, 
apparently under great emotional stress. 
At the same time, a serious split involving geographical 
separation, occurred around another matter of intense 
missionary concern, namely the question of monogamy. 
This split, more than the others, highlighted the nature 
of the cO~flicts. 57 This was probably not unrelated 
to Oasib's final attempt to claim Swartbooi as an ally 
56. Se~ b~i60, Ch~pter~7~ 1 ~33, 
57 .. These conflicts, the desire 'for alternative 
places of settlements and raids, were part 
of othe~ developments characterising the 
'mid-1850s, especially Kaptein Oasib's last 
attempt to mobilise against Jonker Afrikaner 
on the basis of kinship rights. See below, 
Chapter 7. 
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·in wartime on the basis of old kinship ·structures 
(which suited the Kaptein well at the time). Swartbooi 
had tried to reintroduce polygamy, together with some 
of the old judges . He took on f {ve oth~r wives and 
the judges also wanted to take more wives. They 
appointed new judges to.their ranks "of which they did 
.not have anything to fear " . . . .  Kleinschmidt also added: 
.... .,, . 
" .•• the 'young men, eager to get married, could see 
to it themselves where to get a wife from Then, 
at nightly sessions, which were meant to remain unknown 
to the missionary, girls and women had to appear before 
the panel of judges in order to ascertain ~hether they 
would agree ~o the reinstitution of polygamy. They 
were offered special scarfs and were asked: "Do you want 
to fill in the form of the Kaptein?" Many refused 
to take the ~carves and to answer the question. They 
were then badly beaten up. Kleinschmidt learnt about 
this when the girls went to his wife and showed her 
their bruised backs. The women who refused were 
called "those who fill in the form of the missionary". 
On one occasion the girls had to appear in front of 
Kaptein Swartbooi himself who told them that everything 
was happening according to his instructions. When the 
judges asked Willem Swartbooi's wife: "Did you hear 
that?", she answered "Yes, but he is only a worldly 
58. BRMG 1855, 378. 
, 
Kaptein, our king Jesus is more powerful 11 •59 Shortly 
after this she was expelled from Rehoboth by her hus-
band and returned to settle with her family in Bethany. 
Kleinschmidt automatically became the spokesman of 
those ranged against the Kaptein when he wrote the 
latter a letter in favour of the 'rebels'. The next 
Sunday he noted: "There were only a few men at the 
church service but many women and all the youths, these 
t t b 1 t th . . 1160 now wan o e c oser o e m1ss1onary, ... 
Significantly it was the women and 1 children', the 
uninitiated young men who belonged to that section of 
the community with least rights, not being allowed to 
participate in the decision-making processes . 
. The Kaptein 's son David made himself the ieader of 
210 
the rebellious group. When Swartbooi and his followers 
left the station in an attempt "to keep the polygamy 
law in force'', David did not follow them, although his 
62 father had ordered him to do so. This conflict 
extended over several years. In 1857, the Kaptein 
returned to Rehoboth temporarily but forbade the women 
59. Ibid., 379. 
60. Ibid. , 
61. BRMG 1856, 347. 





to wear dresses instead of their 'native' aprons. 
Soon, he moved away again', but, as the missionary 
sources stress, with· the small~~ part of the community. 64 
The conflict apparently ended with.a victory for the 
women and the adult youth in that the Kaptein let David 
know that the attempted reintroduction of polygamy 
would be abandoned. Everybody was again to gather at 
the station. Kleinschmidt commented that Swartbooi's 
"people had forced him to move to the station; they 
had obliged him to accept his son David as a co-
ruler 1165 It does not seem as if the Kaptein was 
moved by a desire to hear the gospel. 
In conclusion, it would be valid to view the missionary's 
role as an integral part of the social dynamic of the 
kommando groups. 66 On the one hand, he acted as a 
focal point ·to attract followers and dependants, thus 
connecting into the pre-capitalist aspects of accumula-
tion. On the other hand, his presence was inextric-
ably linked to aspects of commoditisation and the 
involvement with the Cape trade nexus. This made the 
links between the missionaries and the Kapteins so 
intricate and ambivalent. These iisues will re-emerge in my 
treatment of the 1860s in Chapter 9. 
63. Quellen 20, 27 Sept. 1857. 
64. BRMG 1856, 183; BRMG~l859, 148. 
65. BRMG 1859, 149; BRMG 1859, 24. 
66; See above, Chapter 3. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE CANCELLATION OF NAMA/ORLAM DIFFERENCES 
AND THE EMERGENCE OF ALTERNATIVE PATTERNS 
OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN NAMALAND 
i842 - 1859 
In the preceding chapters we have established the 
. 
terms on which we must view the development of political 
relations in Nama- and Damaraland from about mid-century 
onwards. I demonstrated that after a period of con-
quest and original alliances Nama a~d Orlam came to 
establish communities based on the kommando dynamic. 
Less than a decade after this, all attempts to base 
political relations on the old differences between 
Nama and Orlarn, were given up, and new patterns of 
conflict emerged. Jonker's relations with Herero-
speaking chiefs played·a crucial role in this process. 
7.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ALLIANCES AND TRIBUTORY 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HERERO-SPEAKING CHIEFS 
AND THE AFRIKANERS 
One of the most striking (and politically most success-
ful)features of the Afrikaner's relations with Herero-
speakers was that they managed to establish and maintain 
alliances with several Herera-speaking chiefs in the 
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1840s. This was in spite of the fact that the relations 
between Orlams and Namas with their guns and horses, 
and the southward-pushing Hereros with their shields 
and assegais were intensely hostile at the time. 
When Alexander asked Jonker whether it was possible 
to travel i~ Damaraland at all, Jonker actually replied: 
"It is impossible, no one would take a message ... 
for any reward; for the messenger would be sure of 
death among a people so wild and so exasperated against 
us for turning them out of this country 11 • 1 The 
missionaries noted in 1853: "When a Herero sees a 
Namaqua with a gun, he won!t hesitate; he gets such 
a terrible fright that he forgets all resistance and 
only tries to escape. 112 
The most famous Herero chiefs who struck an alliance 
with Jonker were Chief Tjimuaha and his son Kamaharer~ 
and Ka.hitjine. However, Hahn's records of the 
station at Neu-Barmen in Da~araland (where he was 
stationed on Jonker's sufferance alone)3 indicate that 
there was a whole network of Herero-speaking chiefs and 
headmen who co-operated with Jonker. The following 
typical-remark by ~ahn confirms that non-hostile, 
regular relationships were maintained between the 
1. Alexander: Discovery, II, 158. 
2. BRMG 1853, 35. 
3. See below, footnote 21 . 
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Afrikaners and certain Herera chiefs. Hahn mentioned 
that on July 29, 1849, "Harujezu, a small Omuherero 
chief who stays at Jonker's place, came with a party 
of his people and two of Jonker's servants to Omuini 
ouge (sic). We hear that the latter has sent people 
to Jonker ... to ask whether he could move to him ... tt 4 
Also, Jonker had allies among influential Herera-speakers 
who were part of the eastern Herera, the Mbanderus. 5 
The nature of these alliances was also related to 
matters of social and political organisation withi~_, 
and among Herera-speakers. However, this cannot be 
explored here in any detail. 
The terms of these alliances and tributary relationships 
were precise and their implications were clearly 
perceived by the missionaries. The Herero chiefs 
had to take care of numbers of Afrikaner cattle~ They 
had to assist the Afrikaners with their knowledge of 
4. tA HP 9, 29 July 1849. A little later, Hahn 
reported of another 11of the rich Hereros" 
who had moved to Jonker's place, Ibid., 15 
Oct. 1849. Two years later, it was the 
rich Herera chief Kairama who also decided to 
move to Jonker's place after giving him many 
head of cattle, Ibid., 22 Aug. 1851. 
5. Moritz Hahn 1846, 209. 
of their country, 6 and with Afrikaner exploitation 
of Herero dependants. 
Thus Kleinschmi~t n9ted ttia~ Tjimuaha and Jonker were 
good friends, even though Tjimuaha had to give Jonker 
oxen if he requested them. 7 Hahn once reported that '. 
Jonker came to Neu-Barmen, and Tjimuaha showed him the 
kraals of his followers which Jonker was free to 
''plunder' 8 . 
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Moltke's claim that Jonker and Katjimuaha had maintained 
a kind of "robber.partnership 119 bears some relevance 
here. An additional major advantage which Jonker derived 
from his alliances with the Herero was raiding expedi-
tions to Ovamboland and attempts to establish new 
alliances there. Without the help of his Herera-
speaking allies he could not possibly have pushed that 
far north, especially where knowledge of the country 
was concerned. His Herero-speaking allies also served 
as a protection on the long trek through Damaraland. 
The first raid was undertaken by Katjimuaha's people 
and Jonker's cousins on his behalf, in 1858. Apparently 
the· kommando came back i•with a formidable booty" . 10 
Soon thereafter Jonker was called by one Ovambo chief 
6. For example, Kahitjene's son was reported to have 
joined Jonker in serving as a guide on recent 
"plundering expeditions", see WA AP 2, 9 Feb. 1852. 
7. BRMG 1863, 341. 
8. CA HP, 9, 25 May 1852. 
9. See overleaf. 
to 'help' him against another. He went up in July 
1860 and came back in April 1861, together with some 
c 11 of Amraal's people. 
In return, Herera-speaking chiefs were issu~d with 
· 12 
guns. Their own cattle posts were not raided, and 
they had a chance to enrich themselves during the 
frequent raids. The Herero chiefs being unconcerned 
with the accumulation of goods for' their exchange 
value, were apparently content to leave the procured 
catvle to Jonker and his ffien, while they claimed 
the assegais of captured men, their ornaments and other 
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possessions. The Herero chiefs also captured children. 
This is evidenced by a major raid that was carried 
out by Jonker and most of his men, Adam Kraai and his 
followers, David Afrikaner from J~rusalem, some Mbanderu 
and his allies, Kahitjene and Katjimuaha. 13 
9 0 J. Von Moltke: 'Der Mythos vom' Unabhangigkei ts-
krieg der Herera und'die HauptlingswGrde 
Anderssons', AH, 1973, 36. 
10. BRMG 1860, 208. 
11: BRMG 1861, 317. 
12. CA HP 9, 10 Feb; 1847. 
13. Ibid., 16 March 18460 
' 
Jonker had other things to offer his allies. One 
of them was t~e regular organisation of ~plendid trade 
fairs at Windhoek, to which Herero-speakefs were 
po_ssi bly invite_d. . Th~.s~ also indicate that Jonker 
consistently attempted to expand an effective economic 
system and did not rely on raidin~ alone. Thus 
Kleinschmidt in Windhoek noted several times that many 
Hereros, often total stran~ers, used to arrive at the 
settlement. "Upon their arrival they always have 
cattle and sheep with them in order to exchange them 
1 for small axes, arm rings, calabashes, etc. 1114 
Hahn recalled that Windhoek became a "trade centre, 
because the Hereros came with large herds to exchange 
them for calabashes, tobacco, iron and tin goods, and 
apart from the Afrikaners, Namaquas -J (sic) came as 
well to participate in this advantageous barter. 
Several smith shops were established, old wagons dis-
mantled and the iron was worked into the simple tools 
which Herer9s sought. 1115 
That these trade fairs were held regularly, at least 
14. Moritz Kleinschmidt 1843, 227~ 
Ibid. , 221, 223. 
See ·.'also 
15. BRMG 1862, 38; also Galton: Narrative, 70. 
Andersson had similarly noted that Windhoek 
in the early 1840s was a "crowded, bustling 
market, the whole year round." WA AP 1, 
6 Feb. 1851. 
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in the 1840s, is confirmed by Kleinschmidt's remark 
that Hereros who came to Windhoek for trading purposes 
"request women from Jonker while arguing that they 
could not be without women for the time of their 
visit ... ' Jonker of course refused to comply ... 
now they bring their own women 
The nature of the Afrikaners' relations ·with Herera 
chiefs was adequately summed up in a memorandum by the 
traveller/trader Chapman, to the Cape Government in which 
he argued that the conflicts of the 1860s should not 
be seen in the light of a Herero 'war of liberation' 
as some contemporaries dict. 17 "Even all those tribes 
of Damaras who have been living at o~ near Otjimbirtgwe 
and· amongst the Afrikaners have never been slaves. 
They have always been free to go where they like, and 
with ~horn they like ... without ... being in any way 
interfered with by the Afrikaners. The follower_s of 
Maharero, for instance, have never been attacked or 
plundered by the Narnaquas, but on the contrary have for 
many years past been the instrument employed by the 
Namaquas for either robbing or plundering, or punishing 
the· tribes of Damaras with whom they had any differences. 1118 
16. Moritz Kleinschmidt 18~3, 228. Of course, this 
evidence is also significant in terms of the 
relations between men and women in Herero-
speaking groups. However, these issues cannot 
be explored here any further. 
17. See also Chapter 9. 
18. CA G H 19/10, J. Chapman: 'Memo', Feb. 1865. 
Ar so Mo 1 t k e : ' My tho s ' , 3 4 . 
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In this context mention must be made of the populati6n 
at the two Herero mission stations, Neu-Barmen and 
Otjimbingwe. As I will show in Chapter 9, they assumed 
crucial roles in the early stages of conflicts which 
led to the downfall of the Afrikaners. The populations 
at Neu-Barmen and later at Otjimbingwe were largely 
the victims of this collaborative raiding or tribute 
extracting through Jonker and his allies. Thus, for 
example, Chapman noted that the Herera-speakers at Otjim-
bingwe were not 'slaves' of the Afrikane~. Rather, 
these people were the remwants of tribes formerly destroyed 
or broken up and plundered by _K_am_?.f1?-rero_ himself, 
while fighting on his own account, or in the ranks of 
the late Jonker Afrikaner." 19 They were so-called 
•1ovatjimbas r, which mea.ns impoverished, without cattle, 
and victimised by their 'patrons I.. With Jonker's 
' 
consent they were provided with a place where they could 
subsist without cattle herds through missionary gardens 
20 and other support at Neu-Barmen, and thro~gh the 
opportunities afforded by the function of trade routes 
at Ot jim bing we . The settlement at Neu-Barmen was 
entirely dependent on Jonker 21 and all rights to the 
19./ CA G.H 19/10, Chapman: 'Memo', 1865. 
similar statement, see BRMG 1853, 39. 
For a 
20. Ibid., 4 July 1847. Hahn added that.sick people 
were fed at his expense. 
Footnotes 21 and 22 overleif. 
·-· 
220 
water and grazing and the settlement of Otjimbingwe 
were also considered to be in Jonker's hands. (Jonker's 
reasons here will ~e examined below.) The relations 
between the missionaries at these places and their 
inhabitants have been analysed by several writers in 
greater detail and cannot be explored further here.22 
The process of victimisation of Herera-speakers was 
serious enough to lead to an almost total withdrawal 
of vast numbers of Herera-speakers from the central 
area. Thus, the missionary conference of 1856 noted 
that the language of the Hereros was being forgotten 
and superseded by a Nama/English/Dutch jargon, and 
that "The nation as far as we know it, has ceaied to 
exist; there are only individuals left knowing no 
law nor order, who wander about the country very 
21. For inst.ance, Hahn was constantly supplied 
with slaughter cattle by Jonker. See CA 
HP 9, 26 Jan. 1846, 6 April, 1857. 
. 22 • 
' 
If he wanted to establish gardens, he· had 
to apply to Jonker for land, Ibid., 20 May 
1856. Additionally, he was dependent on 
Jonker's power in matters of administration. 
Thus, he used to order a judge from Jonker's 
place to hold court at Neu-Barmen, Ibid .. 
1 Jan. 1858. As he claimed, Herero-speakers 
at the station would only listen to him once 
he threatened to 11tell Jonker about it" if 
they did not, Ibid., 22 May 1845. Otjimbingwe 
was also supplied with food by Jonker, BRMG 
1853, 37. 
For example, see Werner: 'Investigation', 72; 
also F. Lehmann: 'Jonker Afrikaner und die Herero-
Missionare seiner Zeit als~H§uptlinge wider 
Willen" (1844-1861) Sud west AfrH::a; Veroffentlichungen 
des Museums fOr Volkerkunde zu_ Leipzig,Heft 11, Lei1)zj_g 
Tifol. ) 
.. ,. 
miserably. 112 3 
7.1.1 The Afrikaners' Early Struggle to Remain in 
Control of These Relationships, 1845-1851 
Jonker was fully aware of the importance of his 
monopoly access to these relations with Herero-speakers. 
He guarded his rights very jealously. His struggle 
for control ·as far as the reproduction of exploitative 
relations with Herero-speakers can be demonstrated 
clearly. 
Although contact with a missionary was important 
enough for-him to let Hahn remain at Neu-Barmen and 
Rath at Otjimbingwe, Jonker was extremely anxious to 
prevent Europeans from expioring Hereroland and 
Ovamboland lest they should supply Hereros with guns. 
He was also determined to prevent the establishment 
of any relationships between European missionaries and 
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Herero chiefs independent of his control. The following 
paragraphs will elucidate this further. 
23. RMS KP 1856, paragraph 10. Interestingly, these 
'miserable' individuals would often be women. 
Schone berg noted from Neu-Barmen: "A few 
days ago a group of whores arrived here; I 
do not know from where. They are all run-away 
and expelled women, a miserable lot·... They 
quarrel day and night ... There is nobody here 
who could even try to silence this rabble. 
All station inhabitants are actually nothing 
but a collection of rabble." BRMG 1853, 
252-253. 
.The extensive trade fairs at Windhoek in the early 
1840s,could not be kept up by Jonker and his men. 
Their search for surface water for their cattle obliged 
them to leave Windhoek and to migrate between water 
holes in the area east and north of WindhoBk. 24 
Hahn's establishment at Neu-Barmen had the advantage 
that it was stable and could assume the role of a 
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trade centre under Jonker's control. This centre played 
an important role in Jonker's network of alliances 
with Herero chiefs. Hahn noted in.1850: 11 A big party 
of rich Hereros came today with 60 - 70 head of cattle 
to buy tobacco here. Such trading parties come weekly, 
sometimes daily. The main articles of this local 
trade are: tobacco and calabashes. Other articles 
such as scissors, axes, arm rings, and ostrich egg-
shells are also sought after. The rich Hereros on 
the other hand bring, apart from their cattle, fat, 
meat, beads traded from the Ovambos, wooden and woven 
ve.ssel s, etc. 1125 
Hahn's position at Neu-Barmen held definite advantages 
for the Afrikaners. Yet it was potentially threatening 
24. For the difficulties of kommando groups to maintain 
permanent settlements~ see Chapter 4. 
25. CA HP 9, 9 March 1850. Unfortunately, nothing 
is said about Jonker's involvement in this. 
' . 
because he was close to a number of Herero-speaking 
chiefs. The Afrikaners had to make persistent efforts 
to prevent Hahn from making independent contact with 
such chiefs. Jonker had already tried to prevent 
Kleinschmidt and Hahn from visiting the 'Damaras' by 
f . t . th h d . t t 26 re using o·g1ve em orses an an in erpre er. 
In 1846, Hahn asked Kleinschmidt at Rehoboth for some 
riding oxen as he intended to travel further north. 
However, Jonker intercepted and took the oxen so that 
Hahn could not proceed. 27 Jonker also sent him a 
message stating that 11 I was not allowed to go to the 
Ovaherero, because I only intended to search for springs 
which he (Jonker, B.L.) wanted to exploit first". 
When Hahn insisted on g6ing, Jonker said he would 
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accompany him. 28 In the end the trip did not take place. 
Similarly, in 1852, Hahn planned his first trip into 
Ova~boland, 29 without asking Jonker. Tji~~aha and his 
followers at Neu-Barmen told him "openly that they didn't 
want me to go as Jonker, upon hearing of my departure, 
26~ Quellen 20, 25 and 26 Dec. 1842; also Hahn: 
'Alt.-SWA', AH 1961, 105. 
27. BRMG, Feb. 1847, 11. 
28. CA HP 9, 7 May 1846. 
29. On the Herero~mission as a base for the 
opening of mission stations in Ovamboland, 


















would surely come and attack and kill them."30 A 
little later Jonker probably informed by Tjimuaha, 
wrote Hahn a letter forbidding him to go to Ovambolana. 31 
Hahn departed nonetheless, together with Rath and 
Kolbe. Jonker complained to Schoneberg at Otjimbingwe 
saying that "He was the Kaptein there and without his 
permission no one was allowed to travel inland to 
other peoples from there. 
not allow that". 32 
He could not and would 
However, the Afrikaners' power was not sufficient to 
maintain such tight control 'for very long. Gal ton 
had pressurised them sufficiently by threatening them 
in the early 1850s with annexation by the Cape. 33 
He had then been permitted to travel northwards. 
Similarly, Hahn and a party succeeded in travelling 
to Ovamboland in 1857 against Jonker's will.34 
Jonker's need to control the missionary's relations 
with Herera-speakers was expressed in various other 
ways . Once he denounced the missionaries and said 
30. CA HP 9' 8 April 1852. 
31 • CA HP 9' 11 May 1852. 
32. BRMG 1853, 249. The missionaries started their 
trip nonetheless but had to return soon because 
Rath became ill with fever. 
33. See Galton's letter to Jonker, in WA AP 1, 
Oct. 1850 (no day). 
34. CA HP 9, 15 May - 11 September 1857. 
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that "he would and could not ':;tolerate missionaries 
among the Hereros: the Hereros were his servants 
whom he needed for war and whom he couldn't allow to 
sit around with the missionaries to listen to hetero-
doxies And he was serious about this. Thus, 
on~ of his closest allies, Tjimuaha, tried continuously 
to get a missionary for himself but was entirely 
unsucessful. Once he wrote a letter to 10muhonge 1· 
Kleinschmidt: "We always used to be afraid of Kaptein 
Jonker to prevent us from requesting a missionary, 
as he did with Kahitjene a~d others who desired God's 
word. But now we have spoken to him and he said that 
35. BRMG 1852, 62. The Kaptein of Bethany and 
Jan Booi were also very eager to prevent 
exploited groups from making contact with 
missionaries. They forbade S. Hahn to visit 
a Hau-khoi .. village. Hahn himself suspected 
that the Kapteins were rather more interested 
in plundering and 'suppressing' those Hau-khoi. 
than letting them be served by a missionary, 
see Quellen 3a, 21 Sep. 1849. Hau-khoi 
themselves were probably quite aware of the 
relations between social status and involvement 
with a missionary. Thus Kleinschmidt's 
evangelising efforts were once met with the 
/,following metaphor by a Hau-khoi: : "What you 
are telling me I don't understand", he said, 
"because my ears are blocked by the dust of 
the veld where we have to dig for roots every 




he would not prevent us from taking a missionary n3 6 
He even asked Hahn to go to the Cape Governor with 
hirn. 37 
Similarly, Hahn reported how Titus Afrikane~ (who had 
moved from Blyde verwacht to. join Jonker in 1845) 
spied amongst the Hereros at Rehoboth. He enquired 
about precisely what th~ we·re taught by the missionary 
and asked if they believed these doctrines.3 8 
Tjimuaha on the other hand, was always careful or 
lucky enough not to overstep the lines of his alliance 
with Jonker, as another chief and ally, Kahitjene, 
had done . 
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This interesting case which shocked the Europeans at the 
time, has been commented upon by writers before. 
For example, Mears simply described the relations 
between Jonker and Kahitjene as those of attack and 
counter-attack.39 Goldblatt made Jonker's attacks 
36 .. Quellen 30, 15 Oct. 1859. He was very interested 
to have a missionary indeed. He built a church 
on his main werft, see CA HP 9, 17 March 1852; 
also he made regular gifts of slaughter cattle 
to Hahn, Ibid., 6 April 1851. 
37. Ibid., 28 March 1859. 
38. Ibid., 15 Jan. :i.e48. 
39. W. Mears: Wesleyan Missionaries in Great Namaqualand 
1820-1876, Cape Town 1968, 18 
I 
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and pursuits of Kahitjene appear as actions of revenge 
for some men allegedly killed by the latter. 40 In 
Vedder' s account, the connection between Kahi t jene 
and Jonker is not mentioned at all; they are only. 
touched upon in a quote from Galton's account. 41 
However, it appears that it has never been evaluated 
in the light of Tjimuaha's abovementioned letter. 
Considered in this light, the evidence indicates that 
Kahitjerie had made independent attempts to acquire a 
missionary. This threatened the basis of Jonker's 
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hegemonic position in Namaland. As previously mentioned, 
the presence of a missionary would mean, among other 
things, access to guns and ammunition entirely outside 
of Jonker's control. 
Hahn's diaries p~oduce a body of evidence which shows 
clearly that it was thi~ and no other issue which was 
at stake in Jonker's attacks on Kahitjene and on the 
newly established mission at Schmelen's Hope. Kolbe 
was sent out specifically as a missionary to Kahitjene 
which was a political move and happened behind Jonker's 
back, and for these reasons was never openly contemplated 
. in ~he missionary records. 
On April 15, 1849, Hahn recorded rumours that Kahitjen~ 
40. I. Goldblatt: SWA, 24. 
41. H. Vedder: Early Times, 247-249. 
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wanted to separate from Jonker and take revenge for 
relatives of his whom Jonker's men had allegedly 
'killed while on a raid. Two weeks later Kahitjene 
visited Hahn at Neu~Barmen. He was very friendly 
and · .'offered gifts of slaughter cattle.· Then he 
breakfasted with Hahn and asked for one of the missionaries 
at Neu-Barmen to come and stay with him. 42 Hahn 
promised that this would be done as soon as Kahitjerie 
settled down at some permanent headquarters. As a 
return present Hahn gave the chief , significantly, 
powder and lead. When, in the evening, Kahitjene's 
people came to p·urchase more ammunition, Hahn· declined 
to give it to them. 
After having sent more presents in the shape of oxen, 43 
Kahitjene was visited by Hahn at his main werft. 
Although Hahn, in his diary, did not state clearly 
where the settlement· was situated,·his travel route 
t th t ·t Sh 1 ' Hope.
44 sugges s a i was very near ~c me en s 
Jonker, when he heard of this visit, sent a furious 
42. CA HP 9, 15 April 1849, 28 April 1849. Kolbe 
and Rath arrived at Neu;..Barmen at about the 
same time, to support the Herera mission, 
Ibid., 23 April 1848. 
43. Ibid., 28 May 1849. 
44. Ibid., 6 June 1849. 
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and accusatory letter to Hahn, claiming that Hahn 
had incited Kahitjene to fight against him because 
Hahn apparently had presented Kahitjene with some 
guns. 45 It also transpired in the letter, that another 
Herera headman or chief on Jonker's order, had taken 
one of Kahitjene cattle posts. Jonker then offered 
to allow Kahitjene to recover the cattle. 46 In this 
way~Kahitjene was warned not .to overstep the limits of 
·~· 
his alliance with Jonker. 
On March 22, 1850, Missionary Kolbe settled at Schmelen's 
Hope. Hahn noted that "the station is full of rich 
Ovaherero who cpme because of the trade'! 47 Five 
months later Hahn learnt that Jonker planned to attack 
Schmelen's Hope. He immediately sent· messengers with 
1•48 the news to Kahit jene "who., stays at Sc.hmelen 's Hope. 
Kahitjene immediately transferred most of the herds from 
his cattle posts to Neu-Barmen and took refuge there 
himself. Soon afterwards, Jonker and his kommando 
ransacked and devastated Schmelen's Hope. The missionary 
settlement was destroyed and Kolbe left Damaraland. 
45 .. . Ibid. , 22 July, 1849. 
46. Ibid. , 22 July, 1849, 
47. Ibid . , 22 May, 1850. 
48. Ibid. , 21-25 August 1850. 
Two months later Hahn reported that Jonker had 
organised a massive punitive komma~~do. Significantly, 
this was a communal effort by Oasib and some followers, 
Amraal's men, members of the Veldskoendraers and 
Jonker's people - together they had raided at least 
30 cattle posts belonging to Kahitjene and Katjikuru. 49 
Kahitjene's followers were scattered and his cattle 
seized. He, devoid of support, was killed a few 
months later by another Herero-speaking chief . 50 
This story demonstrates several points very clearly. 
Firstly, it shows crucial aspects of Jonker's struggle 
for control in Damaraland. Secondly, it stresses 
once more how important missionaries had become on a 
political, economic and social level. Thirdly, it 
emphasises that Jonker needed collaborators for the 
reproduction of his power position in Damaraland, 
and that he found them on his terms. What he had to 
offer was greatly desired by many, even if it meant 
accepting the Afrikaner's paramountcy. This was 
p~r~icioatio~ in exploitative relations with Herero-
speakers. It conferred participation in a system of 
49. Ibid., 30 November 1850. 
50. See Galton: Narrative, 187.Galton noted that 
after Kahitjene's sepabation from Jonker he 
"had been a marked man with the Hottentots 
He was the only friend among the Damaras 
that the missionaries ever had ... ". 
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surplus labour extraction that would yield servants, 
herds and, most importantly, cattl_-::_. 51 These allies 
he found irrespective of whether they were Orlam or 
Nama. Therefore' it was precisely "the Afrikaner Is 
extraction of Herero surplus labour which contributed 
decisively to the emergence of a new focus of conflict 
and alliances. At the basis of this process and 
determining it at the same time, was the reproduction 
of the kommando structure among Nama groups. This was 
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traced in Chapter 5. Gradually this new focus supplanted 
the historically founded conflicts between Nama and , 
Orlam. This will be demonstrated in the following 
paragraphs. 
7.1.2 Jonker's Nama and Orlam Allies, 1845 ~ 1851 
The Afrikaners' 'collaborators' in surplus extraction 
from Herera-speakers had been both Nama and Orlam from 
at· least the 1840s onwards. One of their~closest 
allies, who adhered most unambivalently to the Afrikaners 
under Jonker, was the Orlam Amraa1. 52 Amraal never 
51. Jonker's first offer was arms and ammunition. 
Thus, Vollmer noted that Jonker had sen~ three 
men with loads of powder to Piet Kopper and 
his group, see Quellen 5, 6 Feb. 1857. 
52. Hahn, for instance, noted that Amraal was to be 
part of the conference between Oasib and Jonke~ 
mentioned above (see chapter 3 ) . Amraal was 
late and highly indignant that they had not 
waited for him, see CA HP 9, 22 April, 1858. 
' 
232 
contested Jonker's hegemony . He was the only 
Kaptein, apart from Jonker, who had Herero-speaking 
cattle herds servants and 'allies' who would fur-
nish tribute. 53 These were drawn from the eastern 
section of Herero-speakers, the Mbanderus. There is 
no indication that Amraal's exploitation of Herera-speakers 
was ever a cause of strife between him and Jonker and 
his men. Other close allies of the Afrikaner's were 
groups of Veldskoendraers around Kaptein Hendrik or 
Hendrik Nanib and the Fransman Hottentots, later called 
the 'Kopperschen' or Piet Kopper's people. These .. 
were all original Nama groups. Even the missionaries 
noted that one aspect of these relations was that these 
allies were not interested in controlli~g access to 
Herera surplus labour as Jonker Afrikaner did; they 
merely participated in the spoils. 54 
7.2 CHANGING THE TERMS OF REFERENCE: FROM NAMA/ORLAM 
DIVISIONS TO DIFFERENCES IN ACCESS TO COMMODITIES, 
1845 - J.859 
7.2.1 Early Rivalries Between Nama and Orlam 
From the early 1840s (and possibly before that) until 
53. J. Tindall: The Journal, 90, 96, 141. 
54. RMS KP 1852 
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late 1856/early 1857, the relations between Jonker 
and his men and the Gai-//khaun under Oasib were 
characterised by the combination of conflict and 
alliance we noted in very early Nama/Orlam relations. 
They alternated between co-operation and mutual tolerance, 
rivalry, hostile threats or even skirmishes. 
Oasib did not leave Jonker's hegemony uncontested. 
In the early 1840s he carried out raids on Jonker's 
Herero-speaking allies, especially Kahitjene. Thus 
Kahitjene was badly hit by the Gai-//khaun in the 1840s. 
In a revenge expedition, he was prepared to leave 
Amraal's artd Jonker's people unmolested, but planned 
to attack Oasib and his men. 55 Oasib, apparently, 
also attempted occasionally to persuade Amraal to join 
him in raids against Herera-speakers but was unsuccessfu1. 56 
Oasib made frequent attempts to extract surplus labour 
from Herero-speakers in the same way as Jonker~ but 
independent of him. 57 Significantly Oasib also raided 
Amraal's Herera allies. 58 Kleinschmidt noted in_l~46 
55. J. Tindall, Op.cit., 95. 
56. Only some of Amraal's men accompanied him, 
against the Kaptein's will, see Ibid., 115. 
At other times, relations were tense, Ibid., 
101, 114. 
57. Ibid., 84, 85, 97, 98, 101; . also CA HP 9, 
9 March 1846. 
58. This was the case with Herera-chief Kanjack, 
see T. Tindall: The Journal, 126. Kanjack was 
one of Amraal's subordinates, Ibid., 129. 
that the Gai-//khaun were very active in "plundering 
among the Damaras. Jonker did not want to tolerate 
this and so war almost broke out. 1159 Jonker also 
appealed to Hahn. to prevent the Gai-//khaun from 
raiding, emphasising that he, Jonker, after all only 
raided those who had stolen cattle from him! 60 Some 
Veldskoendraers, not yet allied to Jonker and still 
attached to Oasib~ also went on a big kommando. 
Apparently they were pursued by Amraai. 61 In 1848 
Jonker even had to cut short a tribute-raising or 
'plundering' tour north of Otjikango because Oasib ~nd 
his associates had plans to burn down Windhoek. 62 
In'.this, Oasib was assured that so far Jonker had not 
established firmly knit alliances with old Nama chiefs. 
Furthermore~ he also relied on Willem Swartbooi, head 
of the ·'little Gai-//khaunL 63 . Although he could 
not win the Rehobothers' active participation against 
59. Quellen, 20, 12 March 1856. 
60. CA 9, 12 December 1846. 
61: J. Tindall: The Journal, 135-136. 
62. CA HP 9, 28 Feb. 1848. 
63. This is the translation of the old Nama 






he could still share in the advantages of 
Swartbooi's cordial relations with a missionary. Thus 
he had access to a smith's services and a forge, and 
a regular supply of commodities from the Cape through the 
traders at Rehoboth. His relations with Swartbooi 
were close enough to support joint ownership of cattle 
posts. 65 In addition, the Swartbooi__.s would take 
Oasib's horses to a region near the Gamsberg under 
t'neir control. There they were safe during the disease-
ridden summer months. 66 
Jonker and his men, at the same time, carefully avoided 
embarking on· open hostilities with Oasib and his 
followers. They only attempted to win Swartbooi for 
their side as an ally or 'collaborator 1 • 67 However, 
they succeeded in these attempts to an eyen lesser 




In the JBRM G 19 ,1848, 53, it was stated that 
\../ 
Oasib wanted to involve the Rehobothers in 
open conflict against Jonker but was un-
successful. On another occasion, it was 
noted that Oasib tried .to get "help against 
his enemies" from Swartbooi which the latter 
refused to render, see BRMG 1849, 14. 
BRMG 1860, 213. 
BRMG 1851, 42. 
67. CA HP 9, 28 Feb. 1848; S"ee also BRMG 1852; 31. 
energies were directed towards involvement in the 
Cape nexus through a ·missionary rather than through 
competing with Jonker for access to Herero surplus 
labour extraction. They were quite indifferent to 
sharing spoils of this extraction on Jonker's terms. 
Their position of relative independence 68 must be 
accounted for by the fact that successful relations 
with a European missionary gave them significant advan-
tages vis-a-vis both Oasib and Jonker. 
These conflicts had an ambivalent character and were 
not open. At times the Gai-//khaun were actually 
called Jonker's allies. 69 Furthermore, Hahn noted in 
1849 that Jonker had made an agreement with Oasib and 
his followers. 70 In addition, during a time of crisis 
in 1850, Jonker and his kommando was supported not only 
by Amraal's men, but also by a kommando sent by Oasib, 
as mentioned earlier. 
68. For example, it was claimed that next to 
Jonker Afrikaner, Oasib was the most power-
ful man in the country; yet he allowed the 
Rehobothers special rights and privileges 
"as those who are more cultivated'' due to 
their missionary invdlvement. See BRMG 1852, 
327. See also Chapter 7. 
69. BRMG Feb. 1847, 14; CA HP 9, 6 March 1848. 
70. CA HP 9, 6 March 1849. 
• 
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7.2.2 The Final Mobilisation of Nama Political Identity 
1852 - 1856 
This situation changed drastically in the 1850s when 
Oasib:made a final bid to overthrow the Afrikaners. 
The timing of this climax in relations between Oasib 
and Jonker was probably related to the arrival of 
European copper diggers who greatly intensified existing 
conflicts. 71 Oasib's attempts re~ted on the original 
Nama/Orlam difference. He tried to re-establish old 
tribal allegiances. This indicates that in spite of 
all assimilations, these distinctions continued to 
play a role· right into the 1850s. Oasib realised 
the unviability of his Nama mobilisation in 1856/1857. 
As a result, he and his associates finally focuised 
their energies on the exploitation of Herero--speakers 
on Jonker's terms. From then onwards, the relations 
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between groups in Namaland entirely ceased to be patterned 
on the basis of the original distinctions between Nama 
and Orlam . 
During the years 1850/1854, Oasib and his associates 
and the Rehobothers emerged in a strong and unambiguous 
alliance against Jonker and his group. This becomes 
b . . t' . t d . t h. 7 2 o vious in neir s rang propagan a agains . im. 
71. See Chapter 8. 
72. CA HP 9, 2 Oct. 1853. 
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However, it was also reflected in their actions. 
In 1853, the Rehobothers launched a major raid into 
Damaraland. They stayed there for nine weeks and 
c~me back with many head ~f cattle.73 Shortly after 
the excursion into Damaraland, Swartbooi and his men 
were reported to have made moves to visit, raid or 
~ " 
even occupy Otjimbingwe. 74 Otjimbingwe, controlled 
by the Afrikaners, was not only fertile, but strategically 
/ -
situated as far as all trade from Wali.:is Bay inland 
was concerned. It was also the headquarters of the 
- copper diggers. Furthermore, they had plans to 
attack ~;muaha 1 one of Jdnker's most important allies, 75 
an undertaking which would have been unheard of a few ,,. 
years earlier. 
While none of these plans were actu~lly carrie~ out, 
Oasib and his men had been occupied against Jonker 
in different ways. They in fact began to attack the 
Af • k I t t 1 t d • 1 d • k • • h 7 6 ri aner s ca e pos s an were 1nvo ve in s 1rm1s es. 
Shortly before this~ Jonker had had difficulties with 
Topnaar followers from the Bay. Instead of following 
73. BRMG 1852, 23. 
74. BRMG 1859, 188. 
75. BRMG 1859, 234. 






his orders, many had deserted to Oasib and Swartbooi. 
Others returned to the Bay.77 
When Jonker set out on a punitive raid on some Topnaars, 
Oasib left Hoachanas with a large number of people .and 
moved to Rehoboth. Together .with Swartbooi and the 
run-away Topnaars, he assembled a large kommando against 
Jonker. 
Jonker. 78 
Amraal was not prepared to join them against 
Still, when they sallied forth to challenge 
Jonker's kommandos, they had mustered a considerable 
strength 6f 30 men on horseback and about 400 on oxen, 
plus "gun carriers and servants".7 9 
A day of fighting with Jonker did not achieve any 
major results. However, it did initiate a phase of 
open conflict marked by cattle raids, shootings, and 
other engagements. This continued for about two years. 
At one stage, when Swartbooi was absent, Rehoboth itself 
was looted by the Afrikaners.BO The Rehobothers and 
Oasib suffered continuous small-scale losses which 
weakened them considerably. Their weakness could be 
77; BRMG 1854, 15; see also the description in BRMG 
1855, 24-29; BRMG 1854, 15. It is, :however, 
78. 
not quite clear whether Topnaars went to 
Swartbooi instead of Jonker, or simply did not 
follow Jonker's orders, or 'took refuge' at Rehoboth 
after Jonker had carried out a punitive raid 
against them. 
Amraal had a missioriary; 
to be on Jonker's side . 
·detail . 
he never openly claimed 
See Chapter 9 for more 
79. BRMG 1855, 24-29. 
80. BRMG 1856, 102. 
. , 
attributed to the inadequate gun powder stocks had 
by Kleinschmidt and Vollmer. 81 Unlike Jonker, they 
had no access to the illegal importation of gunpowder 
th 1 . th . . . . 82 as ey were re ying on eir missionaries. 
Coinciding with the years of strong alliance with the 
Gai-//khaun, members of the council in Rehoboth tried 
to re-establish the old laws of polygamy. They also 
tried to re-introduce the 'native' dress for women and 
forbade the wearing of European clothing. In this 
way, the political struggles were transfer red to ·other 
levels of social and political organisation. 
The split along Nama-Orlam lines did not only involve 
central Namibia. Jonker and his men had been trying 
to get the assistance of the Orlam group under Kida 
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Witbooi. They were unsuccessful because Oasib and many 
of his followers occupied territory between Kido Wittbooi's 
settlements and Windhoek.They had therefore been able to 
intercept letters, and they also issued strongly 
worded threats. 83 Jonker had attempted to induce his 
relatives in Blydeverwacht as well as those among the 
groups at Bethany and Berseba, to fight against the 
81. BRMG 1855, 51. 
82. The Cape Government had prohibited trade in 
arms and ammunition due to the Frontier Wars. 
83. Quellen 30, Witbooi to Jonker, 21 Jan. 1856, 
and Kleinschmidt's comments to .this letter, 
Ibid. 
the Reho bothers and Oa.si b's kornmandos. 84 Oasib at the . . 
same time, tried to motivate his old Nama associates, 
the Bondelswarts, to move against the Orlams at Bethany 
and Berseba. 85 I~terestingly, Paul Goliath of Berseba 
was not only 'claimed' as an ally by the Afrikaners 
on th~ grounds of historical relatedness, but also by 
Oasib. Allegedly he occupied territory belonging 
to the Gai-//khaun. 86 
7.2.3 The Failure of Nama Mobil~sation. The Emergence of 
New Political/Economic Distinctions, 1857 - 1859 
As it turned out, the five groups in the south did 
not make a move at that stage for or against the 
Afrikaners .. The Bondelswarts largely remained aloof 
from the conflicts in Namaland. They could afford 
241. 
to do so, primarily because of their position as 'border 
police' which was a source of income and protection 
from the Cape Government. 87 The communities of Berseba 
and Bethany were strongly supported by their missionary 
in their desire not to get actively involved. 
The new front was beginning to take shape. Political 
----~ 
84 0 BRMG 1855, 51. 
85. Quell en 3b, 6 June 1854. ---·--
86. BRMG 1853, 57 • 
. ;-' 
87. See Chapter 5. r '\ ~ 
"- .~ ... -··r 
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conflicts were increasingly being patterned along the 
line of participation in Herera ex~loitation on the 
one hand, and close relations with a firmly established 
missionary on the other. The/ were two sides of the 
same coin; the increasing commoditisation of the 
production process. Competition for resources and 
social and political power was coming to focus on access 
to commodities from the Cape rather than on different 
'ethnic' or historical origins. 
(i) Access to Commodities Through Exploitation 
of Herero-speakers 
Even in those years of a final and intense Nama mobili-
sation against Orlam groups, the dividin~ lines were 
not clear cut. The process of reshaping the terms 
of reference was still not well defined. Thus, at 
the same time as Oasib and his men appealed to the 
Kaptein of the Bondelswarts and worked so closely with 
the Rehobothers, other Nama groups were either split 
~r were becoming closely related to the Afrikaners. 
There was at least one Orlam group who had thrown 
their lot in with Oasib and Swartbooi at that stage, 
namely Jan Booi and his men. These were firmly 
d R h b th . t d. th . . /. 
88 attache to the e o o communi y an eir missionary 
8 8 • J BRM G 26 , 21 . 
v u 
and joined forces with Oasib's kommando. 8 9 Thus, 
although no exact dates are available, at least a 
section of the people under Willem Fransmann, later 
Piet Kopper, had moved up to the Windhoek area and 
joined the Afrikaners in the early 1850s, 90 and so had 
the Kaptein of the Veldskoendraers. 91 The Topnaars 
under Piet Haibib, as indicated above, were rather 
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deeply divided. Some stayed with the Afrikaners, others 
with the Rehobothers, others returned to the Bay. 
The tendency to move away from ties and attachments of 
an earlier age very soon came to be the rule. · By late 
1856/early 1857, the old bonds between the Gai-//khaun 
and the 'Little Gai-//khaun' were finally broken. 
This was also true of other Nama affiliations~ The 
precise reasons for this timing are not quite clear. 
Probably it had become obvious by theh to the Kapteins 
that the old affinities between groups of Veldskoendraers, 
Fransmann'schen, Gai-7/khaun and Bondelswarts had lost 
their power and meaning~ Furthermore, it might have 
become clear t9 Oasib that Willem Swartbooi was not 
quite the follower Oasib desired due to the power 
h . h h. f 1 11" . th . . h. 9 2 w ic is success u a iance wi . a missionary gave im. 
89. BRMG 1854, 234; BRMG 1855, 24. 
90. BRMG 1854, 188; also W. Mears, Missiona.ries, 20. 
91. See below, Chapter 9; also above, ftn. 49. 
W. Mears, Missionaries, 20, noted that the 
settlement of Veldskoendraers at Schans Vlakte 
was not very permanent as they left jt to move 
closer to the Afrikaners. 
92.· BRMG, 1852, 327. 
'· 
Oasib shifted away from those old ties and threw his 
lot in with Jonker and his men, together with a large 
number of followers and dependants. As the agreement 
of 1858 (noted above) showed, this he did largely on 
Jonker's terms. Thus Kleinschmidt noted in July 1856 
that Kaptein Swartbooi intended to move away from 
Rehoboth again for fear of Jonker "and he also wanted 
some distance from Oasib because those two .were now 
one against him". 9 3 Kreft reported in a letter from 
December 12 that Oasib's and Nanib's (of the Veldskoen-
draers) kommandos had communally undertaken a raid into 
Dama~aland. 94 Similarly, Hahn remarked in March 1857 
that Jonker Afrikaner had been on a major raid as far 
north as the Kaokoveld. He was accompanied by Oasib 
and many of his men, Amraal's kommando and Nanib with 
many followers. 95 From then onwards, power struggles 
between Oasib and Jonker no longer occurred along 
'ethnic' lines. 
(ii) Access to Commodities Through Bonds with 
the Missionary 
However, it is important to stress again that these 
developments did not suddenly clear away ambiguity and 
93. BRMG, 1857, 89. 
94. QueJ.le~ 3b, 12 Dec. 1856. 
95. CA HP 9, 3 March 1857. 
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uncertainty from the relations between the various 
groups. The conflicts of the 1860s show very clearly 
that the lines of struggle continued to be those that 
had emerged by 1857. Yet the decade between 1855 
and 1865 was characterised by a complex series of agree-
ments, diplomatic missions, contracts and treatises. 
These mainly involved the missionaries as well as the 
southern Kapteins of Berseba, Bethany and Gibeon (which 
came to be'Witbooi's headquarter~. 96 
These efforts were mostly concerned with attempts to 
break Jonker's monopoly over the extracting of surplus 
....--~ - --·- -- - - ·- -- ---~ 
fro_E!.... Herero-sp~kers. Apparently' they were not 
_,..--- . 
effective at a11, 97 but they did initiate a process 
of experimentation with diplomatic, i.e. non-violent 
ways of conflict-solving under missionary guidance. 
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These assumed vital functions in the late 1860s as we will 
see in Chapter 9. Procedures, formulations, their 
possible effectiveness or uselessness, and the like, 
were e~tablished. 
96; See, for instance, the agreement between the 
'southern Kapteins' in 1856, BRMG 1856, 366; 
the 'peace' of 1856, BRMG 1856, 230; the 
'Traktat of Hoachanas', see appendix; 
the frequent visits and missions of David 
Christian to Hoachanas before 1858, Quellen 
3b, Dec. 1857 (no day). 
97. The peace treaty of Hoachanas is a good 
example here, see also BRMG 1856, 336. 
The emphasis oj political relations based on ~e.e.ds 
of commodity exchange reflected the progressive weakening 1 
of pre-capitalist f6rms of exploitation and control. 
At the same time, these diplomatic endeavours served 
to tighten group boundaries. The missionaries them-
selves were quite conscious of their roles in this 
context. As early as 1849 the Rhenish Mission Konferenz 
explained to their society that they wanted to have a 
general peace conference involving all the Kapteins: 
"You may rest assured ... that we do not concern 
ourselves with politics unnecessarily, but in this case 
we may not· be silent, as it is only through our mediation 
that ... unity will come between the Kapteins who 
until now hate each other viciously." 98 
As has been argued in this chapter, the missionaries 
nonetheless added to the polarisation of forces which 
had been emerging. At its core, however, was the 
penetration of merchant capital and the ever-increasing 
dependency on the Cape nexus, and not 'ethnic' or other 
historical differences. 
In the next chapter I shall take a closer look at 
the progressive emergence of this source of conflict. 
98. RMS KP 1849 ,· 40. 
In examining trade patterns, the import~nce of 
trade, the way traders were manipulated but also 
became increasingly ~anipulative, I shall 
demonstrate how some of the pressures of commoditi-
sation and underdevelopment considered in Chapters 4 
and 5 manifested themselves and how the people of 
Namaland became colonised long befo~e the first 
German soldier stepped on Namibian soil. 
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CHAPTER 8 
TRADE AND IMPOVERISHMENT 
IN NAMALAND 
8.1 GENERAL OUTLINE OF TRADE FEATURES DURING :THE 
PERIOD 1815 - 1870 
Any treatment of trade and relations with Europeans 
in pre-colonial Namaland will be ridden with certain 
problems. These are substantial enough to have kept 
other writers in the past from doing any more than 
touch on the subject. 1 A major impediment to collect-
ing data on trade is that traders ra~ely kept diaries 
or wrote letters. Furthermore, as most of the 
trade in Namaland was conducted by way of barter, book-
keeping was of no consequence. In addition to this, 
there are not even general statistics or figures 
compiled by a government agency at any one stage in 
the pre-colonial period. This means that with the 
best of intentions, it will be extremely difficult to 
quantify trade and to make definite statements about 
changing terms of trade. 
For these reasons, the following remarks should be 
taken as a prelude to the next chapter and as linking 
1. See, for instance, J.H. Esterhuyse: South West 
Africa, 10-11; R. Moorsom: 'Proletariani sa ti"on' , 
Chapte"r 3; I. Goldblatt: SWA, Ch. 8. 
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it with- whatever has been sai.d previously .rather than 
as a comprehensive treatment of the trade situation 
itself. 
8 .1.1 Contents of Trade 
Obviously the exchange of cattle for arms and ammunition 
played a crucial role in the trade between Namaland 
and the Cape from very early onwards. However, it 
appears that at least until the 1840s and 1850s the 
exchange was much broader based than this. It involved 
a variety of other items, especially as far as import~ , 
were concerned. For example, the Rhenish missionaries 
in 1845 tried to establish a trade link between Namaland 
and Germany. They explained the local situation to 
their society in these terms: "The only trade of any 
scale here is in cattle, sheep and goats, and hides. 
Other articles such as honey, rubber, elephant tusks 
are negligible, at least at the moment. Ostrich 
feathers could possibly be exported if acceptable prices 
were paid." In contrast, the articles desired in 
Namaland were numerous and sophisticated: "for example, 
2. WA AP 2, 23 Jan. 1853. 
3. BRMG 1856 
4. RMS KP Aug. 1845, 20. 
5. References 
a.mmuni ti.on 
chapter · 4 .• 
J. Ebner: 
to the exchange of cattle for muskets or 
can be found in the Schmelen records see 
Al so _Q\ unsJournals Ki tchingmari 1820, i 5; 
Reise, 175. 
., 
German cotton is sought after but not other German 
materials, and of English materials, only those from 
the Lewick factory in England. Then very coarse powder, 
not fine; lead, tin, guns with firelocks, i.e. English 
ones, as long_as possible ... also soldier's guns. 116 
Their detailed list of sought after items that any 
trading venture in Namaland should stock is instructive. 
Of 48 different articles, 15 were materials and sowing 
kits; six were domestic utensils o! 
_._._-----~-~~~0-" -iE~ u- iron or metal 
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(like pots and pans); 19 were items needed for smithing,· 
. .-.- -,_-:""':- -
building, repairing wagons, or any artisan's work. 
Recommended was the stocking of 10 000 - 15 000 nails, 
axes and compounds used for soldering. 7 
As previously mentioned, even European furniture items 
~--__ ,,. .. 8 
were brought by traders and exchanged for cattle. 
Furthermore, the importation of Cape brandy became 
increasingly important. Trader Ohlsson, for instance, 
noted that during the 1870s an annual a~erage of 400 
gallons of gin and 600 gallons of brandy had been 
~~--..----- ---=....,_c-~-- -- -·' 
---~~-~-~~~~-,-~-~---
imported :-9 Even if these figures exclude local Spirits 
6. RMS KP Aug 1845. 
7. Ibid., appendix. 
8. cf. below, chapter 4. 
9.~BBNA 1879, Ohlsson memo, 20 May 1878. 
production (and also conceal possible changes in the 
relationship between local production and imports), 
they certainly establish spirits as a major item of 
exchange. 
However, it seems that the emphasis of trade until the 
1860s centred increasingly on the exchange of cattle, 
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~~§ .. and ostrich feathers for arms and ammunition. 
Jonk~r Afrikaner once received Missionary Hahn in a hut 
that was void of items of furniture, domestic utensils, 
and articles of clothing. 10 Hahn was quite perplexed 
although, as the missionaries never tired of reporting, 
the settlement at Windhoek had been decaying ever 
since the mid-1840s. Jonker may well have had hidden 
.Je, ~t.: cl 'c.o~k 
storage places, but Hahn's experience does seeml\that 
in times of mounting pressure, all' the Europe~n 
'appenditures 1 would become secondary while access to 
arms and ammunition remained absolutely crucial. And 
these were times of pressure. As we shall see, the 
majority of references from the 1850s onwards to trade 
are either unspecific or deal with trade in cattle, 
tusks and ostrich feathers for guns, powder, lead and 
possibly horses. It was only after the Afrikaners' control 
I 
10. CA HP 9, 3 Aug. 1852. 
11. See, for instance, Hahn who once even insinuated 
that the moral decay at Windhoek had gone so far 
that people were using the church as a big toilet, 
CA HP 9, 6 March 1858; also Ibid., 13 Oct. 1845. 
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over Da~araland and more northerly areas was broken, and 
lung-sickness had made the cattle trade less lucrative, 
that the trade in tusks and ostrich feathers substan-
tially increased to reach peak value in the 1870s. 
Significantly, by then it was controlled by E~ropean 
traders and Herera missionaries alone. 
8.1.2 Scale of Trade 
.. ,.; 
Trade with Cape or other European agents was never 
small-scale. When the traders aligned themselves 
with the missionaries to usurp Jonker Afrikaner's 
power position, large profits were at stake because 
of both the physical extent and the quantities involved 
in this trade. In the Cape Monthly Magazine, an 
anonymous writer noted in the 1850s: "Indeed, it is a 
common saying among the beers that there is a hole 
in Great Namaqualand through which the oxen came out 
of the ground, otherwise the country could not produce 
or provide sustenance for the immense herds which 
12 have been brought up for so many years to the colony." 
Missionary Knudsen noted in 1850 that traders had 
passed through Bethany who had exchanged at Windhoek, 
Rehoboth and Bethany more than 3 000 head of cattle. 13 
Andersson noted in 1845 that ''The cattle trade with 
12. Ku' eep: 'Sketches and recollections of Great 
Namaqualand 1 , Cape Monthly Magazine 1, 1857. 
13. Quellen 3a, 16 M::trch 1850. 
Great Namaqualand, alone, has latterly yielded eight 
to ten thousand head of horned cattle, and a host of 
14 sheep and goats annually." 
Individ~al traders apparently left Namaland with droves 
usually numbering between 200 and l 500 head of cattle 
and large numbers of sheep and goats. Thus, Galton 
noted that "a steady export of Damara oxen goes on 
southwards to our (Cape~ B.L.) Colony in droves of 
200 - 800 head of cattle. 1115 Kreft also recorded 
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a drove of 700, and five further herds of cattle pass~ng 
through the veld of Bethany. ·One of these numbered 
16 more than 1 000 cattle, the others between 200 - 400. 
With Andersson, the system became more centralised, as 
I will show but the figures stayed roughly the same. 
Thus, in 1860, Andersson registered three of his traders 
14. C.J. Andersson: Lake Ngami, 37, emphasis original. 
15. F. Galton: The Narrative, 71. 
16. Quellen 3b, 16 April 1853 and 10 June 1853. 
These figures exclude the sheep·and goats which 
were part of the droves. In the BRMG 1854, 
18, it was noted that the traders usually 
returned to the Cape with herds of 450 - 800 
oxen. Also, Andersson once sent a herd of 
1 400 head of cattle, Quellen 3b, 3 March 
1861. 
returning to Otjimbingwe from trade trips inland 
with 600, 250 and 220 bartered oxen respectively. 17 
Similarly, Hahn noted in 1863 that Andersson himself 
had gone to the Cape with 2 000 cattle and "at least 
. 18 
3 000 sheep". 
The amounts of ammunition brought by the traders were 
equally enormous. Thus, a normal purchase (which 
may have oc~urred several times a year) seems to have 
been minimally around 600 lbs~ of powder per Kaptein. 
Hahn once met a trader at Otjimbingwe with 500 - 600 
lbs. which he was confident "Jonker will all buy 11 • 19 
A little later the trader was indeed fetched by five 
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wagons from Jonker. R. Ridgill, missionary at Warmbad, 
made several applications for gunpowder from the Cape 
for Chief Bondel and 66 individuals. He requested 
17. WA AP 3, 2 Feb. 1860; ibid. 14 March 1860; 
Ibid. 17 March 1860. 
18. Quellen 30, 5 Feb. 1863. Trade with St. 
Helena does not seem to have been extensive 
then. The few references I came across do 
not refer to herds larger than 50 oxen, 
BRMG 1845, 73; WA AP 3, 15 July 1858. 
Also, it appears-rhat the prices were not higher 
than Cape prices, compare Ibid., 14 July 
1858 and 17 Nov. 1858. 
19. CA HP 9, 14 Feb. 1853. 
20 600 lbs. and also 1 200 lbs. of lead. Kreft once 
recorded that three traders landed at Angra P.e.quena 
with a load of 20 000 lbs. of powder. One of them 
Ment straight to Jonker with 3 000 lb~. 21 Andersson 
I 
wrote that if the Walfish Bay Mining Company (whose 
manager he was at the time) would send as much powder 
as he had suggested, a storage house should be built at 
Walfish Bay "capable of holding ten or fifteen tons 11 • 22 
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Similarly, Willem Fransman once made a trip to Walfish 
Bay with rio fewer than 300 oxen to pur·hase ammunition. 23 
Considering the fact that at about the same time David 
Christian and some of his men went to Angra Pequena 
with 19 oxen, and some sheep and goats, to purchase 
"coffee, sugar, tea, tobacco, powder and lead and a 
24 small barrel of brandy" , 300 oxen must have bought 
a huge amount of gunpowder. 
20. C.O. (Cape) 4379, R. Ridgill to Civil Commis-
sioner, 24 Sep. 1855. 
21. Quellen 3b, 9 Nov. 1860. Also, Trader Morris 
"Rollie Diep Step" as he was nicknamed by 
Namaland people, arranged apparently once to 
have 1 400 lbs. of coarse powder sent to 
Walvis Bay, WA AP 2, 18 Aug. 1851. 
22. WA AP 9, Letter to Searle, 4 March, 1857. 
23. BRMG 1852, 309. 
21~. Quellen 3 b, 26 July 185 3. 
The trade in ivory and ostrich feathers was slowly 
gaining momentum in the 1860s, reaching the climax 
only in the 1870s. In the 1860s, the Gobabis people 
under Amraal returned from a hunting trip with 6 000 
lbs. of ivory. 25 Andersson, listing his assets in 
1862, had ivory and hides he valued at £4 500. 26 
Hunters apparently rarely came back from the hunting 
veld with less than 2 000 ·pounds, and sometimes they 
had up to 8 000 lbs. 27 Trader Chapman noted in 1865 
that "saving the last two years, the export of ivory 
from Walvis Bay had already reached fifteen to twenty 
thousand·lbs. per annum II 28 This we must consider 
as a modest estimate. Calculating the selling price' 
of ivory at the Cape in the early 1860s at around 6 






BRMG 1863, 279. 
WA AP 4, 1862, ca. Jan. 
Palgrave was reported to have come bick with 
2 137 lbs., WA AP 5, 24 March, 1864; 
another trader, Grendon, with 2 600 lbs., 
Ibid., 21 June 1864. Green once came back 
with not less than 8 700 lbs., WA AP 3, 2 Dec. 
1859. Similarly, Hahn succeeded in sending 
1 183 lbs. to the Cape which he had procured 
in only three months, RMS KPB II Hahn on 
Otjimbingwe, May 1868.~-
CA GH 19 /10. Chapman: . 'Memo' , 1865. 
WA AP 3, Green's Journal (~.d.) 
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of at least £20 000. This was a considerable sum 
for the handful of merchants who ·by then were gaining 
control of this trade. Ostrich feathers came to be 
almost as profitable, as soon as the northern hunting 
veld was 'opened' to Europeans (i.e. as the Afrikaners 
and their allies' hegemony was destroy~d). They 
fetched between £3 - £4 per pound in the Cape in the 
late 1860s and Missionary Hahn especially seems to 
hnve derived a good profit from this trade. He 
repeatedly sent reports about his exploits to his 
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society, sometimes mentioning batches of up to 73 lbs. 
that had been sent to the Cape.30 The scale of profits 
and prices becomes obvious in Tables a and b.3 1 
8.1.3 Capitalisation of Trade 
The actual conduct of this trade was highly capitalised, 
especially as far as transport went. Major expenses 
30. For example, he noted: "The batch of ostrich 
feathers sent before the last one fetched £201 
net profit ... My last 13 pounds will hope-
fully fetch more." BRMG 1866, 290. At 
another place he remarked that one of the traders 
employed by the mission brought 73 pounds of 
feathers back to Otjimbingwe, RMS KPB II Hahn 
on Otjimbingwe, ·May 1868. --
31. These figures give a very rough but illuminating 
indication of the profit margins of traders 
and indicate the kind of expenses in which 
every kommando group was involved. The com-
pilation of the tables has been exceptionally 
(6ontinued overleaf) 
Footnote 31 continued: 
difficult because the sources do not discriminate 
between prices in oxen, sheep, sterling or rix-
dollar. The rixdollar had been legally fixed at 
ls 6d in 1825 and supplanted by sterling, so it 
existed only as a fictitious unit of accounting. 
(For rather obscure reasons, this fictitious unit 
was raised in Na~aland to the value of 3s by the 
Europeans involved. However, as this happened 
at both ends of the transactions, it does not 
need to concern us here any further.) As far 
as the sterling currency was concerned, however, 
it was also fictitious in Namaland because all 
~ct.e_w_a~s_c~o_JJ.duc_t.ed_Qy: way of barter. Thus, 
the 'money value of an oxf-fi~s been calculated 
from evidence such as stock-taking missionaries who 
had to account for their possessions in money terms, 
or more direct remarks like 'Prof. Wahlberg 
wanted to give goods in the value of £2 for an 
ox ... '. Sometimes, the sources will refer to 
sterling prices and add how many oxen or sheep . 
had to be given in payment of such a price. 
The other major difficulty in establishing lists 
and tables when we deal with barter is obvious 
in the tables themselves, namely the tremendous 
variation in prices. There is nothing that can 
be done about that, because not only did prices 
differ depending on place and the person of the 
trader involved, but the goods differed a lot 
in kind and quality. For example, ox wagons 
came in different sizes and were always second-
hand because the trader would first sell his 
load and then his ox-wagon. As to guns, it seems 
that at least by the 1870s if not before, the old 
firelock guns had been largely supplanted by a 
series of more sophisticated types of guns, like 
pe~cussion guns, Westley Richards, Suiderrifles 
and precious double barrel~d rifles, Afrikanischer 
HeimatL_alender, 1965/66, 91. 
The prices have been calculated from the following 
sources: 
BRMG 1866, 292-293; 1864, 182; 1855, 
1852, 312; 1864, 182; 1863, 279; 
WA AP 2, 15 Aug. 1851; 18 Aug. 1851; 
10 Oct. 1851; 11 Nov. 1851; 5 March, 
27 Nov. 1852; 6 Feb. 1854; 
260; 
5 Oct. 1851; 
1852; 
WA AP 3, 15 July 1858; 23 May 1859; 
Green's Journal, under 2 Dec. 1$59; 
to Andersson 24 May 1864; WA .AP 5, 
17 Nov. 1859; 




Footnote 31 continued: 
WA AP 6, 31 Aug. 1866, WA AP 9, Letter to 
Searle, 4 March 1857; QUellen 30, 5 Feb. 1863; 
Ibid., Heimreise 1873 (n .d-:J; 20, 22 Sep. 
18 4 3 ; 3 a , 6 Jan . 18 4 4 ; 16 May 18 5 0 ; 3 b , 10 
June, 1853; 26 July 1853; 5, 18 June 1849; 
Morj_tz Hahn 1842, 167; Moritz Scheppmann, 1845, 
238; Cook: The Modern, 147; RMS KP March, 
1856 and 16, Itild. May 1868; RMS KPB II and IV, 
Hahn on Otjimbingwe, May 1868;--r1ears: Mis-
sionaries, 10; F. Gal ton: The Narrati.v~80; 
WA A.178, notebook, 1869; ----!'. 1rle: Die Herero, 






















































































































































































































































































































were incurred through the purchase of arms and 
ammunition. 32 Furthermore, no Kaptein or raadsman 
se~med to have been ~ble to sustain this trade without 
wagons and horses. Wagons were very expensive but 
nonetheless they were extensively used. 
On one occasion Amraal and his people were reported 
to have left for an elephant hunt with 20 wagons and 
110 horses. 33 In the 1840s, wagons cost about 40 
oxen or £60; in the 1860s, about 50 oxen. 34 In the 
1860s the money value of an ox had risen so that a 
wagon which then cost between £80 and £90, could be 
bought for 30 oxen or less. However, lung-sickness 
had been decimating cattle resources in the 1860s and 
thus it should not be concluded that the terms of trade 
had actually changed to the advantage of the people in 
Namaland. 
This was not the sum total of expenditure incurred on 
wagons. Wagons had to be maintained, and in a country 
like Namaland large amounts had to be spent on repairs. 
The Konferenz noted in 1849 that missionaries had 
recently bought 13 wagons of which seven were already 
unusable. 35 On the other hand, a new wagon wheel 
could cost the exorbitant price of £26 - £28 at the 
32~ See Table b. 
33. BRMG 1863, 277-278. 
34. See Table b. 
35. RMS KP April 1849. 
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Cape in the mid-1860s.3 6 
The use of horses was equally costly. Firstly, it 
appears that horses were far more expensive than 
firelock muskets, costing in mid-century between 8 - 12 
oxen each (about £20).37 More importantly, though, 
the turnover of horses was massive. In Namaland 
horses were prone to a deadly diseas~ ~alled horse-
sickness during the months of November and December. 
According to Tabler, this was an acute, febrile, 
infectious disease of equines peculiar to Africa.3 8 · 
There were few places where horses were safe from 
this disease throughout the year. One was Keetmans-
hoop where Tseib settled with his followers in the 
1850s; another was the Gamsberg near Rehoboth.and 
apparently the Erongo Mountains were also free from 
this infection. The Gobabis men once lost all their 
110 horses (plus 100 oxen)during a hunting expedition~ 
In this case, their profits of almost £900 from ivory 
were all spent on covering these losses, 39 demonstrating 
clearly that the high degree of capitalisation was 
not necessarily to the advantage of the Ideal people, 
even if wagon~ guns and horses certainly increased the 
productivity of hunting and cattle raiding·. The 
contrary was often true . As I have emphasised, 
. ~ 37. See footnote 31. 
38. E. Tabler: J:J._o~E"...?. __ g.[ SW.~_..§Q9._Ng .. am~land, Cape 
Town , 1 9 7 3 , 1 3 0 • 
39. BRMG 1863, 278-279. 
the expenses and risks involved threatened the profits. 
Thus in the case of the Gobabis kommando, the months 
spent in the hunting veld were made fruitless by the 
loss of their horses. 
8.2 THE PROFITABILITY OF CAPE-BASED VENTURES IN 
NAMALAND, 1840 - 1860 
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,8.2.1 Trade in Guns, Horses and Wagons 
,·,""' 
In the following section I shall briefly consider 
the value of goods sent out of the country. The profits 
made by the traders through the unequal exchange involved 
in barter as well as the exploitation of the copper 
mines were important facets of the Namaland trade. 
A glance at these facets- will facilitate our under-
standing of the economic relations between the Kapteins 
and the traders, which is examined in greater detail 
elsewhere. 
Traders' profits seem to have been immense. Andersson 
once remarked that by exchanging 5 lbs. of coarse 
powder for a larg~ ox trader Morris made only about a 
2 000 per cent profit, 11since I have found by my own 
experience that the cattle trade w;~'\ the Cape is not so 




However, while the profits from 
ivory and brandy cannot be estimated, as no figures 
are available, it appears that in general the dattle 
trade never yielded more than l 500 per cent gross 
profit. On the other hand, it is safe to assume that 
profits were never under 100% - none of my figures 
suggest that. Thus, Hahn noted in a matter-of-fact 
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way that one of the traders who went out from Otjimbingwe 
on his trading excursions (supplied by the mission) 
was paid 42 pe~ cent commission. 41 Andersson once 
offered a-young man, as inducement to work for him, 
42 
half of each wagon load traded by way of payment. 
These figures give a clear indication of the extent 
. ' 
of surlus labour appropriation to which Namaland and 
Darnaraland were subjected through trade with the Cape. 
The country was drained of productive resources for 
the whole period discussed here, and even beyond, in 
spite of the fact that the Afrikaners and their 
associates issued certain controls up till 1865. 
In contrast, attempts by Europeans to exploit copper 
deposits along the Swakop River and near the coast 
were short-lived, as this enterprise proved nowhere 
near as profitable as trading. However, judging 
from the terms of contract established with certain 
4o. WA -AP 2, 15 Aug. 1851. -
41 . RMS KPB II, May 1868. 
42. WA AP 3 ' 21~ March 1854. 
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Kapteins, the profits could have been enormous under 
more favourable political circumstances. 
'· 
8.2.2 The Copper Ventures 
Various mining companies based at the Cape started 
prospecting and mining during the mid-1850s. At least 
five sites were mined then, all by the Walvis Bay 
Mining Company. 43 These ventures had ceased to operate 
by the late 1850s. Only at Rapoensberg (in the 
Bethany territory) was a copper mine opened and mined during 
the 1860s and early 1870s. 44 Even that enterprise was 
short-lived, incurring heavy losses. 45 These mining 
ventures never went beyond small-scale operations. 
For example, the missionaries noted in 1854 that a ship 
had arrived with a company of eight men, three horses, 
four ox-wagons and six to seven wagon loads of 
d t t t . . '46 goos o s.ar mining coppe~ 
43. These were: Ebo,Il.:lJL, Matchless and another un-
identified mine. WA AP 3, Letters to Searle; 
then Oub or_A~p_, Ci'.r"HP, 23 July 1859. Another 
mine near ,JWgr_a_f>eguena was worked for two years 
only, Quellen 3b, 10 Sep. 1853, 14 April 1855. 
Interestingly, this mine was worked on a con-
cession for which David Christian had received 
nothing "beyond some window frames and doors 
for his house". CA G ·H 21/19, question No. 956. 
!J4. J.H. Esterhuyse: SWA, Cape Town, 1968, 10-11. 
45. Ibid. 
46. BRMG 1855, 199~ 
\.. 
A litter later, Andersson, the manager of the Walvis 
Bay Mining Company, complained abotlt the shortage 
of skilled labour. He pointed out to .his superiors 
that with only one trained miner and three labourers 
he had already mined ore to the value of "at least" 
£700. 47 Under optimal work conditions it was hoped 
that 300 tons of ore could be shipped annually from 
Namaland. This did not materialis~, however. 48 
Although his efforts had not proved rewarding, Andersson 
felt impelled to point out that some profits were made, 
II that is, the quantity of ore removed from this 
country is greater than the amount of goods received 
by Kaptein Jonker from the Cape". 49 
Different mining leases had been obtained from 
different Kapteins, thus exacerbating existing power 
struggles between those Kapteins. The terms of these 
contracts were so vague that they were' invariably 
disadvantageous to the various Kapteins. Jonker was 
apparently promised goods to the value of £1 per ton 
of ore extracted, and Andersson assured his company 
that "Jonker is tne best friend you have in this 




WA AP 9, Letter to Searle).. 27 May 1857. 
Th"id., letter to Searle, c8 Sep. 1857. 
Ibid., letter to Searle, 28 April 1857. 
50. Ibid. 
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. , ... 
an organ which reached Windhoek in a totally dilapi-
dated state and which "produces nothing but half 
h . . h 1 f t. fl d d II 51 K t . 0 . b w isper1ng a s i ~e soun s ... . ap e1n as1 
also received the promise of £1 per ton of copper ore 
exported "from his country 11 • 52 Another deal was made 
with Willem Swartbooi of Rehoboth by the same mining 
company. "The Kaptein was promised a share in the 
profit (4 percent) and a substantial gift. In return, 
he granted not only the digging of copper but the 
pas~ure, water and fuel necessary for continuous 
working all over his territory", the missionaries 
commented. 53 
It is not at all clear how these contracts were adminis-
tered. There was little guarantee that the Kapteins 
would receive their dues in terms of these contracts. 
The terms of the Bethany contract in the 1860s were 
particularly damagin~ to the Kaptein. Spence, 
manager of the Pomona Mining Company, insisted that 
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under this grant by David Christian, the latter was 
indeed paid £1 royalty for every ton of ore extractect. 54 
51 ... Ibid. , letter to Searle, 28 Sep. 1857. 
52. Quellen 5' 15 Sep. 1855. 
53. BRMG 1855, 375. 
54. CA G .H 21/19, q.no . 976. 
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In no way did this diminish the value of Spence's 
very considerable concession. It provided that 
David Christian's "whole territory was made available 
to these treasure hunters in the 'small print', while 
the people were made to believe that it was only a strip 
of territory along .the coast and the abovementioned 
copper mountain 11 • 55 Besides the only evidence that 
David Christian ever received any income from such vast 
concessions is limited to a reference in missiona~y 
records to an old general's hat that he was given 
. 56 
as a present by the copper mine managers! 
These copper enterprises failed for a variety of 
reasons. The quality of the ore and the extent of the 
deposits appear to have been the least of them. 57 
There were, for example, constraints inherent in the 
operation of specific companies related to financing 
and the general development of capitalism at the Cape. 
These need not concern us here in great detail. We 
may note, however, that here, as in Little Namaqualand, 58 
or a few years later at Kimberley, prospecting and 
55. Quellen 3b, Sep. 1863. See also map 1 
56. BRMG 1869, 152., 
57. Andersson, the mine manager, act~ally claimed 
that the ore held up to 30 per cent copper, WA 
AP 9, letter.to Searle, 4 Ma~ch 1857. 
58. See. for example, Small berger: C£P_Q~ Mining 
Jn Namaqualand Cape Town,1975. 
initial mining enterprises were all undertaken on a 
very small scale indeed, buoyed up by the hope of 
expansion which would follow upon immediate high 
returns at the pioneering stage . 
. 
One major obstacle to the achievement of this aim in 
Namaland was the cost and difficulty of transport and 
communications· with the Cape base. The transport 
of copper Ore from Aub or Otjimbingwe to Walvis Bay by ox 
wagon proved to be outrageously high. The missionaries 
noted that the transporting of one batch of ore, with 
little more than a quarter ton of ore per wagon59 from 
60 Otjimbingwe to the Bay cost the company £20. Taking 
into account that the number of ox wagons available 
were increased from 12 to 15 by Andersson in 185761 
about four tons per transport could be conveyed. 
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To maintain this flow they would nee\../d up to 300 trek oxen 
(which were more expensive than slaughter oxen). 62 
Scarcity of drivers, dryness of territory which made 
59. Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, 
Vol. io, 569. 
60. BRMG 1856, 131. 
61. WA AP 9, letter to Searle, 27 May 1857. 
62. Quellen 3a, 6 Jan. 184~. 
transport impossible or even more costly (because 
of a higher turnover of oxen), as well as inadequate 
or non-existing roads, added to the expenses and 
difficulties. 63 Furthermore,_there were no established 
lines of communication between Namaland and the Cape 
(or Europe, for that matter). Kleinschmidt once 
noted that the mine at Aub could not be worked because 
( all connections with the Cape were broken. 64 Similarly 
Andersson often pleaded to his superiors that general 
knowledge of the localities were insufficient to faci-
litate efficient working. 65 
There were technical difficulties, too. Thus, (as 
was known from the whole of Namaland and Damaraland), 
there were powerful streams of water close to the 
surface which often made work at the Matchless and 
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Ebonie mine impossible. 66 Also, the ground at Matchless 
was apparently so hard that the miners had to use 50 
6" 
lbs. of blasting powder per week. 7 
63. WA AP 9, letter to Searle, 4 March 1857. Also, 
repair works for wagons were costly and thus a 
blacksmith's shop had to be set up in Otjimbingwe 
with a double forge to curb some of these costs, 





On roads that were made or had to be repaired, 
see Ibid., letter to Searle, 27 May 1857. 
BRMG 1856, 90. 
WA 1\P 9 letter to Searle, 1.1 March, 1857. 
Ibid. , letter to Searle, 11 March, 1857. 
Ibid., letter to Sea1~1e, 27 May 1857. 
In addition to this, it appears that, for once, 
European entrepreneurs could not sucbessfully exploit 
the political power struggles and divisions among the 
inhabitants of Namaland. Although this was attempted, 
as the three similar contracts with ·the three Kapteins 
in the area show, it seems that the Walvis Bay Mining 
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Company derived no advantages in this case. The contrary 
was true. There were frequent quarrels between the 
miners and Jonker's men at'Otjimbingwe and Neu-Barmen 
especially about cattle. 68 At these settlements, cattle 
thefts and rather large-scale raids by both Swartbooi 
and Jonker occurred as well as at other settlements of 
the copper diggers. 69 Other losses were sustained 
with large quantities of ore disappearing overnight, 
and thelike. 70 Apparently, the directors of the Walvis 
Bay Mining Company even applied to the Methodist Church 
to send a missionary to Jonker Afrikaner, offering to 
carry all transport costs plus a salary of £50 per year. 71 
It seems that the loss of time and cattle in these 
conflicts was considerable for the copper company. 
Although he certainly eiaggerated grossly in this 
68. BRMG 1859, 104. ' 
6 9 • J BR MG 2 6 , 18 ; BR MG 18 5 6 , 13 2 . 
70. WA AP 9, Letter to Searle, 27 May 1857. 
71. Mears: Missionaries, 10. 
••• J 
context, it is appropriate to refer briefly to 
Esterhuyse's jud~ent that copper mining had to be 
finally abandoned in 1859 due to "the high expenses 
and Nama riots 11 • 72 
At the same time that the managers of the copper 
companies came to t~ke a part in- the political struggles 
of Namaland, they were also (probably unknowingly) 
involving Kaptein Jonker and his allies in a specific 
contradiction. This did not help their attempts to 
work copper profitably at all. On the one hand, Jonker 
was their "best friend" and had certainly a definite 
interest in them as they constituted another advan-
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tage'-pus link with the Cape. However, the copper working 
soon showed ~tself to be potentially dangerous to an 
important prop of the Afrikaners' hegemonic position, 
i.e. their ability to hold groups of Herera-speakers 
in subjection. I demonstrated how forcefully Jonker 
fought any attempt by Herero chiefs to gain access to 
the acquisition of guns beyond his control. However, 
it was precisely through working for the copper 
companies that such an independent avenue of access to 
arms and ammunition could be found. For instance, 
missionaries once noted: "It could well be that the 
material position of the Damaras will improve through 
th~ copper workers . Those who go to them (to work, B.L.) 
72. J ~H. Esterhuyse: SWA, 10. 
are easily accepted, very much to Jonker's vexation. 
Some Damaras are employed already in the mines and 
the Englishmen hope that they will be good miners 
soon. 1173 
The danger was mitigated by the fact that the majority 
of the Herera-speakers were not cattle owning chiefs, 
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nor were they attached to 'one. 74 They actually appear to 
have been a rightless and rather miserable lot. 
H6rnemann noted that "there may be many working for 
the copper diggers, but apart from food they don't 
earn anything, 75 are treated brutishly and are •.. 
out of the mission's reach ... 11 7 6 
Still, things could always change, especially in the 
event of success. ~he mine could expand and the 
workers be better paid. The threat was undeniably 
there and probably influenced Jonker's actions. The 
'danger' was always kept on a very modest ~cale. 
Andersson once noted in his routine reports on Ma'tch-• 
less that "my staff.of men on the mine at this time 
73. Quellen 30, Kleinschmidt, Vollmer and Eggert to 
Society, 28 Nov. 1855. 
74. See my notes on the populations of Neu-Barmen 
and Otjimbingwe, Chapter~- · 
75. Apparently 'native' workers earned more in the 
Bethany copper mines, see BRMG 1855, 279. 
76. BRMG 1856, 310 
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is four miners and three labourers, one smith and 
one carpenter, as also 14 Damaras 11 • 77 If operations 
remained on that scale, Jonker had not much to fear. 
Still, the desire to contain this threat or at least 
control the situation more fully was probably an 
important element in the conflicts with and around 
the copper diggers. 
8.3 THE ENTRENCHMENT OF DEPENDENCY ON THE CAPE NEXUS 
Thus far, I have largely dealt with quantitative 
aspects like the scale of trade and the degree Of 
11: 
capitalisation involved. In the next paragraphs I 
shall examine the social relations organising this 
trade, and their dynamicJover time. This will enable 
us to assess more clearly the implications of incorporation 
into the Cape nexus for the groups discussed here. 
The figures indicating the enormous profits made by 
traders over several decades suggest that no Kaptein 
~ucceeded in changing the terms of trade to ,his ad van-
tage. Thus a certain degree of 'victimisation' 
inevitably prevailed. In trying to answer the question 
why this should have been so, one could refer to the 
77. WA AP 9, 28 Sep. 1857. 
close alliance between European traders and the 
various Kapteins and their raads. Thereby the real 
victimisation could be delegated to the lower echelons 
of the various communities. (One wonders, for instance, 
how much the bywoners at Rehoboth and .the Windhoek. 
area ever saw of the goods and presents which Swartbooi 
and Jonker received from the Walvis Bay Mining Company.) 
Although this is most certainly a valid consideration, 
it is not entirely convincing. Why should the Kapteins 
not have gained even more? 
There are two aspects which must be examined in greater 
detail. Firstly, as was shown in the preceding 
chapters, the traders and the Katpeins did not meet 
as individuals, let alone as equals, in some neutral 
social and political space. Rather, the Kapteins 
and their raad 's power was p~pen_9ent for repro.-ctuction 
on the trader's supply functions. The trader himself 
could naturally find other markets for the disposal of 
his goods. This was even more possible as up to the 
mid-1860s his abilities to take and exploit the 
country's riches for himself were severely limited 
through the control exercised by the Afrikaners and 
their allies. Besides, as was argued earlier, the 
social forces r~presented by traders operated in such 
a way as to increase_ this inequality and d~pendency 
contrary to all attempts by the Kapteins to control 




Secondly, the alliance between the Kapteins and the 
traders was only as strong as their own position. 
However, their position was based on a number of 
specific skills necessary to gain access to means of 
production outside of the community's production 
resources. As I demonstrated e~rlier, such skills 
were available to many and not restricted to the ruling 
group. If a man exchanged two oxen for a gun and 
powder, he had gained a measure of independent access 
to the principal means of produ~tion. The Kaptein's 
power was at all points limited, due to this structural 
overlap of production/exchange relationships which made 
it Qext to impossible to exert tight control over 
access to means of production. 
In the trade relations with the Cape, both these aspects 
of social organisation were expressed very clearly. 
As we will see, trade could not be controlled effect-
ively; neither 'externally' nor 'internally'. 
8.3.1 The Kaptein~' Struggle to Keep in Control of 
the Trade with the Cape 
I shall start by briefly considering the difficulties 
that the chief had in controlling trade 'internallyL. 78 
78. See my analysis of difficulties of control in 
the kommando, Chapters 4 and 5. 
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We hear of Jonker complaining to Galton that "many 
of his Bergdamara and Namquas have of late broken 
loose, killing the Bergdamara (i.e. other Hau-khoi, 
B.L.) and carrying away their cattle. He thought 
that if he could prevent them from buying gunpowder he 
would be better able to keep them in order". Galton 
suggested a system of 'internal licensing': gunpowder. 
and lead by order should only be s6ld at his place and 
nowhere else in his territory, and only "under a certain 
fine". Jonker apparently was "much pleased and asked 
Galton to write out a few rules, etc. 1 which he would 
send to Mr. Morris who is now stopping at Rehoboth". 79 
Andersson recorded what became of such attempts a 
fe~ days later. Morris came to Jonker's place and 
Jonker requested him to hand in a list of prices of 
his goods he wanted to trade, but Morris refused and 
left immediately to trade his goods with Oasib and his 
followers. Jonker was not able tb prevent this.
80 
The traders could not be forced to sell their goods at 
fixed places to strictly selected people only. 
Oasib himself once thought of using the missionary's 
power ov~r his congregation to control the distribution 
79. WA AP 2, 16 Aug. 1851. 
80. Ibid., 19 Aug. 1851. Also, Kleinschmidt once 
commented on a conflict about prices between 
Willem Swartbooi and an itinerant trader, not-
in~ that the latter intended to leave for 
Amraal's place in the hope of a better deal, 
BHMG 1859, 22. 
of guns. Thus, Tindall reported in 1847 that Oasib 
was worried by "deserters and unruly 'subordinate 
chiefs'". He added that Oasib "requested me to use 
my influence to prevent the parties concerned getting 
horses, guns and ammunition 11 • 81 
In another case, Kapteins Oasib and Amraal planned to 
control trade movements in their area.differently. 
Vollmer reported that they wrote letters to all Kapteins 
and asked for two things: Firstly, that licences 
be iss~ed to anybody who might want to trade, and 
secondly, that no trade be conducted with members of the 
Gai-//khaun and Gobabis p~ople who came without such a 
82 pass. Here, as in other attempts at controlling . .. 
the flow of trade, the same set of factors denied success 
to the Kapteins. 
Firstly, ·countrywide ' coope\ration ·was impossible to 
achieve as there was no basis for alliances on this 
scale. Willem Swartbooi, for one, explicitly refused 
to cooperate~· Nor is there concrete evidence that 
these attempts at control met with any noticeable 
response.in other communities. 83 This was probably 
81. J. Tindall·: The Journal, 111. 
82. Que.llen 5, 14 Oct. 1854. 




a benevolent missionary project doomed to failure 
from the outset. Certainly there was never an 
administrative framework, reaching beyond the realms 
of individual Kapteins, that would have been essential 
to success. On the contrary, group membership was undefined 
and became increasingly blurred as kinship structures 
lost their cohesion. However, it is significant that 
both Oasib and Amraal responded to such suggestions 
or ideas. This indicates that the problems of control 
were considerable indeed, and t-hat they knew of no 
better solution. Who traded when, and with whom, 
at what place, was certainly not entirely arbitrary. 
' Yet the various Kapteins and their raads were obviously 
not in a position to exercise the kind of controls 
which they felt were desirable and necessary. This 
was partly related to the nature of the kommando group 
as I analysed it in Chapter ~- Moreover, it was 
specifically the emerging opportunities for every 
Kaptein to compete for the same commodities in the 
same way which must account for these difficulties. 
Similar dynamics became obvious when the struggles 
to control the trade 'externally' are examined. 
Throughout the decades under discussion, the Kapteins 
applied four main means to break the monopoly over the 
supply of necessary commodities held by traders, be 
the~ itinerant or, as later, located at fixed distri-





Most promiment here were efforts to exploit competition 
among the individual, unorganised traders. This was 
done by establishing and maintaining as many trade 
links as possible. Thus, from the beginning of 
the century onward, we learn that the various groups in 
Namaland traded at Angra Pequena~ at other smaller, 
natural harbours along the coast, at Walvis Bay, at 
Warmbad, across the Orange River with "unprincipled" 
Boer farmers, with Trader Fryer at Konkins Bay or with 
a resident missionary himself . 84 Indeed, it is 
striking that even in mid-century and ~ater, there is 
no. evidence of total reliance on any one trader or 
one supply route. 
The second prominent means of maintaining some control, 
related to the first, was to travel to the Cape, or 
85 at least to Little Namaqualand. This practice 'was 
not only prevalent before the 1840s but continued when 
84. LMS Journals, Schmelen 1815, 17-18; Ibid., 1821 
-=-rs22, sept. 1821; Ibid., 1819, 6. 
B. Shaw: Memorials, 136~ 
J. Ebner: Reise, 133; G. Thompson: Travels, 
291. 
Moritz Kleinschmidt, 1842, 2116. 
E. Cook: The Modern, 154; J. Tindall: The 
Journal, 31 . 
85. E. Cook, op.cit., 104, 112; TLMS III, 432. 
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itinerant traders arrived regularly and even settled 
at some places. Independent trips to the Cape, to 
Walvis Bay, across the Orange River and to Angra 
Pequena continued to be important for the various 
Kapteins. 86 What does emerge is that the cost and 
effort involved in making regular trips to the Cape 
or to other outlets, creating a feasible alternative to 
dependence on itinerant traders, became too high in the 
long run and could simply not be met. 
) 
There were other ways in which Kapteins hoped to manage. 
relations with the Cape to their advantage. One was 
retaining specialists who could inform them about 
prices, as well as about the supply and demand situation~ 
at the Cape; another consisted on levying high fees 
for the use of roads, water and pasture. 
Specialists and informers played art important role. 
Green explained in the late 1850s that "the natives'' 
generally knew the value of ivory "only too well'' and would 
86. There are a great many references to Kapteins 
and others travelling to different trading 
outlets. See, for example, BRMG 1849, 195; 
1855, 54, 208; 1852, 309; 1854, 22; 1856, 7; 
1863, 211-212; Quellen 3a, 14 Aug. 1849; 
Quellen 3b, 26 July 1853; 6 June, 1854, 









not take beads and "other trash" but only guns. 87 
Missionaries were ~nown to complain about the riff-raff 
from Griqualand who knew a bout prices and would irinci te 
the p~ople against the traders 11 • 88 In a similar vein, 
Andersson was impressed by the extremely knowledgeable 
and well-educated Malay man from the Cape who was in 
Jonker's service as an interpreter. 89 Furthermore, 
Jonker seized the first opportunity he had to ask a 
knowledgeable European who was sympathetic to him 
(as none of the missionaries were), namely Sir Francis 
Galton, "if there was no way of getting things from 
the Cape at a lower rate than what the traders who come 
into the country ask. He said the prices they demand 
are so enormously high that it is not in their power 
to buy things that they may be in the greatest want 
of He said Mr. Morris only offers- five pounds of 
d f 1 1190 coarse pow er or a very arge ox •.. Evidently 
the missionaries themselves were part and parcel of 
the Kapteins' struggle against monopolies of trade and 
information held by the traders from the Cape. 91 
87. WA AP 3, Green's Journal (n.d.) 
88. BRMG 1859, 25. 
89. WA AP 2, 15 Aug. i851. 
90. Ibid., Galton, interestingly, advised him to 
become a trader in his own right. 
91. At this stage, mention must be made of trading 
parties reaching Namaland from the east, from 
Bechuanaland and Griqualand. Trade lin.ks between 
the two areas appear-to have been fairly well-
establish even if it is not quite obvious bow 
regular they were. 
283. 
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Lastly, traders sometimes had to pay fees and duties. 
However, it is not clear how widespread such practices 
were before the 1870s. 92 Possibly such assertion of 
chiefly power vis-a-vis traders was only available to 
Jonker. Jonker was known to have asked for fees if 
people wanted to use his ~oads through the Auas mountains 
and to Walvis Bay.93 He attempted to control trade 
more effectively by asking traders who were on their , 
way to Lake Ngami to pass through his place which, by 
then, was known as Okahandja, and pay a thoroughfare 
'tax' 6f 50 lbs. of powder per wagon. Kleinschmidt 
noted that "shortly before that he had done the same 
with five other wagons. 1194 
Taken together, these attempts by the Kapteins and 
their raads to exercise control over trade and the 
traders proved ineffectual. The attempts were in-
variably on a puny scale and never· went beyond an indi-
vidual group. Thus, the exploitation of competition 
among the traders could alway~ be matched by the 
trade~s' exploitation of competition among the various 
groups in Namaland. Furthermore, these attempts 
92. CA G~--50:::!77· .. Palgrave: Report Ann. III, T. Hahn 
to magistrate, 21 Oct. 1872; CA G,'H 18/12, 
A. Andersson to Governor 21 March 1872. 
93. See Baines: Explorations in South West Africa, 
An Account of-AJourney in the Years lb bl· and 1862 
London~--r304J bj · -
94. BRMG 1862, 48. 
were so· inadequate that they failed to prevent matters 
from deteriorating for the Namaland ko~mando. 
8.3.2 The Gradual Deterioration of the Terms of 
Trade for Namaland Kapteins, 1845 - 1863 
As indicated in Chapters 4 and 5, the kommando groups 
were inherently dependent on supplies from the Cape 
285 
which·:made Namaland a captive market for a few itinerant 
traders. This fact, combined with the importance of 
access to commodities in the achievement of positions 
of political leadership (and the difficulty in main-
taining tight control of such access), placed the 
Kapteins into an extremely vulnerable position vis-a-vis 
the Cape traders. The traders in their turn were 
quick to recognise and exploit these weaknesses, espec-
ially through the extending of credit to people in-
creasingly deprived on independent resources. 
The credit system must be seen here as elsewhere 95 
as one of the most powerful ways in which subordination was 
entrenched and reproduced. By extending much needed 
credit, the traders were able to manoeuver themselves 
into a position of power which they had not previously 
95. For example, in the compound system at miries 
in southern Africa, see C. Van Onselen: Chibaro, 
London, 1976, 161, ff. 
enjoyed. This clearly exposes trad~rs as agents of 
social forces which had become 'locked into' these 
communities, thereby sustaining a process of ever-
increasing dependence on specific goods. This form 
of commoditisation was indeed "the acid in which the 
structures of non-capitalist society are dissolved 11 • 96 
The image of 'locking-in' is powerful and adequate 
because no newly emerging ·forces within and around 
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these groups could possibly be released to topple the 
old order and thus do away with factors like the credit 
sy$tem completely. Social energies potentially released 
throt.flgh higher productivity were absorbed by having to meet 
the pressures of indebtedness. It also becomes obvious 
at this point that certain political and economic courses 
of action had to be taken to counter debts. Control 
slipped out of the hands of Kapteins and their raad and 
passed into those of the traders and missionaries who 
acted as agents of capitalist penetration. No 
investment of industrial capi~al nor formal political 
domination was needed to achieve this. 
The credit system evolved at a fairly early stage in 
Namaland. Jonker and his raadsmen were known to 
have already incurred heavy debts with Trader Morris 
in the early 1840s.97 In fact, it was suggested by 
97. Hahn noted that Jonker and his raadsmen owed up 
to 800 oxen each to Morris, CA HP, 16 March, 1846. 
contemporaries that his series of 'raids' on the, 
Mbanderu in 1846 was a direct response to pressure 
from Morris. 98 Galton noted that at Jonker's place 
a lively trade was conducted. Cattle, and goods 
man~fa~tured at Windhoek were exchanged for goods from 
the Cape. He commented that this "did not last 
long; the traders sold their goods on credit; Jonker 
and the others became deeply in debt, and as the only 
way of paying it off involved themselves once again 
in the endless Damara quarrels 11 • He concluded that 
"of_ late years the news of a brader 's wagon being on the 
road has been the sign for a general raid upon the 
Damaras". 99 In 1856, the Missionaries recorded that 
people from Berseba proposed to earn extra income by 
transporting loads of copper to Little Namaqualand in 
order to pay off their debts~lOO 
Similarly, the men of Amraal's group were eagerly 
awaited by a trader ~ho had even arrived( at Gobabis 
two weeks before them) after coming back from a six 
months long hunting excursion. He wanted to "sell 
98. Ibid. 
99. F. Galton: The Narrative, 70-71. 
100. BRMG 1856, 109. The missionaries also noted 
that the necessity for barter and exchange with 
the Cape traders increased as credit was given 
and debts were incurredr BRMG 1854, 19. 
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his powder and cash in his debts 11 • 101 Was it not 
primarily this debt which made the men leave in the 
first instance? K~eft at Bethany noted that the credit 
system was deeply entrenched: "I know people who 
have bought new wagons without possessing a single 
102 ox for payment''· We must not be in any doubt about 
the traders themselves; they knew very well what they 
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were doing. At ·one stage,· traders at Bethany offered 
brandy to everybody103 so as to create a dependency which 
was not there before. This initiated a conflict among 
the people at Bethany which raged for decades104 and 
has even been considered sufficiently dramatic to 
inspire part of a nove1. 105 
Another important aspect of this particular dynamic of 
trade was that the divisions between the groups were 
intensified. The ~qualising' effects of being 
involved in the same network and being pressurised by 
the same social .forces in very similar ways, were 
101. BRMG 1863, 279. 
102. Quellen 3b, 26 May 1861. 
103. Ibid., Sep. 1863 (no day). 
104. BRMG 1856, 7-12; Quellen 3b, 26 July 1853, 
Sep. 1863, 29 Dec. 1864, 18 April 1865, when 
David Christian was even forced by his raatj 
to sign a paper saying that he would never 
touch brandy again. 
105. Uwe Timm: Morenga, Munchen, 1978·. 
··off-set by an ever stiffer competition for commodi-
ties. This corresponded exactly to the rising level 
of dependency on these goods. Admittedly, competition 
in itself may not uncritically be accepted as a causal 
facto~ for social processes. As concerns the 
Namaland kommando groups, there were at least two 
further factors which emphasise why divisions between 
groups of people never ceased to be important during 
the period covered here. 
The first is that the Kapteins were competing for 
means of production which were to be found outside 
of the 6riginal communities. Therefore, their 
incqr_po_rat ion_ was princi oal ~ y possible for e_very_ 
group in question. The establishment of exploitative 
relations with Herero~speakers or the purchase of guns, 
were practicable for every Kaptein. Possibly more 
importantly, those means of production were not repro-
duced independently by the people who made use of them. 
As previously noted, in the case of resources such as 
ivory and feathers, surface waters and pastures, these 
were not reproduced at all but were in fact declining. 
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This increased their 'scarcity' infinitely. In the case of 
cattle acquired from Herera-speakers, reproduct~on 
rested on structures of political control which could 
not be maintained without ammunition and horses from 
the Cape. These commodities wer~ primarily accessible, 
not only to every Kapteinj but even to those who 
wanted to become Kapteins. 
This leads us to the second factor. The struggle for 
control did indeed become increasingly harder for the 
various Kapteins vis-a-vis the agents of merchant 
capital. However, before the 1870s, they had not 
yet lost control. As fa~ as access to the northern 
hunting veld, Herera cattle and two trade routes to 
Lake Ngami were concerned, it was still the Afrikaners 
and their allies who controlled them. Those Namaland 
Kapteins who sought to wrest that power out of the 
Afrikaners' hands by concluding alliances with 
missionaries from the 1850s onwards, hoped to win it 
for themselves. 106 
In the next chapter I shall demonstrate more clearly 
how far the Afrikaners' powers of control determined 
political divisions between the groups and. led to a 
heightened sense of competition among Narnaland Kapteins. 
In the final chapter I shall examine how, and more 
especially why, in the 1860s independent access to 
principal means of production was largely taken away 
106. See Chapter 6. 
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from the Afrikaners by a trader-missionary alliance. 
For the following decades, traders, missionaries and 
colonial administrators took over central control 
functions which had formerly been in the hands of 
the Afrikaners. They were never restored to any 
Namaland Kaptein again. The Kaptein 's subordination was 
not complete. Yet, when the power of the Afrikaners 
and their allies was broken, a new historical epoch 




THE TRADERS' AND MISSIONARIES' 'WAR 
OF LIBERATION' 
The developments of the 1860s have never been adequately 
assessed in Namibian historiography. The various battles 
and conflicts are either dealt with highly selectively1 , 
or we are informed about a whole series of fights but 
learn very little about why they took place at that time 
I 
and in that form. 2 As we shall see, within the context 
of the preceding argument, these struggles take on a 
new significance quite different to anything that has 
ever been previously suggested . 
. Heinrich Vedder was among the first to interpret the violence 
in Namaland as a "Herero war of liberation". Ever since 
then this view has been echoed by other writers. In the 
more modern historiography this interpretation is sometimes 
( t4 accorded inverted commas, or preceded by a 'so-called ) 
but not always 5 . 
As I shall demonstrate in this chapter, the so-called 
7-year 'war of liberation'· of 'the Hereros" was a war of 
l. See for instance Loth: Mission~ 56-74; W. Werner: 
'Investigation', 84-92; R. Moorsom: 'Proletarlanisa ti on',· 
chs. 2 and 3 
2. H. Vedder: Farly T!-m~,_ 325-~391; I. Goldblatt: SW!, 31-39 
3. H. Vedder; op.cit., 325-359 
4. H. Lot.h, op.cd.t., 56; J. von Moltke: 'Mythos', AH 1973,33-1!!-l. 
5 . I . Go 1db1 a. t t : SW A , 3 1-- 3 4 
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liberation indeed, not however, of 'the Hererors' .but of 
the traders as well as the missionaries. The minor 
involvement of Herera-speakers had a merely mercenary 
character; they weri tools rather than political actors 
in their own right. The real 'freedom fighters' were the 
' 
traders and the missionaries. 
What they fought for was freedom from the limitations and 
controls which the Afrikaner's independent power position 
imposed on them. Their true allies were not Herera-speakers 
but all those Kapteins of Namaland who were equally 
interested in undermining Jonker's power. It is partly due 
to a historiographic tradition expressed in rigidly 'ethnic' 
or even 'racial', terms that the notion of a 'Herero' 
liberation from 'the Namaquas' yoke could have persisted 
for so long. Another reason for the longevity of this 
myth lies in the sources themselves. It was the traders 
and missionaries who created this myth in the first place 
because it suited their purposes. The disguise of a 
"Herera war of liberation" was so much more .~on~cive to 
enlisting support from the Cape and particularly from the 
berman missionary establishment than any direct involvement 
in violent strife could have been no matter how just such 
conflict may have appeared. The records do not speak with 
the voice of those who lost the first round in the struggle 
against colonialism. 
\ 
9.1 GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE INTERESTS INVOLVED IN 
THE CONFLICTS 
9.1.1 The Position of the Afrikaners Before the Outbreak 
of Violence 
Let us briefly consider the nature df this struggle as 
far as the two contending parties were concerned. The 
preceding chapters indicated the position of the 
Afrikaners and their allies, headed by Jonker until his 
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death in 1861. Their political stature remained remarkably 
powerful, even if it was already crumbling at the base. 
The relatively small group of highly trained military men 
had succeeded in establishing control over vast territories 
bzy'ond the borders of the Cape Colony. The missionaries, 
although maintaining a firmly anti-Jonk~r attitude through-
out the years under question, could not fail to marvel at 
these achievemen~at time. Kleinschmidt once expressed 
his wonderment that such a "dwarf-like'' figure as Jonker 
Afrikaner could have reigned over the vast territory 
stretching from the Orange to the Cunene ... 6 
The amibivalent nature of the Afrikaners' rule has also 
been indicated. They (and;manyother leading Orlam 
families) possessed political .;n~ 13t,+ and shrewdness won by 
a long history of struggle against the servile roles 
•imposed by Dutch or British colonialism (which they never 
6. BRMG ·1862, 100 
ceased to fear). Yet they themselves imposed similar slavish roles 
on 'natives' beyond the colonial borders. This ambivalence 
was encapsulated in their war slogan of the 1860s: 
"Africa to the Africans, but Namaqualand and Damaraland 
to the Hottentots", they said. 7 
Their awareness of the nature of colonialism was clearly 
expressed in Jonker's assessments of the missionaries. He 
always suspected them of being agents of this colonialism. 8 
Once, he even said to Hahn that he would accept a missionary 
if he promised never to-bring surveyors to the Afrikaner 
territories. Hahn noted that "of course~ he could not make 
such a promise. 9 There was much at stake for them in these 
conflicts, because the loss of control over monopoly access 
to tribute and taxes from Herera-speakers would erode 
their power base. 
9.1.2. The po~ition of Namaland Kapteins 
• J 
A group of Kapteins had emerged as the Afrikaners' allies 
in the 1840s and 1850s. 10 They participated in tribute 
extraction from Herera-speakers on Jonker's terms. They 
included Jan and Jakobus Boois, Amraal Lambert from 
Gobabis and his men, Oasib and his followers, Hendrik Zes of the 
Veldskoendraers with his associates, Piet Kopper and some 
7. BRMG 1869, 12-13 
8. See -chapter 6. 
9 • CA HP 9 ' 8 March 1853 -
10. See chapter 7. 
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of the 'Topnaars' from the Bay. The other Kapteins, as 
we saw, had tried to consolidate their position, and to 
gain access to the Cape nexus, via an ever firmer 
involvement with.individual missionaries. Their 
concern was to break the Afrikaner's monopoly over access 
to the cattle herds of Herero-speakers as well as their 









·( ; '! 
_,:.. "I 
power to control access to the northern and eastern 
hunting veld (through Amraal). This was the only veld 
remaining by the 1860s where ivory and ostrich feathers 
could be procured. Their position is clearly borne out by -+-l.~ 
largely ineffectual treaties of the 1850s, and notably the 
Traktat van Haochanas• 11 . Thus, the primary dividing line 
between the Namaland kommando groups was participating in or 
being excluded from ·the appropr ia ti on of Herero surplus 
on Jonker's terms. 
9.1.3. The Traders' Situation 
'i 
As far as the large-scale trading interests established by Ander-
sson and Green were con~erned , I demonstrated in the last 
chapter what was at stake for them. The northern 
hunting veld contained considerable riches of ivory and 
ostrich feathers and the cattle trade had been animmensely 
profitable business for almost two decades. All this 
could be .exploited much more easily if control was 




wrenched out of the Afrikaner's hands. It is not quite 
clear whether traders like Andersson were actually 
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thinking that the cattle they obtained almost exclusively 
via Namaland kommando.s( who had' procured' it from Herero-speakers) 
would. be cheaper to obtain directly from those Herero-speaking 
groups themselves. Their course of action indicates that 
they probably did. 
9.1.4. The Interests of Missionar1es, with special Reference 
to Carl Hugo Hahn 
When we talk about the missionarie~ interest in these 
con~lic~, it will become apparent that there was only one 
missionary who engaged full-time in trade and poli'tics. 
That was Carl Hugo Hahn. Nevertheless, he was the 
acknowledged head of all the missionaries. Therefore he 
must be considered as representative, even if there were 
other missionaries in Namaland who were only marginally 
interestd in trade and politics, and only in so far as 
it effected their missionary·activity d~re9tly. Thus 
for a number of years the missionaries , as represented 
by Hahn, came to be con<;dously and actively involved in 
the violent conflicts of the 1860s. 
Their interests may not have been quite as blatant as those 
of the traders, but they were nonetheless perfectly clear. 
Their desire to see~the Afrikanersf power undermined rested 
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on the insights gained during almost 20 years of completely 
unsuccessful attempts at missionary work among the Hereros. 
Jonker Afrikaner had successfully prevented missionaries 
from establishing alliances with Herera-chiefs or exploring 
Damaraland. Even where he could not directly deny them 
reconnaissance trips through Darnaraland, his position in -/ 
relation with Herera-speakers did so indirectly. Hereros 
had probably come to assume 'naturally' that every European 
encountered in Damaraland was a friend of Jonker's as nobody 
went there without his permission, and therefore should be 
avoided. At all events, they withdrew into the far 
interior and left the central area depleted of peopl~. 
Th~ missionaries consistently responded to this situation 
by expressing their fear.that the Herera nation faced extinc-
tion or had been largely annihilatect. 12 As far as the 
desire of Herera chiefs to make use of contacts with a 
missionary went, Kahitjene probably served as a most 
deterrent example. 13 
Hahn's involvement in the conflicts needs further 
'elaboration. Neu~Barmen was considered ~entirely useless'' 
as a stepping stone for the Herera mission by Hahn himselr.
14 
Otjimbingwe, the other mission station in Damaraland, 
was a trading centre rather than a mission station. 
1 c:; 
Its inhabitants were called "a collection of riff-raff". J 
By 1853 the missionary Konferenz had already asserted to 
12. RMS KP 1856, paragraph 10. 
13. See Chapter 7. 
14. CA HP - 9, 10 Nov. 1856. 
15. BRMG 1853, 252-253. 
r'. ·. 
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their superiors that with Jonker's power unbroken, the 
H . . ld t . t 16 Y t '-h R h M So erero-mission cou no exis . e , ... e henis 1 ission ciety 
continued to pour money into the undertaking under 
these conditions for almost 20 years. By doing so, the 
society pursued its interest in 'opening up' 9~a~bol~nd~ 
This, however, reql.lired a firm base in Damar-aland. 
The traveller Galton had provided Hahn with promising 
reports about an agricultural and politically centralised 
people further north. After flahn's abortive trip north 
with Rath and Bornemann in 1852 the idea of the Herero-
mission w~s abandoned. As the missionar~es noted in 1859, 
it was revived three years later only in view of a possible 
thrust into Ovamboland 17 . After his disastrous and entirely 
unsuccessful journey into Ovamboland in 1851-, Hahn was 
heavily criticised for his "waste of money" by mission 
representatives in Germany. Sherly afterwards he was 
? expelled from the Rhenish Mission Society for "confes-
• II 18 sionary reasons . 
7 He only returned after years of lobbying in Germany for 
the consolidation of the missionary's independent position 
through trade.- Thus he intended giving it concrete foundations 
that would protect it against threats from the Afrikaners. He 
16. RMS KP 1853! paragraph 13 
17. BRMG 1B59, 102 





had successfully co~vinced his society that 
""--
missionary J 
work in Damaraland would be fruitful if the missionary 
provided not only the teachings of the Gosp~l but also 
a store with desired commodities such as guns and 
ammunition. He hoped to give Herero-speakers independence 
from their chiefs (who were often allied to Jonker) 
through offering jobs at the mission station as crafts-
19 men, etc. 
Clearly it is at this point, and especially in the 
case of ~rl Hugo Hahn, that we must see the mission-
aries not only in their roles as teachers, community 
workers and even as speaking out for the oppressed. Rather 
such motives and interests exposed the missionaries' 
~--=~--=-------,,.-- . .,,...~ --- ~ 
links with the approaching imperial age. They give 
-~~·-- --- ·. . . ···- - _" ____ -- ~ 
I 
! 
an indication of missionaries' roles as pioneers of colonial 
conquest, even if other functions they fulfilled did not 
point in these directions (such as· doctors, community 
20 workers, etc.) 
Al though Hahn pr_ovided much of the driving force behind 
missionary involvement, other missionaries were equally 
involved, even if not primarily for the same reasons, 
but often by default. r previously indicated that the 
missionary had assurr.ed a considerable degree of political 
19. This was expressea in his idea about a 'mission 
colony', see Quellen 30, 5 Fehr. 1862, See also T. 
Sundermeier: ! D1e Kolonisa tions:i.dee· C.H .. Hahns', AH, 
1963. 
20. See chapter 6 
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power within these groups. Amongst other things, -he 
assisted the Kapteins to achieve and maintain access to 
the nexus of comm ocli ty exchange with the Cape in various 
ways. Thus, he constituted an alternative to aligning with 
Jonker on Jonker's terms. Now we can perceive even 
more clearly the emergence of a second dividing line 
between the groups which largely coincided with the fitst. 
This was the direct involvement with a missionary. The 
missionary came to be the symbol for the complex set of 
social forces emanating from Europe and the Cape which 
threatened the Afrikaners' hegemony'. In the 1860s, 
to acquire a missionary meant automatically to decide 
a~ainst Jonker ~nd hi~ .~~lies,· and for 'the traders 
and other Europeans. Therefore-, the struggle often 
appears to be one between those who were committed to a 
missionary as against those who were not. The fundamen-
tal issue, however, continued to be the Afrikaners' 
powers to control the northern hunting veld and to 
extract surplus from Herera-speaking chiefs. 
9.1.5 The Participation of Herero-Speaking Chiefs 
As far as Jonker's former allies, the Herera-speaking 
chiefs were concerned, we cannot explore here in any 
detail what social forces and pressures compelled them 
to co-operate with the traders and missionaries. 
Maherero and others probably sei.zed this opportunity 
to shake off the subordination which their alliance 
with the Afrikaners had always implied·. However, 
it seems that they had no apparent desire to destroy 
the Afrikaners. As I shall demonstrate, their 
immediate interests aspired no further than altering 
• the terms of the alliance in their favour. 
9.2 THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 
9. 2. 1 The Depleti~m of Na~tural Resources in Central Namibia 
Finally, it must~e stressed that the 1860s were not 
just characterised by a series of battles as political 
history would have it. However, this superficial 
view cannot be avoided, because although the downfall 
of the Afrikaners was a long-term social and economic 
process, as the preceding chapters have indicated, 
it was the military events of the 1860s that revealed 
dramatically the true nature of this process. 1+.s 
basic facets must be briefly recalled at this stage 
to pe~mit accurate assessment of the timin& of the 
events. 
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One of the more important aspects of the kommando groups 
·' in Namaland was that the reproduction of major productive ass'ets 
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was not guarante.ed ·but was actually increasingly 
threatened. I concluded that the groups came to be 
involved in a process of impoverishment whereby skills 
became lost and social structures disintegrated. Old 
cultural practices became so subsidiary next to the 
military priorities of the kommando that spiritual 
reproduction had to be taken care of by European 
missionaries. For many communities the missionaries 
became a vital cornerstone in times of political uncer-
tainty. Thus social processes lost their 'self-generating' 
qualities, and dependence on certain imported commcdities 
increased steadily. In some instances, the lack (or 
loss) of skills geared towards the independent repro-
duction of the groups could be compensated (for instance, 
by more imports). The depletion of natural resources of 
Namaland and the southern par~s of Damaraland appears 
to have been more serious. Surface waters w.e.r_e___J.!__s_e_d ... 
0 
u,p, pastur_e_~ _b_ecame exhauste_d,,_and.:_game_r_ese1"ves..,, 
_,...... . h -' 21 fanis ea. Large numbers of Herera-speakers with 
their c~ttle herds retreated far into the interior, 
leaving a barren belt between the Kuiseb and Swakop 
. Rivers, and even north of the Swakop. Already, in the 
1850s, Jonker Afrikaner had begun to concentrate his 
efforts on acquiring cattle from Ovamboland as the 
large resources of Herero-speakers appeared to have 
21. See Chapter 4. 
sadly diminished.
22 
9.2.2 The Deteriorating Health Situation and the Outbreak 
of Smallpox 
By the late 1850s, the social, political and economic 
resources of the communities in Namaland were so 
depleted that two major epidemics (which broke out south 
of the Orange Riverlcould not be contained and had 
devastating results. The one, lungsickness, affected 
cattle and disrupted cattle trade with the Cape for 
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almost 10 years. The other was smallpox. The crippling 
h~ 
effect of these epidemics mustn simply be considered 
as a consequence of a natural disaster, but rather as 
an expression of the people's lack of outer and inner 
resources. Importantly, the spread of epidemics is 
not simply a function of the virus involved. Rather, 
its destructive power is determined by the amount of 
resistance in the attacked organism, by the individual 
22. This is not to argue that they did diminish. 
All we know is that for a period of some 
decades people and cattle in Damaraland 
retreated far into the interior, see above, 
footnote 16. 
and social strength available to fight the virus. 
An organism, unlike a tree destroyed by a fire, has 
it~ own innate strength to defend itself against 
disease. If smallpox and lungsickness were raging 
throughout southern Africa at the time (as they did) 
this indicates that people 1 s resistance was low because 
their strength had been sapped otherwise. Then there 
was the consideration that they were no longer resource-
ful enough to take the necessary steps which would stop 
the rapid spread of lungsickness among their cattle. 
Significantly, lungsickness and smallpox did not 
spread to Damaraland. 
The general health situation in Namaland had not been 
good for some decades. The increasingly military focus 
in all questions of social organisation did not allow 
for adequate health services. While some 'traditional' 
healing methods were still practiced as we saw, some 
Cape diseases were resistant to them, such as syphilis. 
This disease was rather widespread and particularly 
prevalent at places like Otjimbiniwe. 23 Cases of 
a kind of fever or influenza were frequent. 24 Amraal 
23. As far as evidence of the spread of veneral 
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diseases is concerned, see BRMG 1853, 247; BRMG 1824, 
236; BRMG 1855, 92, 200. Quellen 5, 23 Nov. 1854; 
24. 
CA HP 9, 13 Oct. 1845. 
See, for instance, Moritz Hahn, 
Moritz Kleinschmidt-, -f81f3, 226; 
6 May 1845; BRMG 1857, 85. 
1844' 193. 
CA HP 9, 
'. 
'• 
and his followers were once hit very badly. 25 
It does not appear that any epidemic ever gripped the 
whole of Namaland so severely as did the smallRO;K_in_ 
the first half of the 1860s. Apparently, a combina-
tion of the abovementioned influenza and smallpox did 
' 
break out. People contracted one or the other or 
both26 . By the mid-1850s it was already raging in 
Little Namaqualand and Warmbad, and the years 1860/61 saw 
it spread to Bethany and Berseba. Aggravating factors 
such as extremely heavy rains after drought conditions 
making the temperature suddenly cool and humid, 
accelerated the spread of the epidemic. 27 By 1863 
missionaries had obtained vaccine from the Cape and went 
from place to place to vaccinate people "because the 
smallpox is threatening to penetrate further and 
further inland". 28 However, they could not arrest 
the destructive force of the disease. At Gibeon 110 
people died and Gobabis had more than 140 deaths, includ-
ing almost all adult memberi of the Kaptein's family. 29 
25. J. Tindall: The Journal, 105. 
26. BRMG 1862, 251. 
27. BRMG 1862, 292, 338-340; Quelle~ 3b, Feb. 1860, 
(no day). 
28. Quellen 3b, Sep. 1863 (no day); BRMG 1864, 195. 
29. BRMG 1864, 246 1 330. 
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In these years, the epidemic had also reached places 
further north such as Hoachanas 30 , Rehoboth31 and 
Windhoek. 32 
There were other signs that intense stress characterised 
the period just before the outbreak of open conflict. 
In Rehoboth, for instance, the year 1862 saw an enormous 
revival. The men organised extra prayer sessions, 
long prayers continued at times for the whole day. 
There was weeping and wailing during the Lord's Supper 
and Missionary Kleinschmidt was offered to use of some 
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of their precious horses for a trip so that he could hurry 
back. The Rehobothers took consolation from the fact 
that they could at least keep his wife.33 A general 
meeting of all RehobothHseven agreed for the first time 
that the best Christians should be judges and counsellors. 34 
9.2.3 Andersson's Establishment at Otjimbingwe and the 
Outbreak of Lungsickness 
At about the same time, lungsickness broke out in the 
veld of dtjimbingwe. The fact that it broke out around 
30. It was mentioned that half the population of the 
outpost !Anis died, .see BRMG 1864,246. 
31. BRMG 1863, 79. 
32. BRMG 186ll 195. 
33. BRMG 1863, 80-81' lOl-1-108. 
~ 
34. BRMG 1863, 111. 
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Otjimbingwe had significant political consequences. 
Therefore, the settlement at Otjimbingwe merits more 
consideration. 
After the copper ventures had finally closed down in the 
north of Namaland, the former explorer and manager 
Mir'\ i ~ Con-.po.nj 
of the \.Jo.lvi~ !~~harles John Andersson, decided to purchase 
all the company's assets in Otjimbingwe (buildings 
He established a large-scale trading 
venture there, with Otjimbingwe as a fixed distribution 
centre. This was in 1860. 35 Although traders had 
sometimes previously lived ~or long spells of time at 
one place, this establishment was the first of its 
kind. Not being an itinerant trader for Andersson 
meant that the dependence on what a Kaptein and his 
raad had to offer for exchange was greatly reduced. In 
fact, Kapteins could actually be bypassed in the trade 
arena, because the presence of his own store meant that 
the trader became self-sufficient. Even if the operation 
was only on a small scale, in the long run enough cattle 
could be collected from various people to ~ustify the 
despatch of a drove to the Cape. 
In other words, the opening of a trading network in 
Otjimbingwe presented the greatest threat ever to the 
. indigenous control of trade, especial..1.¥.. as far as 
35. See Goldblatt: SWA, 31. 
Herero-speakers were concerned. Understandably, 
Jonker Afrikaner set himself against this development 
right from the start and did not want to allow Andersson 
to settle in. Otjimbingwe. 36 However, his need for 
regular_ and secure access to commodities from the 
Cape far outweighed his willingness to take any drastic 
steps and Otjimbingwe developed into a very busy place. 
Andersson had several men ·under his commission who 
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went out on trading trips, mainly to Namaland, collecting 
cattle from the Kapteins.37 When a sufficiently large 
-. 
herd had been assemble?, they would send it to the · 
Cape. 
By March, 1860, however, the effects of spreading lung-
sickness were noticed by Andersson as it became more 
and more difficult to get cattle.38 The month before 
he had complained bitterly that he had "doubled 
·the prices but still the natives hesitate to buy"-
(trom him, paying with cattle, B.L.)~ 9 
36. Ibid. 
37. See, for instance, WA AP 3 Feb. /March 1860. 
38. Ibid. , 31 March 1860. 
39. Ibid . , 10 Feb. 1860. 
9.2.4 The Building Up of Tensions Between Andersson 
and Some Namaland Kapteins 
Another major difficulty now emerged for Andersson. 
The Kapteins of Namaland, and notably Jonker, did not 
want to allow the contaminated cattle to pass through 
their areas on their way to the Cape. Kleinschmidt 
noted ih 1860 that only Trader Runcie was allowed to 
proceed from Rehoboth because he could prove that his 
cattle were not infected by lungsiokness. 40 
Jonker had been highly reluctant to let Andersson pass, 
but finally decided with the agreement of his raad 
t 
. . . 111 o give permission. In the next year, 1861, 
Andersson was not so fortunate. Jonker and his 
kommando were absent in Ovamboland. In January 
Andersson simply started for the Cape with a drove of 
1 400. En route from Otjirnbingwe to Rehoboth, 
Andersson's contaminated cattle herd was attacked and 
raided by Jonker's closest ally, Hendrik Nanib (or 
Hendrik Zes) who seized 500 heact. 42 The Rehobothers 
then permitted Nanib to ·pass through their veld un-
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molested with the raided cattle. They were subsequently 
40. BRMG 1861, 74. 
41. WA AP 3, i8 April 1860, 10 April 1860. 
42. BRMG 1861, 312. Another source, however, claims 
than 5 000 head of cattle had been taken, see 
Quellen 3b, 3March1861. 
so hard pressed by Andersson's traders who threatened 
an attack that Willem Swartbooi sent a letter to Nanib 
and requested the return of the cattle. The latter 
actually complied 43 which wai some~hihg quite without 
precedent, indicating that the Afrikaners and their 
,f 
allies were on the defensive and reluctant to assert 




impetus towards the progressive building up of hostilities. 44 
When Andersson's drove (now restored to its original 
~trength) arrived in Bethany in June, on the assurance 
that every head of cattle was vaccinated, the cattle 
were clearly infected .. Andersson was forced to return 
immediately. Furthermore, because of false assurances 
regarding the stati of the cattle, he had to pay a 
penalty of 100 sheep to David Christian. 45 
9.2.5 Andersson's First Moves to Establish His Own 
Fighting Force 
Burdened with these complications in acquiring and 
transporting cattle, Andersson reacted in two ways. He 
43. BRMG 1861, 325; BRMG 1862, 100. 
44. A little later Hendrik Zes was called the. 
"deadly arch-enemy of the Rehobothers", see BRMG 
1864, 33. 
45. Quellen 3b, 23 June 1861. 
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began to expand support structures for his trade, by 
training and arming small groups of Otjimbingwe residents. 
These were mostly Cape men of 'mixed descent, who came 
to be known as the 'Otjimbingwe volunteers 1 • 46 In 
addition, it seems that attention was slowly diverting 
away from cattle trade. With lungsickness spreading, 
the traders were bound to become more interested in 
other assets of the country: ivory and ostrich feathers. 
Compared with the thousands of cattle formerly sent 
to the Cape, this trade could be sustained with 
relatively few oxen. 
Jonker, when he came back from OvamQoland in July, 
watched these developments with great indignation. 
He stationed one of his headmen with some followers 
at Otjimbingwe to keep an eye on the Europeans there. 
He also began to tax traders' wagons en route to the 
east very heavily. 47 However, by that stage he was 
already a dying man. On August 18, 1861 he breathed 
his last, victim of an inflammation contracted in 
. 48 
Ovamboland. 
This was good news for Andersson who had no difficulty 
in identifying his enemies. The restrictions imposed 
on his venture through the Afrikaners' control of his 
46. BRMG 1862 
47. BRMG.186~, 48. 
48. BRMG 1862, )I'.) ... J. 
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moves had even led to military engagements as we 
saw earlier. He was well aware of the direction of 
developments. In January 1862, five months after 
Jonker's death, he noted: "The Hottentots are fearfully 
jealous of me; they got a notion that I am the only 
person who benefits by my presence. I am not afraid. 
of any Hottentot ... but I may have to leave the 
country unless I resort to bloodshed 11 • 49 He continued 
to make generous presents to the new Kaptein of the 
-Afrikaners, Christian. 50 Yet, when news of severe 
internal quarrels among the Afrikaners following 
Jonker's death became known to the Europeans, 51 Andersson 
happily noted in his diary that there was a "war 
pending between several of Jonker's parties. Hurrah! 
I only hope it is true and that they will earnestly 
set about cutting one another's throats. 1152 
It appears that he did not hesitat~ to help along such 
developments when they initially failed to produce 
the.desired results. When another consignment of his 
cattle waiting at the Bay under Latham was plundered 
in 1862, he sent "a very reputable party" of armed 
49. WA AP 4, 26 Jan. 1862. 
50. He claimed the goods had a value of £30 
altogether, Ibid. 
51.. See, for instance, BRMG 1862, 45. 
52. WA AP 4, 15 May 1862. 
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Herero-speakers to Latham's assistance. Addit~onally, 
he "raised another ... auxiliary corps for Latham 
headed by Phillipus" (one of the Otjimbingwe Hereros) 
soon afterwards. 53 He commented: "I don't exactly 
know whether we ha~e done right in thus arming the 
Damaras, of course they go in hopes of plunder. The 
Hottentots if I dare say will feel very sore about 
th . 1154 lS ••• But "the Hottentots" were on the defensive 
and did not respond to the provocation. 
In this year, Andersson had to threaten force whenever 
his way was barred to get his cattle through to.th~ 
Cape. 55 He had been assured of help by Abraham Swart-
booi, the son of old Willem who expressed his firm 
alliance with the traders and missionaries in this way. 
David Christian of Bethany, under pressure from Jan 
Boois, Paul Goliath and missionary .Kleinschmidt, 
actually allowed Andersson's cattle to pass through the 
veld of Bethany, whether they were sick or not. 56 
Apparently, Andersson persevered with his overtly 
provocative course of action. Having returned to 
53. Ibid., 3 and 4 April 1862. 
54. Ibid. , 3 April 1862. 
55. Quell en 3b, 30 August 1862. 
56. WA AP LI. 19 May 1862, 28 May 1862. . , 
~ .. , 
Namaland in 1863, he was harassed and insulted by one 
~ 
of Christian's men. Andersson promptly shot the man. 57 
While reporting the incident to Kaptein Christian, 
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Andersson sent for all Europeans and Hereros at Otjimbingwe 
who were willing to help him; guns and ammunition were 
issued to them. 
9.2.6 The Outbreak of Open Conflicts and the Battle at 
.Otjimbingwe, 15 June, 1863 
Meanwhile, the Hereros at Otjimbingwe were drilled in 
target shooting. 58 Trader Chapman related: ''This 
gave great offence to the Afrikane~. It was now 
observable that there was a move amongst the Damara 
people, and it appears that intrigues commenced between 
the Damaras at Otjimbingwe, and those in the service of 
the Afrikaners - messengers were going backward and 
forard, and the next movement was that some of these 
Damaras were off with their masters' flocks and herds, 
and .drove them into Otjimbingwe. The owners of the 
cattle came after them, on horseback, but the Damaras 
... protecte~ by one Phillipus (one of Andersson's 
'generals', see - . above) a missionary Damara, showed 
a bold front, and the Afrikaners, not having expected 
57. C.J. Andersson: Notes on Travel in South Africa, 
London, 1875, 15-20. 
58. See Chapter 7 for a note on the Herera-speaking 
inhabitants of Otjimbingwe. 
resistance in such form, re·turned 11 • 
It was only then that Kamaharero and his associates 
also decided to drive the Afrikaners' cattle which 
they were herding into Otjimbingwe. 59 
Kamaharero apparently made it clear to Andersson that 
they did not intend to steal the cattle, but neither 
60 did they wish to work as herdsmen any longer. This 
~meant that they wanted to breach part of the agreement 
with the Afrikaners. Andersson now wrote to Christian 
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saying that if Christian asked him, Andersson, he should 
t 11 h . t t 1 b k . d . t 1 61 Ch . t . ge a is ca e ac imme ia e y. r1s ian 
ignored this and set up a kommando consisting of Oasib, 
Piet Kopper and their men, some Topnaars, men from 
Gobabis, Hau-khoi servants and the "remaining cattle 
Damaras", altogether 400 to 500 men. They.attacked 
Otjimbingwe on June 15, 1863. 
This was the beginning of the traders' 'war of liberation'. 
Clearly Andersson had been urging the course of ev.ents 
in this direction. In this battle, the Afrikaners, 
and their allies, were terribly routed. Almost all 
59. CA G.H. 19/10, Chapman 'memo'. 
60. BRMG 1863, 342-343. 
61. CA GH. 19/10, Chaprr.an, 'memo'. 
. ' 
their riding oxen and powder wagons were captured. 
They appear to have lost more than a third of their 
men, including Piet Kopper and Christian Afrikaner. 62 
On the other side, 60 Herera-speakers were killect. 63 
Andersson had been supported by all the Europeans at 
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Ot jimbingwe, 64 their servants, his ''auxiliary corps 11 which 
~ .. 
had been practising target shooting and probably the 
group of "Otjimbingwe Volunteers". Kamaharero 
was not involved in this, nor were any of his men. 
The missionaries._noteg that Andersson had provided the 
fighters with advice as well as with arms and ammunition. 65 
This advice giving must not be underestimated at all 
because it was just as important as the ammunition. 
It not only involved target shooting but apparently 
was also of a strategic and tactical nature. This was 
most important because as we will see later, Herera-
speakers even in large numbers, were at that stage 
hopelessly inferior fighters in comparison with the 
62. Ibid., also BRMG 1863, 346-347. 
63. BRMG 1863, 347. 
6lt. As Kleinschmidt noted, the Europeans were not 
to be underestimated as a fighting force. 
"They are 40 Whites and with their Cape 
wagon drivers and those Damaras who are 
likely to follow them, they can afford to 
be daring 11 • BRMG 1862, 103. 
65. BRMG 1863, 348-349. 
Namaland kommandos, practised as the latter were in 
methods of bush warfare. Importantly, the core of 
fighting men in so far as they were Herero-speaking, 
in this and the subsequent battle were those very 
loose and largely unconnected groups who had been 
collecting around Otjimbingwe and Neu-Barmen for quite 
a few years already. They were the victims of 
Kamaharero and the Afrikariers' heavy taxation policies. 
Some of them had been working at the mines; others 
for resident Europeans, while others tried to live by 
agriculture under missionary guidance. Until the 
third violent encounter in June 1864, no organised 
military actions involving established Herera-speaking 
chiefs were made. 
Even though the conflicts had already progressed so 
far, the Afrikaners showed no desire to pursue this 
matter further, nor did the Herera-speaking Otjimbingwe 
residents. 66 This clearly indicates that the 
Afrikaners were prepared to have that part of the 
alliance cancelled and concede additional power to 
Kamaharero, so that he would be an ally on the very 
same terms as other Namaland Kapteins. These, as we 
uJ.<e 
saw, did not herd the Afrikaners'/\ or pay taxes. Jan, 
the successor of Christian, was even reported to be 
66. CA G H 19/10, Chapman 'memo'. 
considering formal peace moves but was hindered by 
internal splits and power struggles. 67 Not so the 
traders. 
9.3 THE YEAR 1864 




this time apparently with more active 
68 support from Kamaharero 1 led a kommando of Hereros 
in March 1864. against Windhoek with the purpose of 
raiding the Afrikaners. They gained considerable 
booty. Kleinschmidt estimated that 3 000 head of 
cattle were captured, as. well as 22. wagons which were 
destroyed by fire. 69 We must not misinterpret this 
incident by regarding the Herero-s~eakers as motivated 
solely by thoughts of booty, using Green and his 
resources to achieve their aims. The power and driving 
force was with the traders. Thus, it was noted by 
· the missionaries that the group of Hereros originally 
counted 1 500 men. However, only 1 200 - 1 300 were 
led against Windhoek because more than 200 left after 
67. BRMG 1863, 350. 
68. CA G·H 19/10, Chapman 'memo'. 




Green had their leader executed for "insubordination''.70 
The Afrikaners escaped in time. Soon afterwards a drove 
of 1 600 head of cattle was sent to the Cape, probably 
. 
part of the booty made by Green. He himself went to 
Walvis Bay to baord a ship for the Cape. However, 
this drove was intercepted by some Afrikaners and 
Hendrik Zes, the warrior king of the Afrikaner allies. 
After a fight in which several of Green's men lost their 
"lives, the Afrikaners seized all the cattle.71 
9.3.2 Hahn's Return from Germany and the Establishment 
of an Alliance With Kamaharero 
This showed that the action taken 
against the Afrikaners had so far proved insufficient 
to guarantee a safe overland trip·for Andersson's 
cattle. A much more aggressive ~ourse of action 
was obviously needed. When the news was broken to 
him. in April 1864 that his cattle were lost, Andersson 
decided not to board the ship but to return to 
Otjimbingwe .. At this stage, a new factor (in the 
short term) came into play. 
70. BRMG 1864, 245 . 
. 71. BRMG 1864, 245-246. 
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Hahn was returning from Germany with his society 1 s 
consent to establish missionaries and missionary 
assistants as traders and craftsmen in Otjimbingwe in 
order to support the Herera-mission in concrete, 
material terms. 72 Hahn was well-acqua~nted with Kamaharero 
who had been trying - cautiously, of course, - to get 
a missionary for himself for about 20 years, 73 in order 
to establish himself more independently of Jonker. 
The question now was whether Green and Andersson 
should not perhaps try, through Hahn, to involve 
Kamaharero and his sub-chiefs in their struggle. This 
was a new and risky suggestion because .an alliance with 
Herero chiefs would mean that the total control that 
Green and Andersson had so far enjoyed over their 
private corps would have to be shared. Still at the 
Bay, Andersson received two letters from Green and 
Hahn advising him not to enter into such an alliance. 
Green claimed that Kamaharero was unreliable and ''so 
void of any principle" that Andersson should not attempt 
72. It cannot be established from the available 
evidence whether Hahn's return was in any way 
related to the defeat of the Afrikaners at 
Otjimbingwe in the year before. However, it 
is likely. 
73. On Jonker's relations with Herera-speakers, 
see Chapter 7. 
any association with such people. Still, he noted 
that the Otjimbingwe Hereros were fully prepared to 
follow Andersson in battle. He·concluded that 
Kamaharero would have to call his chiefs togethe~ which 
would take time; the people he had called so far 
"appear rather indifferent about.coming in 
Hahn, writing in favour of such an alliance, also 
stressed the risks. He complained to Andersson that 
"the Hereros" had "no idea of a national feeling, they 
being the very essence of selfishnessn. Importantly 
he added that "had ... I not been continually driving 
and pushing on, and holding together, th~y would be 
scattered ill ; .. to all directions and none would have 
th~ought of doing the last thing for the benefit of the 
whole community ... Here is not a single Herero worth 
trusting". "The Hereros can be kept in order only 
by fear" he added, and consequently advised Andersson 
that he Tiought to have a small army, a few hundred 
men, quite dependent on you, who would keep them in 
order and obedience".75 Hahn concluded his letter by 
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firmly, assuring Andersson of "my and all the missionaries' 
fullest supp9rt 11 in case Andersson should decide to 
become commander of the combined forces. 76 
74. WA AP 5, Green to Ander~son, 12 May 1864. 




Eventually the concept of such an alliance was generally 
accepted, spurred on by heavy pressure from the large-
scale mobilisation that the Afrikaners were undertaking 
at the same time. The contempt for Herero-speakers, 
as well as fear of them, evident in Hahn's words, was 
obviously shared by Andersson and Green. After 
shooting "insubordinate" subjects promptly, Chapman 
had claimed that both men "openly confess(ed) that before 
the Damaras could be reduced to order it would be 
necessary to shoot one half of their number ... 11 77 
Andersson tried to minimise the risks he had to face. 
He had Kamaharero 'elected' as chief of all Herero-
~peakers by those around at Otjimbingwe. Then he 
made Kamaharero and some councillors write out and 
sign a document appointing him "as Regent and Military 
Commander for the period of his natural life or for as 
long as he desires to hold office. We promise to 
be faithful to him unconditionally in all matters con-
cerning his control over the internal and external 
circumstances of the country. Charles John Andersson 
is to be responsible only to God and his own conscience. 1178 
Even so, the difficulties of mobilisation were con-
siderable. It seems that there was no great interest 
77. CA G.H 19110, Chapman 'memo'. 
78. Quoted in Goldblatt: §WA, 33. 
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in or enthusiasm for the traders' and missionaries' 
war. Kamaharero had to write to Swartbooi, his ally, 
apologising for the delay in setting up the kommando. 
Green complained that after three weeks of lobbying he 
had only mustered 150 instead of 400 to 800 pe le. 
Some of Greedsand Andersson's supporters were drawn 
from the ranks of former Afrikaner servants. Green 
wrote to Andersson that Hau-khoi around Otjimbingwe 
were now to be collected by force as their ·chief did 
·not seem to be willing or capable of doing so, as he 
promised. "He is one of the run-aways from the 
Hottentots (Afrikaners, B.L.) and I guaranteed him 
protection from the other Damaras ... upon his expressing 
his willingness to accompany this kommando". 79 
All this was clearly entirely unrelated to a "war of 
liberation" of Herero-speakers. Andersson and Green 
had certain long-term motivations like the opening 
of the northern and eastern hunting veld. Another 
important goal seems to have been very short-term 
plunder. Apart from seizing very large numb~rs of 
cattle from the Afrikaners and then sending them to the 
Cape for sale (as noted above), Green once remarked 
79. WA AP 5, Green to Andersson, 3 June 1864. 
Swartbooi 's active participation 
1
by sending 
a kommando was probably due to pressure 
from missionary Kleinschmidt who was Hahn's 
closest friend. 
casually that he bought a horse from J. Chapman for 
the enormous price of £40, planning to "pay him in 
cattle from whatever I may get after the return of 
80 
the kommando as my share". 
9.3.3 Military Preparations and the Engagement Between 
Andersson's Forces and the Afrikaners, 22 June 1864 
While Otjimbingwe became a military fort with entrench-
·ments and other earthworks, regular target shooting 
and strategic classes81 , "the Afrikaners and their 
friends had been mobilising ever since Green's raid. 
in March of the same year. They sent out messages 
to other Namaland Kapteins "to come and help them, 
Andersson and the missionaries wanted to take the 
82 
country away". The actions of the kommandos came 
to be focussed .~trict_l_y on the missionaries and the 
traders. This in itself is a significant reflection 
of the nature of Herera involvement. 83 For example, 
Jan Jonker's son wrote a letter to Governor Wodehouse 
iri 1869 after their struggle had been lost. In it 
80. WA AP 5, Green to Andersson, 24 May 186Li. 
81. BRMG 1264, 181. 
82. BRMG 1864, 178. 
83. This was expressed by missionary Brincker in 
1863 already, see BRMG 1864, 177. Andersson 
once quoted Jan Jonker as saying to Hahn: 
II you preach war to the Damaras when you 
have only or should only have come amongst 
them to preach and teach them oeace and ~ood 
will." WA AP 5, 12 Nov. 1864.· 
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he asked for a missionary. With reference· to ·Hahn's 
activities in Otjimbingwe, he insisted that a German 
missionary would be unacceptable, "because it is not 
possible for a teacher to instruct people while he 
likes trade,· better than the bible". 8 ~. 
Th~ offensive started by the Afrikaners when they 
took Andersson's cattle in March 1864, was seriously 
delayed. This was to prove a great disadvantage 
because it gave Andersson and Hahn all the time th~y 
needed to set up and prepare a very large kommando · 
against the Afrikaners. 
One of the immediate obstacles to the success of 
their mobilisation efforts was the substantial effort 
that had to be diverted to preventing Herero-speaking 
and other dependants from deserting ·to Ot jimbingwe. 85 
Another difficulty proved to be the reaching of 
consensus among the allies. By the beginning of 
1864, a large force of about 600 men (150 of them on 
horseback) were collecting around Rehoboth, consisting 
of Afrikaners, · Topnaars · ·, and Oasi b' s and Hendrik 
Zes' men. They threatened to attack Rehoboth. 
However, apparently they could not agree whether they 
should first attack Rehoboth and then Otjimbingwe, or 
84. CA G. H 19/10, Jan Jonker to Governor, 22 
April 1869. 
85~ BRMG 1864, 178. 
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the other way round. When the decision went in 
favour of Rehoboth, a considerable number of the 
kommando from the Gai-//khaun went home for entirely 
. 86 
obscure reasons. Thereafter, it took the allies 
some weeks to reassemble. They did not have enough 
time to attack Rehoboth before clashing with Andersson's 
army. 
In the meantime, Andersson had managed to muster about 
, 2 500 men. "About 600 of these were furnished with 
firearms of all sorts of sizes", 1 000 had assegais and 
spears, and the rest had knobkierries, 
8'7 
bows and arrows. 1 
After a festive farewell service when Hahn addressed 
the departing army in front of the new 'national flag 188 
they began to march to Rehoboth to collect another 
kommando, and then to meet Jan and his friends. On 
the way, which took more than two weeks, their only 
provisions were ransacked from Hau-khoi villages. 
For example, Andersson recorded on Ju,ne 21 that they 
"more or less surprised some Bergdamara-werfts but 
got little for our pains - a fe~ hundred sheep and 
· goats". 89 
86. BRMG 1864, 292, 332-335. 
87~ WA AP 5, 8 June 1864 - 22 June 1864. 
88. T. Baines, who happened to witness this event, 
made a drawing of it. A good reproduction 
is in J. Wallis: Fortune My Foe, London, 
1936. 320. 
/ 
89. WA AP 5, 21 July 1864. Later in the same day 
tfiey were lucky enough to "get 11 "50 - 60 nice 
c.attle .and about 400 sheep and goats and are 
now provisioned for a week or so". Ibid. 
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The forces engaged on 22 June, 1864, and the Afrikaners 
retreated after a day's fighting. They may not have 
actually been defeated, but neither did they emerge 
as victors. 90 Andersson received a major wound in 
his l~g which did not heal and slowly sapped his 
strength away. He realised his assets in Otjimbingwe 
and died from a fever only a few years later in 
Ovamboland, in 1867. 
9.3.4 The Destruction of Rehoboth 
After this engagement, the Rehobothers knew that 
they were in a very precarious position indeed. They 
decided to leave=Rehoboth altogether and to move 
closer to Otjimbingw~. On their way, however, they 
were surprised by an Afrikaner kommando, had their 
cattle taken, their wagons burnt, se~eral men wounded 
and others taken prisoner (who, however, later escaped). 91 
Kleinschmidt and his family walked through the bush 
for four days, to Otjimbingwe, .where Kleinschmidt died 
soon afterwards from exposure. Apparently he had 
also been inconsolable about the routing of 'his' 
Rehobothers. 92 
90. BRMG 1864, 376. 
91. WA AP 5, 22 .Aug. 1864, also 8 Oct. 1864. 
92. BRMG 1864, 137-145. The Hehobothers, however,. 
regrouped at Ameib a few years late~,- see 
BRMG 1868, 295. 
9.3.5 Andersson's War 
,:-' 
By October of the same year, the myth of a "Herero 
war of liberation" had gained full stature. Andersson 
now began to talk of "the war of independence of the 
Damaras~. 93 He insisted on this interpretation from 
then onwards. A little later he recorded a long 
conversation with Kamaharero who apparently told 
him "that Abraham Swartbooi (old Willem's son, B.L.) 
is unfriendly to me and every other white man. Speaks 
of wanting payment for the people killed in the war 
which was my war and not theirs!!! How sick I am of 
this hum bug". 94 
The 'independent Damaras' appear to have become rather 
frightened, even intimidated by their experience of 
the confrontation in June and the spectacle of the 
powerful Rehobothers in retreat. Kamaharero and his 
followers had deserted Otjimbingwe and its surroundings 
and communications between him arid the Europeans seem 
to have broken down. 95 Thus, when the Rehobothers 
(who were located temporarily near Otjirnbingwe after 
regrouping) wanted to go on another kommando in 
Noyember to attack Jan Jonker and his allies, they 
93. WA AP 5, 25 Oct. 1864. 
91~. WA~P 6, 7 .. Tune, 1866. Emphasis in the original. 
95. WA AP 5 1 21 Jan. 1865. 
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9.3.5 Andersson's War 
By October of the same year, the myth of a 11 Herero 
war of liberation" had gained full stature. Andersson 
now began to talk of "the war of independence of the 
Damaras 11 • 93 He insisted on this interpretation from 
then onwards. A little later he recorded a long 
conversation with Kamaharero who apparently told 
him "that Abraham Swartbooi (old Willem's son, B.L.) 
is unfriendly to me and every other white man. Speaks 
of wantin~ payment for the people killed in the war 
which was my war and not theirs!!! How sick I am of 
this humbug". 94 
The 'independent Damaras' appear to have become rather 
frightened, even intimidated by their experience -0f 
the confrontation in June and the spectacle of the 
powerful Rehobothers in retreat. Kamaharero and his 
followers had deserted Otjimbing~e and its surroundings 
and communications between him arid the Europeans seem 
to have br~ken down. 95 Thus, when the Rehobothers 
(who were located temporarily near Otjimbingwe after 
regrouping) wanted to go.on another kommando in 
November to attack Jan Jonker and his allies, they 
I 
93. WA AP 5, 25 Oct. 1864. 
91i. WA~P 6, 7 Ju.ne, 1866. Emphasis in the original. 
95. WA AP 5, 21 Jan. 1865. 
329 
failed to convince any of the remaining Otjimbingwe 
Hereros to join them. By late December the news of 
a "Hottentot kommando" of about 200 men heading for 
Neu-Barmen reached Otjimbingwe. 96 By that.time all 
Hereros had abandoned Otjimbingwe. The Europeans 
became very frightened and Andersson noted that 
"Mr. Hahn thinks with me that every white man will 
now try and make the best terms he can with the 
Hottentots 11 • 97 
9.4 THE FOCUS OF THE WAR SHIFTS AWAY FROM DAMARALAND 
There was another reason for this assessment of the 
situation. The same kommando that had beaten the 
Rehobothers now attacked Gibeon . The Witboois 
....... ~ ·-
under Kida had settled with a missionary just.the 
year before, which meant, as I indicated,that they, 
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though old friends of the Afrikaners, had put themselves 
on the other side ol the frontline. 
I 
Although they 
had not yet been actively engaged _a_gainst_ the 
Afrikaners, they also had not helped them to fight 
Andersson's army. It also appears that the Kapteins 
in the south (all with m~ssionaries) had indirectly 
taken the field against the Afrikaners by concluding 
9 6 • Ibid . , 2 6 Dec . 1 8 6 4 • 
97 ~ Ibid., 30 Dec. 1864. 
mutual agreements not to allow any traders from Angra 
Pequena or the Cape to pass through to the allies. 98 
The attack against Gibeon initiated a series of 
skirmishes between Gibeon (later supported by kommandos 
from Berseba while David Christian insisted on his 
'neutrality') and the Afrikaners with their associates. 
This first time, in early December 1864, the Afrikaners' 
attack seemed by way of a warning. Their violence 
was focussed entirely on the missionary. The fight 
·took place around his house, not at the werft, and 
the fire was aimed at him for a whole day. He was 
only slightly wounded, though. 99 Apparently no cattle 
posts were raided and no other booty taken, and the 
kommando retreated after two days. 
9.4.1 Intrigues Against Traders 
The missionaries and the traders had, however, been 
needlessly afraid because the Afrikaners had not 
suc6eeded in replenishing their provisions of ammuni-
tion. .They withheld from attacking Otjimbingwe, 
vulnerable though it was. This was due to Hahn's 
and others' intrigues which will be considered below. 
98. BRMG 1865, 178. 
99. BRMG 1865, 179. 
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Andersson might have been a very powerful trader, 
but he certainly did not hold a monopoly. Throughout 
the years under discussion there were traders who 
remained loyal to their old clients and continued 
to provide the Afrikaners with arms and ammunition. 
One of them, Trader Smith, was threatened with deten-
tion by Hereros who were 'blocking his way to the 
Afrikaners in 1864. 
l 
Another one, Iversen, at Arries 
(near Windhoek) made strong statements indicating 
that in the event of Smith's detention, he would then 
place himself at the head of the Namaquas and bring 
him (Smith, B.L.) 'out' or die in the attempt 11 • 100 
Apparently Andersson's methods were finding imitators. 
On his return to Otjimbingwe, Iversen brought a letter 
from Jan Jonker. Andersson commented: "They (the 
Afrikaners, B.L.) expect old Smith with lots of goods 
and may only be delaying their attack (on Otjimbingwe, 
B.L.) until he is extricated. What a sell if the 
Damaras were to detain Iverson also! 11 • 101 It does 
not seem as if the Afrikaners ever received the much 
needed goods. When Iversen and Stewardson (another 
of the Afrikaners' traders) left Otjimbingwe with one 
of Smith's wagons, Andersson noted in not really 
flattering words: "Mr. Hahn told me the other day that 
100. Ibid., 31 October 1864. 
101. WA AP 5, 12 Nov. 1864. 
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it was an understood thing that in the event of 
Stewardson and Smith proceeded via Barmen (sic) 
the Damaras were to stop them, whilst if they went 
by the Mine road the Rehobothers were to cut them 
off! What damned treachery! Why not stop the poor 
people at once ... What raskallity! 11 • 102 
9.4.2 The Afrikaners at Gobabis 
Instead the Afrikaner kommando directed its steps to 
Gobabis. The Gobabis people are an interesting case 
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because this was the only group who had always been 
allied to Jonker, yet had Seen committed to a missionary 
in ways very similar to Rehoboth or Bethany. In 
these times of polarisation it seems that they got 
the worst of both sides. Amraal and his son had died 
of smallpox at the end of 1864. Shortly afterwards, the 
Mbanderu, the eastern section of Herera-speakers, 
who had been involved in servile relationships with 
Amraal's men, raided Gobabis and seized whatever they 
\ l\ ,., 
102. Ibid., 14 Nov. 1864. Iversen, having been 
thoroughly indoctrinated by Hahn about the 
nature of Jan Jonker and his group· , apparently 
left for some other destiny. 18 months 
later he was employed by Hahn as a tradesman and agent of 
the Rhenish Mission Society at the Bay~ Shortly 
after he began his new job, he was killed 
by the Afrikaners, see RMS KP 1866, paragraph 
3; BRMG 1868, 243. 
could get. · They retreated first to Neu-Barmen, then 
further inland. 103 As the Afrikaners' hold over 
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subordinate Herero-speakers weakened, so did that of the 
Gobabis people. Shortly after this raid by Mbanderus 
(in December/January 1864/65), Jan Jonker and some 
associates marched into Gobabis, .being unable to attack 
Otjimbingwe due to lack of ammunition. Interestingly 
they did not come to help Andries-Lambert and his 
council against the Mbanderus. They only came to 
' raid and plunder the m~ssionar_y 's_ and his assistant's 
houses with all their assets such as ivory and a herd 
104 of cattle raised to cover missionary expenses. 
Their intentions again$t the Gobabis leadership 
remained rather hostile. As the missionaries noted: 
"now Jan Jonker Afrikaner is almost the Kaptein of 
lOr:;: 
Go ba bis" . ::> The Gobabis people split up after this. 
Some allied themselves with Jan, others went to join 
Kido Witbooi and his men, 106 but apparently they never 
took the field against the Afrikaners in any way. 107 
,. 
103. BRMG 1866, 276, 247-248; see also T. Sunder-
meier: Mbanderu, 17-31. 
104. BRMG 1866, 154. Even before all of the 
missionary's assistant's cattle was stolen 
by some of Oasib's men, see BRMG 1865, 277. 
· 105. BRMG 1866, 154. 
106. BRMG 1866,47. 
107. BRMG 1866 
9.4.3 More Conflicts in the South 
After intercepting a trader with a load of ammunition 
on his way to Gobabis in March 1865, 108 another attack 
was made by the Afrikaners on the Gibeon group who had 
not responded to the first warning. A number of 
cattle posts were now raided by the Afrikaner kommando. 
Men from Gibeon and Berseba (with full missionary 
support) promptly started in pursuit of this kommando 
. and captured six horses, 22 riding_ oxen, guns and 
some lea~. Soon after that they ·raided a rather la~ge 
109 'enemy werft'. This indicates that raids and 
counter-raids, unlike before, were now proceeding 
under missionary supervision. 
9.5 THE SECOND ATTACK ON OTJIMBINGWE 
Oasib and his kommando, being closest to Gibeon and 
Berseba, suffered most from these skirmishes. Still, 
many of his men joined the Afrikaners for another 
major attack on Otjimbingwe in·September 1865. Hendrik 
Zes and his followers followed suit. The ambivalence 
and importance surrounding missionaries can be seen 
clearly in the prelude to this attack. The kommando 
moved a~ainst Neu-Barmen where missionary Brincker 
108. H. Vedder: Early Times, 370. 
109. BRMG 1866. 35-36. 
335 
was stationed. They stayed there for several days, 
ransacking the place thoroughly. Brincker's life 
was apparently only saved by Jan Jonker who, by that 
stage, probably doubted that he could win this war 
. th t . . t llO A B . k t d w1 _ gu m1ss1onary supper . s r1nc er no e , 
the attack on Otjimbingwe took place on a. Sunday, in 
the afternoon. "This was contrary to the Nama's 
usual habits for it was customary for them to attack 
in the early morning. Hendrik Zes had, however, 
· insisted that the baptism of blood should take place 
or1 a Sunday afternoon 11 • 111 
This time things went very badly indeed for the 
Afrikaners. The Rehobothers (not Kamaharero) had 
sent a large kommando to the defence of Otji~bingwe and 
Oasib's men apparently took to flight after the first 
shots, and so did the rest of the kommando. They 
were pursued and in the ensuing fight Hendrik Zes was 
killed, 33 wagons burnt and another eight captured. 112 
This was a crippling blow. Jan now tried to get a 
missionary so as to ensure access to ammunition and 
other goods, but, as Brincker commented: "They cannot 
get one, because they have no peace, no country, no 
cattle anymore; indeed, their ammunition is finished 
113 and they cannot buy anymore ... 11 Jan's next 
110. BRMG 1866, 47. 
111. Quellen, 28, Brincker 1865. 
112. W~ AP 6, Hahn to Andersson, 2 Nov. 1865. 
113. BRMG 1866, 40-41. 
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move was to visit 'neutral' David Christian in a 
final attempt to win him as an ally (and thus access 
to trade goods via Angra Pequena). He ·told David 
that they had to do away with the missionaries if 
things were to go better. David Christian replied 
clearly and revealingly: "I migh~ have given in 
to alcohol but I am not yet as far down as to do 
something against our teachers. 
it is only because of them 11 • 114 
If I still manage 
9.6 OASIB'S DEFEAT 
For the next two years it appears that Jan Jonker and 
some of his men, though nbt all, retreated from the 
battlefield into more eastern regions. 115 In these 
two years, the focus of conflict moved away from 
Otjimbingwe and Herero-speakers and ttirned towards 
114. Quellen 3b, 15 March 1866. 
115. BRMG 1867, 49. There is very little evidence 
on what happened to the women and children 
while the men were engaged in skirmishes 
all over the country. Weber once stated: 
"The poor women and children. with the 
remaining men are like the hunted and chased 
game". BRMG 1867, 102-103. 
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the more southerly regions of Namaland. There 
was a most complicated and continuous process of 
reshuffling of forces, alternating between hostile 
clashes, reconciliations and attempted alliances, 
followed by sharper clashes. The degree of violence 
increased. A climax came with the utter defeat of 
Oasib, who in all this was the Kaptein most representative 
of the Afrikaners' side. While we cannot examine this 
phase in allits detail, it does seem that fundamental 
· to these conflicts were deep splits within and between 
the groups of Bethany, Berseba and Gibeon. There 
was a war party and 'the better minded' in all the 
three places. Some of Kido's men in oarticular . ~ 
were not always sure whether they should stand by their 
alliance with the missionary (the 'better minded') 
or possibly join Oasib's kommandos (the 'war partyt). 
Weber noted that the situation in Namaland by late 
1866 was growing "worse and ever more complicated ... 
Almost everywhere quarrels and feuds emerge. Here 
in Berseba too not everything is peaceful anymore. 
About 8 - 10 men have rebelled against the authorities 
(the raad, B.L.) and collected followers. 14 days 
ago there was a fight between Berseba men and rebels 11116 
The same was reported of the Gibeon group where an 
11£. BRMG 1866, 376. 
"evil minded party" had formed. 117 Weber felt 
compelled to say that "the war in Namaqualand is 
only a war for cattle, sheep and goats and that is 
precisely why it is so boring and of such sad and 
118 complex consequences". Missionary Vollmer, who 
had been with Oasib intermittently over the past years 
found himself right between the grinding fronts and 
did not survive. 119 
117. BRMG 1867, 356. This missionary terminology 
indicates that there were people in the 
community who questioned ~heir leaders' 
firm commitment to the missionaries. 
118 . BRM3 18 6 7 , 10 6 -107 . 
119. Although Oasib had clearly allied with the 
Afrikaners, his one-time missionary Vollmer 
returned to Hoachanas after he had been 
a.way for some time. . Oasi b had to move 
ihto a hide-away because he was threatened 
by a kommando from Gibeon and Berseba 
and Vollmer had to go with him, although 
he was ill at the time. After an engage-
ment with the Witboois and people from 
Berseba, Oasib and his men had to escape 
quickly and left Vollmer behind. He was 
found by Witbooi and P. Goliath, who took 
care of him, but he died shortly afterwards. 
His widow now had to stay with the Witbooi's 
kommando and could only reach Gibeon 
after Oasib was completely defeated. 
See BRMG 1867, 225-233. 
339 
, J 
The degree of violence increased alarmingly. While 
previously skirmishes had concentrated on cattle, 
as with the kommandos sent against Gibeon, the very 
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people who had vigorously opposed the official 
introduction of the death sentence 20 years earlier, 120 
were now carrying out executions. In a series of 
engagements between Oasib's and Kido's kommandos, the 
latter once executed 30 of Oasib's men who had been 
taken prisoner, while the Gai-//khaun kommando shot 
· seven prisoners at Gibeon. This was over and above 
the peo~le who were killed in battle. 121 
Shortly before 'that, late in 1866, the composition 
of the opposing forces had changed to Oasib's disad-
vantage in that Kaptein Tseib, one of his former sub-
chiefs, decided to accept.a m~ssionary at his 
'headquarters' at Zwartmorast. This meant he was 
lost as an ally. 
In October 1867 Oasib and his men had been compelled 
to take flight after a skirmish with a Gibeon and 
Berseba kommando. The latter pursued them and at a 
place near Rehoboth managed to overwhelm Oasib's 
kommando so conclusively that they were able to take 
-------·-------------~-----
120. See Chapters 14 and 5 . 
121. BRMG 1867, 105. 
"all the cattle, sheep and goats, wagons and domestic 
. 122 
utensils". Oasi b died very shortly afterwards 
and his son Barnabai began to sue for peace. 123 
9.7 THE LAST ATTACK ON OTJIMBINGWE 
Although Barnabas agreed to a 'peace treaty' with the 
southern Kapteins, he rejoined the Afrikaners' forces. 
Jan Jonker, having recovered apparently, attacked 
Otjimbingwe together with his allies for the third 
time on December 13, 1867. As Hahn noted, they had 
been "without doubt" supported by "many from the 
south" (i.e. anti-missionary people from Berse ba, Be-
thany and Gibeon), "because the Red Nation, Jan 
Afrikaner and Jan Boois could not lead such a number 
of people into the·field 11 • 124 They.were fairly 
successful and Hahn claimed they had poisoned their 
bullets. After dusk they went to Anawood, near 
Otjimbingwe, and rested, providing themselves well 
with cattle and 30 bushels of grain. A large part 
of the captured cattle were sent to Barnabas' cattle 
posts. Jan Jonker took a cart which he found at 
Anawood and went to Walvis Bay. On his way he raided 
a trader at Salem, took all the missionaries's provisions 
which were stored on the Swakop R~ver awaiting 
122. BRMG 1867, 232. 
123. BRMG 1867, 359. 
124. BRMG 1867, 301. 
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distribution further inland, stripped the shop 
belonging to Andersson's widow at the Bay and destroyed 
the missionary printing press at Rooibank. Other 
Afrikaner parties essayed to raid Herero-cattle posts, 
. t . f t. 125 JUS as in ormer imes. 
In the meantime something entirely unexpected had 
happened. As Hahn explained, for the Hereros at 
Otjirnbingwe, especially Maharero and Zeraua, this battle 
had been a defeat. They were demoralised because, 
after so many defeats, the Afrikaners had almost taken 
Otjimbingwe. Then, a few days later, on 22 December 
1867, a kommando from Otjimbingwe surprised Jonker's 
kommando in Anawood. The Afrikaners and their allies 
were entirely defeated, in what Hahn called a "blood-
bath". 
This occurred after Andersson's death. But his friend 
and ally Hahn was then active and reckoned that the 
Afrikaner kommando would never have been routed at 
Anawood had it not been for his incitement of the 
Otjimbingwe men. Chiefs Kamaharero and Zeraua had 
become very anxious. "No body would have undertaken 
anythin& against the Namaquas if Green and I had not 
requested the young men (at Otjimbingwe, B.L.) to do 
so. Independent of the frightened chiefs, about 800 
---------------




for Anawood and initiated the massacre. 
The Afrikaners did not recover from this blow. 
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Immediately after this, Herera-speakers began to abandon 
Otjimbingwe. Eventually the entire Herera-speaking 
community moved away in the wake of a 'pagan reaction' . 127 
(This cannot be explored here any further). At about 
the same time, the Afrikaners and their ·associates 
collected once more around Rehoboth. The missionaries 
and other Europeans now without any Berero protection, 
felt more threatened than ever in all the war years. 
Petitions were sent tQ the Cape and to London; 
Fabri, Hahn's colonial-minded frienct·· of the Society, even. 
petitioned the King of Prussia. 128 An English warship 
was sent from the Cape to be stationed at Walvis Bay. 129 
However, the kommando did not attack Otjimbingwe. 
They could no longer afford to offer battle without the 
hope of booty in the form of cattle, and there were 
no more cattle at Otjimbingwe. 
Large numbers of Herera-speakers and their herds were 
beginning to concentrat·e around Okahand ja, Kamaharero 
and jonker's old headquarters. The number was 
126. BRMG 1869, 260. My emphasis. 
127. BRMG 1868, 243. See also Sundermeier: 
Mbanderu, 51. 
128. ~oldblatt: SWAi 40. 
129. BRMG 1868,357-358. 
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estimated to be around 20 000. 130 Towards the end 
of 1868 the Afrikaner kommando prepared to r~id this 
place, but the chiefs at Okahandja had been forewarned 
by Hahn. For the Afrikaner kommando this skirmish 
meant a final defeat. They could only escape, 
abandoning most of their remain{ng possessions. 
9.8 THE 1870 'PEACE' CONFERENCES 
When we take a brief look at the 'official' confirmation 
of the downfall of the Afrikaners and their allies, we 
again see clearly that Kamaharero and the Afrikaners 
had not been inherently antagonistic towards each 
other. Their alliance and ~riendship was broken up by 
traders and missionaries who exploited the one fundamental 
I 
.. difference between them, namely that Kamaharero had 
herds of cattle, and the Afrikaners did not. 
A series of moves between the various Kapteins and the 
missionaries to negotiate peace had been unsuccessful. 
Jan Jonker arrived unexpectedly at Okahandja with a 
very large kommando of about 1 000 men on May 17, 1870, 
·to meet Kamaharero. Hahn was not present and Jan and 
Kamaharero, with the assistance of missionaries Brincker, 
Diehl and Irle, quietly renewed their old alliance 
130. BRMG 1869, 261. 
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on slightly different terms. In Goldblatt's words, 
"Jan Jonke~ was proclaimed as Kamaharero's co-regent 111 31 • 
However, the basis for such "co-regency" as far as the 
Afrikaners were concerned, had been eroded completely: 
any claims that the Afrikaners had to political 
power had been negated. When Hahn arrived at Okahandja, 
he succeeded in negotiating a second 'peace treaty' whose 
terms defined the Afrikaners' diminished power status 
in writing. He stated "that Kaptein Jan Jonker 
Afrikaner has. obtained no right whatsoever to interfete 
or meddle with the affairs of the Herero people or 
their land nor with foreigners living in or travelling 
among them. 111 32 Apparently it was also at the time 
of finalising the Afrikaners' defeat, that Hahn, in a 
final bid to prevent Jan and Kamaharero from renewing 
their alliance, obtained permission from Kamaharero to 
ensure that the Basters settled in Rehoboth. The 
Basters had migrated to Namaland ·in the late 1860s 
coming from the C~pe. Their settlement at Rehoboth 
successfully acted as a "buffer" between Jan and 
Kamaharero. 133 
This treaty merely set the seal on a situation that 
had already been in existence for at least two years. 
1 "">l ~ ld 1 <::'J /\ . Ii J. uo batt: ~  Lh. 
132. Ibid., 46. My emphasis. 
133. Quellen 30, 8 March 1873. 
The ·toll had been heavy. Years of warfare had devas-
tated Namaland. When Hahn left for the Cape in 
1873, he noted when travelling through the devastated 
regions: "How different it looked around here hardly 
10 years ago! The war had enough incredible 
consequences - Namaland always gave you the impression 
... of a sparsely populated country; but now it's 
just about frightening; everything seems to be extinct, 
as in a large charnel~house". 134 





The downfall of the Afrikaners marks the beginning of 
colonial conquest and leads fr~m one historical epoch into 
the next. Yet, the social process in Namaland and 
Damaraland did not stop, nor did it even pause slightly. 
By way of conclusion I shall take a cursory glance at 
the decades following 1870. My aim here is to point to 
. new questions arising from arguments presented in this 
thesis. Hopefully they may facilitate a better under-
standing of the years up to 1907. 
Most Namaland Kapteins were utterly impoverished by the 
beginning of the 1870s. Those who had not been involved 
directly with a missionary were abandoned by most of their 
'followers~ Hahn, for instance, on his trip to the Cape, met 
Hulda, wife of Barnabas of the Gai-//Khaun, near Rehoboth. 
He noted that Barnabas' followers were ''completely im-
poverished ... The tribe is still rather numerous but 
entirely scattered ... n· 1 Jan Jonker who finally a~uired a 
missionary (although not an English one as he h~d wanted) 2 
apparently was too poor to support him.3 Furthermore, he 
. 1 . . . l 4 was virtua ly living on his own when the missionary arrivec . 
1 • Quellen 30, Hahn's H'eimreise, 1873. ----
2. See chapter 9 
3. Quell en 30, Hahn's Heimr·eise, 18'{3 
lL RMS KPB IV, Liune 1871 
The situation among Topnaars at the Bay was similar. 5 
Hahn was led to believe in 1873 that the 'Namaquas' were 
really hunter/gatherers and not pastoralists at all. 6 
Palgrav~, Special Commissioner from the Cape, who was 
sent up in 1876; most interestingly found only 1 500 
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'Namaqua' inhabitants in Namaland but 3 000 'BushmenJ and 
30 000 'Bergdamara'. 7 This was a significant assessment, 
not only as far as the degree of impoverishment among the 
groups went, but it is also an interesting reflection on 
the still popular 'tribal' classification. We shall return 
to the question of classification a little later. 
After the 'Peace Conference' of 1870, peace prevailed for 
about a decade. The reasons for this were most probably 
related to the tremendous expansion of trade. The traders 
had won their war, and this was subsequently of use to 
them. New opportunities had been opening up ever since the 
restrictions placed on the exploitation of the northern and 
the eastern hunting veld by the Afrikaners and their 
a~sociates, were lifted. Traders were able to supply 
Herero-speaking chiefs with as many guns and ammunition as 
·lhe traders deemed necessary. Thus, the new situation was 
5. CA G. 50...!77 P8.lg;rave-: Report, 6-7 
6. Quellen 30, Hahn's Heimreise, 1873. 
7. CA G. 50J77, Palgrave: Report, 83. This estimate was 
probably not adequate, see figures on population 
estimates, ch.4. 
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qualitatively different from when the role of traders 
had been merely that of supplying the kommando groups -
with what they required. Subsequently, their role became 
an extractive one as nobody any longer had the power to 
restrict them from exploiting the country's products or 
resources directly. They hunted ivory and ostrich 
feathers, then sold them at the Cape. This had not been 
possible under the Afrikaners who kept tight controls on 
the exploitation of the northern and eastern hunting 
veld. Now, Kapteins only tried to profit from the new 
situation as much as possible. 
Hahn's attempt to monopolise this new trade by formi.ng the 
Mission Trading Company, 8 must be seen in the context of· 
. 
newly emerging conflicts between traders and the missionar1 es 
who still feared for their success in Damaraland. However, 
this attempt at monopolisation quite possibly also 
represented renewed endeavours to prevent the Afrikaners 
and their associates from making use of any new avenues 
of s~pply. The kommandos wer~ no longer a fighting force, 
and this suited both the missionaries and the traders. It 
soon appeared that although the Mission Trading Company 
did not operate at a loss, it could not expect to achieve a 
monopoly position either. It certainly had no major effect 




Quellen 30, Hahn to Society, 25 March 1870. See aiso 
Loth-: Mi.ssion, 32. 
In mid-1871 there were still only 69 adult Herera-speakers 
in Otjirnbingwe who were baptised, see HMS KPB V, 1871. 
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The remarkable expansion of trade can be easily demonstrated. 
In 1878 Palgrave reported that there were five wholesale 
and retail stores in the area, and about 100 wagons and 
othe~ vehicles "engaged in trading and hunting pursuitstl.lO 
He further noted that Otjimbingwe had a population of about 
1 1 2 000 people. ·. Theophilus Hahn, a trader himself, 
~entioned that "there are about 3 000 regular ostrich 
hunters in this country" and 30-40 traders. 12 The mission-
ary Hahn noted that in 1873 a trader Grendon was building 
fa big house for himself in Okahandja. Another had built a 
house and a big store in Windhoek. About Rehoboth (where 
the Basters were now settled), he noted: "The store in the 
centre of the place is a pretty building and towers above 
everything;it yields a lot of income for the people and 
their wealth increases by the hour. 111 3 
The Namaland Kapteins 1 participation in the trade had 
moved away from cattle (which they no longer could 
extort from Herera-speaking subordinates) to ivory and 
ostrich feathers. Toget~er with European hunters, traders 
and missionary agents, they went into the northern and 
eastern hunting veld. Palgrave stated that the annual 
export from the territory consisted mainly of 34 000 lbs ~ 
ivory and 5 000 lbs of ostri.ch feathers but only 3 000 oxen. 
)/ He added: "The gross value of each year's export may be 
10.lABBNA (Cape) 1879, Palgrave to Secretary, 1 July 1871. 
1 1 • C ~ G · . 5 0 -'7 7 , Pa 1 grave : Report , 12 . 
12. Ibid., Hahn to Magistrate, 21 Oct. 1872, Ann.11 
13. Quellen 30, Hahn's Heimreise, 1873. 
estimated at £ · 45 000 ... ,/4 
As far as imports were concerned, in the second half of 
the 1870s these included annually 1 000 guns, mainly to 
Hereros, 39 600 lbs of coffee; 51 000 lbs of sugar and 
10 000 lbs of soap. 15 Yet the main recipients here were 
Herera-speakers; Namaland Kapteins were imp.....,overished and 
were no longer able to control the trade. 
Palgrave commented .about Andries Lambert and 300 men 
staying north of Gobabis at the time that they had no 
cattle and lived by hunting. 16 As far as the eastern 
hunting veld was concerned, extra money could apparently 
only be made by Kapteins through charging licence fees for 
351 
hunting and trading. Theophilus Hahn wrote from Kho es: '' ... 
this place is one of the chief places along the Eastern 
Ka~ahari for feather trading; people of all directions 
come in _here, and here is no jurisdiction. The country where 
the Veldskoendraers do their robberies and violence, 
belong to the said Willem Christian ... They, the aforesaid 
Veldskoendraers, take from a trader £ 15 licence fee 
where the same trader had paid already to Willem Christian 
£ 4. licence- fee (sic)." l 7 A. Anderson, not a trader but an 
14. CA G. 50J77, Palgrave: Report, 83. This figure is 
probably inflated as PaJ.grave tried to con vi nee the 
Cape Government that the territory was able to support 
a British magistrate. 
15. CA GH 19/10, A. Ohlsson: 'memo' 
16. CA G 50~'77, Palgrave: R~ort, 55 
17. Ibid., T. Hahn, to Magistrate, 21 Oct. 1872, Ann.11 
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explorer busy on a 'survey' of the south-western part 
of Africa, also complained to the Cape Govemmen t that 
"every petty captein claims a.licence fee" for hunting, 
passing through and trading. Apparently the people did 
not shy away from helping themselves if the traders 
reje~ted their demands. 18 
However, as indic~ted, this must be viewed as rather weak 
attempts to retain minimal controls over territories and 
resources which formerly had been exploited by the Kapteins 
and their raads alone. 
In view of these developments the question arises why the 
trade was still focussed on what Namaland Kapteins could 
provide rather than on tapping the truly enourmous herds 
of cattle possessed by Herero-speaking chiefs.in 
Damaraland. Why should ostrich feathers and tusks remain 
so significant, now that all political restrictions to 
access to Herera cattle had fallen away? 
It seems to me that the answer to this question must be 
sought in differences between the cattle-owning Herera-
chiefs and Ehe kommando groups. These differences 
existed and were maintained throughout the 19th century. 
18. CA GH 18/12, Andrew Andersen to Governor, 21 March 
-~ 1872. 
This was in spite of the equalising influences of 
merchant capital which had promoted a very thorough 
assimilation between incoming Orlams and the original 
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Nama-groups. These Orlam groups had met with pastoral 
people all the way from the Orange to the areas far north 
of the Swakop river. Among the Nama-soeaking people a 
process of assimilation (which probably had alread7 
begun in the 18th century) occurred fairly rapidly. ·Soon all 
their social energy was directed towards the reproduction 
of the kom~ando structure along Orl~m lines. 
The most bbvious distinguishing feature between these 
kommando groups and most inhabitants further north, in 
Damaraland, was wealth in cattle. As I demonstrated 
earlier wealth in cattle or the lack of it, may not simply 
be explained by reference to ecological restraintsT
9
as 
far as the Namaland kommando groups were concern~~ 
cattle breeding has to be seen as one aspect of
1 
the. total 
social process. In these groups, this process was 
structured by relations of production that were relations 
of exchange a. t the sarile time. In other wor~s, commodi ti-
sa tion had turned the focus of·. ;production away from pre-capitalist 
forms of accumulation (the accumulation of f6llowers and 
goods for use value .. ) to exhange V3.lue.;. 
At the same time, due to the nature of merchant capit~l, 
'a spli~ between the direct producers and the means of 
---------~-·--·-----
19. R. Moorsom: 'Proletarianisation', ch.3. 
production had pot occurred to any noticeable scale. 
As we saw, this led to the formatio:L of structures of 
underdevelopment by which the dependence on imported 
commoditie~ increased continually while skills. geared 
towards local self-sufficiency (materially and spiritually) 
19st their function and ceased to exist. As I showed, 
these included certain critical pastoral techniques. 
Broadly speaking where the .Namaland kommando groups were 
concerned, we can observe a decaying of ·pre-capitalist 
relations of production. 
Yet, it would seem that such a process was not happening 
among the northern cattle owners, even aft~r prolonged 
contact with the forces of merchant capital. It is 
important here not to confuse characteristics like 
language or cultural similarities with certain types of 
production relations. It appears that the preservation of 
pre-capitalist relations of production only coincided to 
a limited degree with the territory where the Herero 
language was spoken. 'Ethni6'classifications such as 
'the Hereros' do not serve to establish the nature of 
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existing differences adequately. Thus) Jonker Afrikaner 
had a very large number of Herero-speaking servant families, 
and so had other Orlam-groups, even as far south as 
20 Berseba and Bethany. 
20. RMS KPB IV, 1871. 
Alsor it is certain that evidence 
of such mixture within population groups will have 
been underpl~yed by 19th century m~sion~ries and other 
Europeans because this did not coincide readily with 
their own racial presumptions and prejudices. A 
very considerable number of Herera-speakers were 
occupying the stations Neu-Barmen and Otjimbingwe 
working for European traders or at the copper mines. 
These people had clearly been largely separated from 
the pre-capitalist p~oduction process. They were generally 
tending gardens and living off income from employment 
of various kinds. Their life was in no way structured 
by their position in the kinship group . 
Similarly, people who lived in Damaraland and had 
decided to ally themselves politically with lcical 
cattle-own~g chiefs were considered as Hereros even if 
they spoke Nama. When the question of differences between 
'Herera' and 'Nama' missionaries was discussed, Schrader 
mentioned in a letter to the Society that ''as far as 
Brother Bohm and the Ameibers are concerned llie was 
talking about Willem Swartbodi'sgroup· and their new 
missionary) it is to be noted that the latter have become 
Hereros due to the wars against the Namas ten years ago''· 
He also indicated that the same was true for Topnaars 
at the Bay and certain Hau-Khoi. who were living in 
Damaralanct. 21 
21. Quellen, 30, Schr6der to Society, 12 Aug. 1880 
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As the political conflicts show, the difference between 
those who owned and reproduced large herds of cattle 
and those who raided them was maintained in the relations 
between the Swartboois and Hereor-speaking chiets 22 even 
if for practical purposes they hadftbecome Hererosn. 
These confl.icts did not become manifest as 'ethnic' 
differ~nce or 'ethni~ conflict at all. Thus, to indicate 
that specifically pre-capitalist relations existed; 
I propose to talk about 'the northern cattle-owners' . 
. Although this term is inadequate in that it excludes all 
the northern cattle-herders, the followers, 'clients' and 
the women who together made up these formations, it seems 
to b~ the best term available for the time being. 
I am not arguing here that ~11 the ~urrents shaking Namaland 
and~areas further north left those cattle own-
ing.chiefs completely untouched. For instance, processes 
of community formation in certain areas began to resemble 
closely those we observed in Namaland. Thus, Hahn reported 
on a conversation he had with Kamaharero regarding a 
,; new station Otjizeva. "There those Hereros who have been 
freed from confinement by the Namas and have largely 
become Christians are supposed to consolidate. Maharero 
intended long ago to provide them with a missionary, not 
because he was conceY~d about their spiritual well-being 
but rather to keep those who ~riginalJy belonged to 
·-----··---------
22. On c~nflicts between Swartbooi and Kamaharero and 
his associates, see RMS KP 1870; CA GH 23/38, Reports and 
Correspondence on the-S'tate of Afi'airs in Damaraland 
and Great Namaqualand, in connection with the mission 




different tribes, togethern. 2 3 
Also, as Werner noted in a recent study, important items 
like guns and wagons came to be inherited outside of the 
more firmly established 'oruzo' and· 'eanda' kinship 
structures.
24 
In a similar vein, Kamaharero's 'paramountc-/' 
established by Andersson with the support of a very limited 
number of Herera-speakers (as we saw in the last chapter) 
came to be a permanent feature of political relations 
·.among andr within Herera-speaking clans and sub-clans . As 
other writers have asserted this continued to play a very 
important role in Leutwein's colonial 'divide et impera' 
politics.
25 
Ihus, while we cannot explore the subleties 
and implications of certain fundamental. changes that were 
taking place among the northern cattle owners and their 
followers at this time, we can still note that a 
dissolution of ~re-capitalist relations was apparently 
not taking place. 26 
Quite to the contrary, it seems that merchant capital 
penetration acted as a stimulus to cattle-breeding while 
structures of underdevelopment did not develop noticeably. 
This means that the basic material difference between the 
Namaland kommando groups and the cattle owners further 
nort~ (which I demonstrated was established in the first 
23. Q~~~le_Q_ 30, Hahn's Heimreise, 1873 
24. W. Werner: 'Inves tiga ti on', 35 
25. H. Drechsler: Fighting, 84-88 
26. Interestingly, W~rner's research conclusions pointed 
in the same direction, W. Werner: 'Investigation', 94-97 
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half of the 19th century) was maintained right through 
.the second half of the 19th century: t~e cattle owners 
reproduced their large herds, and the kommandos r'aided them. 
Before we consider some of the more ideologically based 
differences which were probably also maintained, we will 
briefly consider the evidence supporting such conclusions. 
Special Commissioner Palgrave noted in 1876 that whePever 
.he travelled in Damaraland, men and boys were carrying 
guns, mostly good rifles. It was only young boys who 
had old flint guns. He remarked that the gun market was 
completely overstocked, 6,000 guns were on offer for sale, 
"and not less, probably much more, than 20 tons of 
· gunpowder and a proportio.na te weight of lead". 27 
Two years later he was more explicit. In a letter to the 
Secretary fo~ Native Affairs he talked about the 
difficulties of trade. While ostrich feathers and 
iv6ry had increased tremendously in scarcity, the 
l· ~'Damaras' "long intercourse with white people has developed 
singularly few wants amongst them ... More than three-
fourths of the Damaras are without a single want the trader 
can gratify that would compel them to part with a sheep or 
goat from a herd of thousands-; and the wants of the other 
·~---...... _. __ . -·.-..---.----~~-
27. CA G,50~77: Palgrave: Report,22 
...... 
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fourth are limited to a little powder, and lead, and a 
11. ttle cloth1· ng ... 1128 B · d h h d t d b f th t es1 es, e a no e e ore a 
"those actively engaged in this trade, believe that it is 
not capable of any material extension 11 • 2 9 
In the early 1880s the situation had not changed. This 
becomes obvious in Hahn's letter, notwithstanding its 
optimistic tone. He said: "The Damara· is wide awake to 
what is profitable, and in a few years he will learn that 
it is to his interest to sell his cattle rather than to 
hoard them up as he now does 11 • 30 Hoarding, of course, 
is a very characteristic f6rm of pre-capitalist 
-·accumulation designed to secure followers or dependants 
but not commodities. 
At the beginning of the 1880s the kommandos of Namaland 
began raiding ._again_ probably bec8.use income· from the 
trade in ostr}ch feathers' and ivory was decreased due 
to the depletion of natural resources. In addition 
they had had opportunities to supply themselves anew with 
arms and ammunition. Thus, Kamaharero claimed that such 
kommandos (he in fact mentioned Jan Jonker and a whole 
number of associates) had raided ten of his cattle posts, 
28.u,BBNA(Cape), Palgrave: to Secretary, 1 July 1879. -
29. CA G. 50..J77, Palgra ve: Report, 8 3. 
30. CA GH 23/38, Correspondence, Hahn to Secretary, 
Ib March, 1882 . 
··' 
killing 20 men 31 . This was only the beginning. Yet, 
the circle of impoverishnent was not to be broken. The 
Special Commissioner noted that the Namaland kommandos 
had captured many thousands of head of cattle, but they 
were "now poorer than when the war broke out3 2 and 
they have nothing to pay the traders to whom they are 
deeply indebted for ammunition and guns~.33 As far as 
certain Herera-speaking chiefs were concerned they were 
still rich; some, he claimed,like Kambazembi, had lost 
. next to nothing. "Al though the loss in oxen alone is 
computed at some 30 000 head, that has not impoverished 
the Damaras who will in a few years make up for these 
losses. There is, perhaps, no people in the world who 
equal the Damaras as cattle breeders ... 11 34 
Here as in the conflicts of the 1860s the dividing line 
was not 'ethnic' .. For example, the group of Basters 
from the Cape who had settled at Rehoboth, finally allied 
• wai"' 
themselves~Kamaharero and his associates and stopped 
supporting Jan and his friends. Soon after this, a 
kornrnando headed by Jan stole 600 oxen,2 000 sheep as well 
as 26 horses from Rehoboth, killing two men 3: As 
frequently before, it was noted that the Kapteins of 




Ibid, Official Journal of British Resident, 24 Aug:-6 
Seot. 1880. 
Eu~opean commentators of course immedi~tely_ made this 
into a 'Hercro/Nama war'. 





35~ CA GiH 23/38, Coresspondence, Windhus. to Secretary, 7 M.J.rch 
T082 
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enter into negotiation · for peace". 36 We can proceed 
no further with the examination of these issues, but 
must look finally at possible ways of viewing the 
political-ideological manifestations of the distinctions 
between certain groups, especially in the light of 
evolving relations with the Cape Government. 
Hereo-speaking chiefs had begun to make independ@nt use 
of exchange relations with the Cape to support their own 
. positions of political power (like Kama:herero). The 1880s were 
not marked by any signs of a trend towards the dissolution 
or transformation of pre-capitalist relations of 
production. This meant that around the time of formal 
colonial occupation, the relations between the Namaland 
kommando groups and those northern cattle-owners were 
characterised by two major aspects. The one was that in 
spite of a commbn involvement in the same mercantile 
networks (which had been developing over the decades) 
the historically determined original differences between 
incoming Orlam-groups and Herero-speaking cattle owners 
were not suspended. Thus, whatever had separated those 
groups historically had not actually been overcome by 
·the ·common involvement in the Cape nexus. 
As I argu~d briefly in the preceding paragraphs, the 
roots of conflict stayed the same. On the political 
36. CA GH 23/38, Correspondence, Hahn to Secretary. 
lo· Marc.: h 18 8 2-:-·---------
362 
level, we can see this.inthat Herero-speaking chiefs 
seem never to have acquired insight into the forces of 
imperialism and the n~cessity to fight colonial domination 
which was one of the major political traditions of the 
kommando groups. Thus, while Kamaharero and his 
associates were very keen indeed to cooperate with 
Special Commissioner Palgrave and even invited the Cape 
Government in writing to annex Damaralanct 37 , the 'Namaqua' 
were reported to be "still sullenly hostile to our 
· exercise of any influence ;n the country".38 
liowever, the kom.T.ando groups also had a long history of 
collab.ora ting with the forces of imperialism, in order 
to ensure their own positions of dominance. We saw in the 
last chapter how eager the Kapteins of Berseba, Gibeon and 
Bethany had been to ally with Andersson and other 
Europeans to ~he detriment of the Afrikane~. Due to the 
. needs to consolidate positions of dominance' opportunities 
for combining with Herero-speaking chiefs were always 
present. ·This we saw manifested in the long friendship 
between Jonker and Tjimuaha. 
37.~BBNA (Cape) 1879, Palgrave to Secretary, 11 
Aug. 1878. See ?lso J. Davies: 'Palgrave and 
Damaraland' South African Yearbook, 18._42. 
38. GA-BBNA (Cape) 1879, .Palgrave to Secretary, . 26 June 
-1878. It does not seem appropriate to charge those 
Herero-speaking chiefs with political naivety. 
Kamaharero for instance, sternly refused to allow 
any European to pay any taxes:. especially the 
British Magj.strate. He said.: "You would take 
part of the land from me by allowing these men to 
pay taxes, and thus gain a right to land. 11 CA 
GH 23/38, Correspondence, meeting Hahn/Kamaharero 
14 Feb. J8F2. 
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Thus, despite all their differences, both Herero chiefs 
and Namaland Kapteins had a history of alliance and 
friendship and had been closely related at certain points 
in the past. The Cape Government was genuinely afraid 
that such a combination would unite the advanced military 
technology of the kommandos with the material resources 
of northern cattle owners. 
Palgrave once wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs 
about his grave worries that the "rebels of the Northern 
Border and Griqualand West", together with "Bastards, 
Namaquas and Korannas" would form an alli.__Jlnce and then 
gain the sympathy of Kamaharero and his associates. "Then", 
Palgrave argued "we may find that -0ur protectorate of the 
Damaras has exposed us to a war, the consequence· of which 
may be very serious". He also claimed that in recent 
years there had been a subs tan ti al influx of Griqualand West 
''re be ls'', "many of whom are Wa terboer 's people 11 into the 
country, where they: settled with other fugitives.3 9 
Quite apart from reflecting on the nature of relations 
between Namaland Kapteins and northern cattle owners, 
Palgrave's remarks betray a res.pect and fear of the kornmando 
groups all around the borders of the Cape Colony that 
might account for the Cape's very apparent reluctance to 
annex those territories. 
39.<..J.i.BBNA (Cape) 1879, Palgrave to Secretary, 28 Nov. 1878 -
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In the 6oncluding section I shall consider the nature 
of the kommando groups again and attempt to situate 
them in their historical and historiographical context. 
When the Orlam kommandos crossed the Orange River around 
the turn of the last century, a new historical epoch began 
for the people then inhabiting Namaland. Fairly rapidly, 
a process of fundamental transformation took place among 
the Nama-speaking pastoralists who populated these areas . 
. By the mid-1850s, they were reproducing the determining 
features of the kommando communities established by 
Orlam groups. Politically, as well, all references to 
earlier differences were given up. 
In the 1860s, almost a quarter century before the official 
annexation of South West Africa by Germany, major 
functions of control over territories, and people, were 
taken away fr,om the Namaland kommando gvrups led by the 
Afrikaners. The new powers in control were not other 
kommando groups, nor groups of Herera-speakers, but -
European traders 2nd missionaries. 
These suggestions should lea.d us to reconsider the notions 
of'primary resistance' or collaboration' which have 
• l!I 
played an influential role in African historiography since The 
1960s. 40 The Afrikaners and their associates put up an 
40. T .0. Ranger: 'Connections bet.ween 1 Primary Res1stance' 
movements and modern nationalism in East and Central 
Africa', Journal of African History, 1968, Parts I and II; 
A. and B .-Jsaacman; 'Resistance and Colla.boration in 
Southern and Centtal Africa, c. 1850-192a; International 
Journal of African Historical Studies, 10, 1~77. 
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arduous struggle lasting for almost seven years ag~inst 
the trader/missionary alliance. Their aims were strictly 
limited to their own interests which centred on the 
exploitation of Herero-speakers and the riches of the 
northern and eastern hunting veld. Yet, they were also 
resisting the political rightlessness and subordination 
which European imperialism began to impose on many 
Africans. Thus, this resistance was so multi-faceted 
that it is not easily labelled with a single term. It 
cannot be called 'primary' because it had progressive 
elements. It had itself a long history to it. The 
Orlam kommando groups partly emerged in the second half 
of the 18th century at the Cape. Through the 
kommando, the dispossessed indigenous inhabitants. of the 
Cape tried to find an alternative to accepting the 
subordinate roles available in the colony and immediately 
beyond its borders. This was not a resistance against 
colonialism itself but rather a refusal of the roles 
colonisation assigned to the indigenotis peoples. 
The alternatives found, however, were of such nature that 
thenceforth the newly-emerging kommando-groups thems~lves 
began to perform 'colonial' political and economic roles. 
As Legassick has indicated 41 , this was true for the 
-·--------------- .. -·--------~·-------
41 • See chapter 2, ftn. 4. 
:= 
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relations established between Griqua~ dnd Sotho-Tswaria 
peoples on the north-eastern frontier. My study strongly 
supports and extends such contentions as far as the 
relations between Orlam-groups and indigenous Name-speakers 
north of the Orange River were concerned. ~s indicated, 
,., 
·~,,..,. 
these relations were marked by a combination of conquest, 
forms of subjection and alliances between the parties 
concerned. Thus, the kommandos which fought the missionaries 
were already formed by a multitude of experiences of 
colonisation, conquest and the subordi e roles attached 
to it as:well _as of the str~ggle against it. The Orlams 
had partly come as colonisers to Namaland~ Yet their 
subjection of Nama groups was restricted to a limited 
loss of pastures and waterholes and did not involve long-
term relations of exploitation. Fundamental social and 
economic transformations of Nama groups involving des-
tructive dependencies came about in more indirect ways 
(which came to be shared by Nama and Orl~m alike). 
Through the agency of the kommando group, peoples beyond 
the borders of the Cape Colony ex6eri-en9ed _ forms' · 
of political, but also economic, subjection because they 
became incorporated into the expanding world market. 
Under the impact of the Orlam invasions, the original 
inhabitants of Namaland soon came to organise kornmandos 
themselves, and after roughly half a century, the kommando 
had replaced the kinship group as a means of political 
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identification. This resulted in processes of 
'underdevelopment'. ~hus, here we have a case in which 
'underdevelopment' may not be seen as a function of 
merchant capital penetration. . It may not be conceptualised 
on the level of exchange only. Nor, have I here found 
it possible to explain processes of impoverishment and the 
transformation of political and social structures by way 
of analysing an 'articul~tion of modes of production'. 
This is mostly due to the fact that in kommando groups, as 
bearers of merchant capital, old forces and relations 
of production did not entirely dissolve, and the development 
of capitalist relations was thus jeopardised. It was 
precisely this stalemate condition, reproduced by Nama 
groups, that made thefu unable to control and defeat the 
traders' and missionaries' claims for political and 
economic rights. Still, that struggle was clearly 
informed by an emerging awareness of the nature of the 
ever encroaching European imperialism. 
Lastly, mention must be made of 'ethnic' classifications. 
I was careful in my terminology to avoid terms like 'the-
Herero' or 'the Nama'. Still, I have not found it possible 
to abandon distinctions between groups of people which are 
seemingly based on differences in language or 'culture' 
alone. My study suggests that recent attempts to 
eliminate such distinctions as largely as possible 42cannot 
42. See for instance Loth: ~sion, R. Moorsom: 
Proletarianisatio~; SWAPO Department or Information: 
'Namlbia: People's Resistance-, 16'70-1970; Race 
and Class, 1980. ---
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be supported by an analysis of the pre-colonial period. 
However,. I hope to have made it clear that the remaining 
distinctions only coincided to an extent with those in 
language or 'culture' but were bj no means based on them. 
Rather, they appear to have been based on specific social 
and economic differences. As far as most Herera-speaking 
chiefs were concerned, they continued to focus on the 
incorporation of as many followers or clients· as possible 
through the hoarding of cattle. The focus of their social 
energies, certainly as far as the period up to the 1870s 
is concerned, were concentrated on the breeding of cattle 
in order to attract followers rather than in order to 
accumulate cattle for their exchange value, thu~ bn the 
reproduction of pre-capitalist relations of production. 
The kommando groups of Namaland, however, were not 
pastoralists but had specialised in extracting this 
cattle wealth. 
Therefore, we should not try to assume that the differences 
betw~en groups were only minimal, or did not exist at 
all. It is equally misleading to rely on the still 
prevalent view (originally proposed by Heinrich Vedder) 
that there was no discernible pattern in the pre-colonial 
violence. Rather it is necessary to make precise 
inquiries into the nature of the remaining 
differences and splits among the people of Damara-
land and Namaland. This is particularly so as 
far as the kommando groups t0emselves are concerned. It 
seems rather striking that fundamentally similar social 
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and economic structures should exist in various groups yet 
their separate political identity be maintained. For the 
period up to the 1870s the independent position of 
political power held by the Afrikaner alliance might 
account for this. It probably had a fuelling effect on 
competitive tendencies among the various Kapteins. 
However, post-1870 attempts to achieve a larger unity 
a:mong the kommandos such as those undertaken by Hendrik 
Witbooi, were also only partially successful. It seems to 
me that a thorough investigation into 'ideological' aspects 
of the kommando organisation over time, such as the 
formation of a groups consciousness not based on a 
capitalist ethic nor on kinship structures, could be use-
fully ·examined in this context. 
For the people of Namaland, Orlam, Hau-khoi and Nama 
alike, colonisation did not begin in 1884. Through forms 
of social organisation imposed by invading Orlams on 
original Nama inhabitants, from the beginning of the ltl~ 
century, political and social controls slipped out of 
these people's hands. When the power of the Afrikaners 
and their associates was broken by a European trader/ 
missiona~y alliance, this mark~d the final stages of 
po 'litical and economic independence for the inhabitants 
cf Nama-and Damaraland. At the same time, it indicated 
the actual beginning of colonial conquest and domination 
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I. UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL 
1. Windhoek State Archives 
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(a) List of the Andersson Papers by J.H. Davies, Archivist 
Pretoria. 
The Charles John Andersson Collection (on microfilm): 





Vol. 6 : 
··-,!.Vol. 9: 
Vol.10: 
Vo 1 . 11 : 
Diary 1850 March 15 - 1851.June 7. 
Diary 185Y June 8 - 1854 August 30. 
Diary 1857 - 1858 July 8. 
enclosed:. "Sundry Mero.a. copied from Mr. 
Frederick Green's Journals, pp.277-283, 
n.d. 1 ca. 1859. 
Diary 1861 December - 1862 November 
_Diary 1864 May - 1865 May 
enclosed: (i) Green & Hahn to Andersson 
May, 1864. 
(ii) Green to Swartbooi, 27 May 
1864 .. 
Diary 1865 June 1866 December , . 
enclosed: Hahn to Andersson, 2 November 1865 
Letter Book 
1857 March 4 - 1857 December 19 
Notebook 
1853 February 5 




- 18511 April 17 
"Short notes of the manners, 
customs, riligious rites, etc. 
of the Namaquas." 139-152 




(b) Quellen zur Geschichte Sudwestafrikas 













Zur Einfuhrung der Gemeindechronik Otjimbingwe 
Mundliche Mitteilungen von Eingeborenen uber 
die vorgeschichtliche Zeit 
Berichte von den Missionaren Garth und 
Sch6neberg uber Walfischbai, Otjimbingwe und 
Otjikango aus den Jahren 1851-1852. 
Berichte von Missionar Knudsen Uber Bethanien 
·und Namaland aus den Jahren 1844-1851 
Berichte von Samuel Hahn Uber Bethanien und 
Namaland aus den Jahren 1848-1852 
Berichte von Missionar H.H.Kreft ilber 
Bethanien und Namaland aus den Jahren 1853-1877 
Berichte des Mi~sionars F.H. Vollmer ~ber 
Rehoboth und Hoachanas aus den Jahren 1847-1866 
Berichte ube·r Gobabis, 1854-1880 
Berichte des Missionars J.G. Kr6nlein ilber 
Berseba aus den Jahren 1851-1870 
Auszilge aus dem Tagebuch von Franz Heinrich 
Kleinschmidt, 1842-1864 
Berichte von Missionar F.Heidmann uber Rehoboth 
aus den Jahren 1866-1879 
Tagebilcher Hugo Hahns uber zwei Reisen nach dem 
Ovamboland, 1857-1866 
Berichte uber Okahandja, Neubarmen, Walfisch-
bai, Otjimbingwe von den Missionaren 
F.W. Kolbe, 1848-1851 
C.G. Buttner, 1876 
P.H. Brincker, 1864-1870 
Sammelakten (varia) 
( c ) A . 8 Rust Co 11 e c t ion . 
Ryksboek, bevattende alle wetten en regten van het 
kapiteinskap te Bethani~ 
1. Het Boek der Ryks-Geskiedenis 
2. Het Boek der Wetten, en 
3. Het Boek van Aanmerkingen 
(Typ~d copy. Original temporarily lost.) 
(d) A.178 Notebook, containing 
(i) Traktaat van Hoachanas 
(ii) Account to James H.Morris,1868-1869 
(e) Palgrave's Album. Photographies 1876. 
2. Archives of the Rheinish Mission Society, Windhoek 
(a) I 1.1 Protokollbuch der Herero- und Namakonferenzen 
1844-1872. 
enclosed: (i) Hahn to ·society, 2 April 1852. 
(ii) Hahn, Brincker, Cloete, H~lbich 
to Society, 4 December 1865 
(b) I 1.8 Beilagen zu Konferenzprotokollen 
(Protokolle, Briefe, Mitteilungen) 
(c) I 1.9 Beilagen zu Konferenzprotokollen, 1868-1878 
Konferenz Mai 1868: 
Beilage I (Bohm on Ameib) 
Beilage II (Hahn on Otjimbingwe) 
IIa (Bericht von H~lbich and 
Baumann, Otjimbingewe) 
Beilage IV (Hahn, Otji~bingwe. 




Konferenz Mai 1870: 
Nachschrift) 
(Bohm.on Ameib 
(Accounts Otjimbingwe by 
H~lbich and Baumann) 
(Report be Redeker on 
agriculture in Otjimbingwe) 
Beilage II (Bohm on Ameib) 
Beilage III (Cloete on Omaruru) 
Konferenz June 1871: 
Beilage IV 
Beilage V 
(Schroder on Windhoek) 
(Hahn on Otjimbingwe) 









3. Cape Archives 
(a) A.2048 Carl Hugo Hahn Papers 
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Vol. 6: Correspondence Sivelius (Finnish Mission Society) 
to Hahn 
Correspondence Hahn to Society, 1862-1875 
Vol. 9: Diaries 
1 1837 November 15 - 1838 September 27 
·2 MISSING 
3 1845 January 30 - 1853 April 9 
4 1853 April 24 - 1855 October 31 
5 1856 January 1 - 1860 July 6 
. (b) "Angra Pequena and West Coast Claims Commission,1863-1885 11 , 
G.H. 21/i8 - 21/22 . 
(Evidence contained in manuscript 21/19 is largely printed 
in 21/21) 
(c) "Damara land, Walfish Bay and Great Namaqualand, 1865-1860", 
G.H. 19/10 
(d) G.H. · 14/1; 18/12; 1/777 
(e) C.O. l.f397 
(f) Prime Minister's Office 243 




Abraham and Christian Albrecht 
1805 January 20 - 1810 December 31 
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APPENDIX B 
TRAKTAAT VAN HOACHANAS, 1858 
'i. There shall be no right of self-defence in a serious war but resort 
must be had to an impartial Kaptein as arbitrator. 
ii. Failure by the party found guilty to obey the decision of the 
arbitrator, to pay a fine or to suffer punishment, shall lead to all 
the signatories of thii.: treaty combining to take up arms and 
punishing him. 
iii. No commando raids arc to take place against the Dam:ins without 
cause, and any members of the tribe undertaking any raid~ of their 
ovm accord shall be punished. 
iv. No junior official shall deal \Vith important matters without the 
consent of the Kaptein, and no one shall take the iaw into his own 
hands. 
• v. No Kaptein shall permit copper mining in his territory without 
the consent of all Kaptcins. _ 
vi. No Kaptein shall sell lt:nd to any white person of the Cape Colony. 
The seller shall be punished with a heavy fine and the purchaser 
shall pay damages unless he was unaware of this bw. It is agreed 
that the signatories shail come to the assistance of the Griquas, in 
case of need, in any serious wars. 
vii. Provision is m::i.dc fo~ mutual extradition of offenders. 
viii. No Kaptein shali take to arms without written proof of hostile acts. 
ix. Murder trials shall take place by the Kaptein of the tribe ~cting 
with two or three impartial -Kapteins. 
x. Provision shall be made for an annual meeting of a!l the Kapteins 
for the preservation of land and people. 
xi. An appeal may be lodged by any member of a tribe from a sentence 
by his Kaptein, to the other Kapteins. 
xii. Any member of a tribe may lodge a complaint against his Kaptcin 
with the other treaty Kaptcins, who shall investigate, ~.nd, if need 
be, punish the gui!ty Kapteins.' 
This document is notc\Yorthy in a number of respects. In so far as rights 
of indi'·ddual members in a tribe are concerned it provided for protection 
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APPENDIX A 
JAN AFRIKANER AND HIS RAAD 
Afrikaner Women 
Frqm: Pa.lgrave's ... Album, .Windhoek State Archives 1876 ' . . 
